

**Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System
Management & Operating Contractor**

Waste Package Degradation Process Model Report

TDR-WIS-MD-000002 REV 00 ICN 02

December 2000

Prepared for:

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


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


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CHANGE HISTORY

Revision Number	Interim Change Notice (ICN)	Description of Change
00	00	Initial issue
00	01	<p>Substantive technical changes are limited to Section 3.1.7 (stress corrosion cracking) and WAPDEG Analysis (Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.4, and 3.2.5) results. Stress threshold and uncertainty ranges in the stress corrosion cracking model were changed in response to DOE review comments.</p> <p>Minor changes are primarily nontechnical editorial changes throughout the document including reference citations and clarification statements. Changes are designated by a change bar in the right margin.</p>
00	02	<p>Changes are made to address effects of the design change from the backfill to no backfill. Most technical changes are for the affected process models, stress corrosion cracking (Section 3.1.7) and hydrogen-induced cracking (Section 3.1.8), and associated model abstractions (Sections 3.2.4, 3.2.5, 3.2.7). Other technical changes are made to update process models and associated model abstractions to incorporate the latest data and analyses (Sections 3.1.2, 3.2.2, 3.2.6).</p> <p>Minor changes are primarily nontechnical editorial changes throughout the document including clarification statements. Changes are designated by a change bar in the right margin.</p> <p>The references listed below have been added to the reference list:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASM International 1990 – (TIC: 239807) • CRWMS M&O 1994b – (ACC: NNA.19940413.0033) • CRWMS M&O 1998c – (ACC: MOL.19981208.0099) • CRWMS M&O 2000p – (ACC: MOL.20000418.0818) • CRWMS M&O 2000y – (ACC: MOL.20001121.0040) • CRWMS M&O 2000z – (ACC: MOL.20000526.0336) • CRWMS M&O 2000aa – (ACC: MOL.20000727.0092) • CRWMS M&O 2000ab – (ACC: MOL.20001031.0062) • CRWMS M&O 2000ad – (ACC: MOL.20000823.0002) • CRWMS M&O 2000ae – (ACC: MOL.20001005.0282)

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- Dyer 1999 (ACC: MOL.19990910.0079)
- Haynes 1993 (TIC: 239935)
- Lu 1996 (Library Tracking Number-247903)
- B00000000-01717-1705-00003 REV 00 ICN 01
(ACC: MOL.19991117.0160)
- ASTM B 443-93. 1995 (TIC: 237693)
- ASTM B 575-99a. 1999 (TIC: 247534)
- MO9910SPAFWPWF.001
- QAP-2-1 (ACC: MOL.19991109.0221)
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A crucial element of the long-term postclosure safety strategy for the potential monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain is to contain high-level radioactive waste, and to keep that waste and its container as dry as possible. This report is one of nine Process Model Reports developed to address the technical basis supporting the Total System Performance Assessment model. These Process Model Reports are supported by Analysis and Model Reports that contain more detailed technical information.

The waste package is a major component of the engineered barrier system and contributes to isolation of high-level radioactive waste during the preclosure and postclosure periods. It also reduces the uncertainties associated with performance of the repository. As a result, the integrity of the waste package and the drip shield have been designated as “Principal Factors” important to the repository safety strategy. The waste package, protected by a drip shield, will be subjected to degradation processes in the repository that will eventually impact postclosure performance. Some of the important conditions contributing to waste package degradation include: humidity and temperature in the emplacement drift; chemistry of the dripping water; and the corrosion susceptibility of the waste package materials. Eight process-level models or analyses, four abstraction models, and two engineering calculations were developed and documented in individual Analysis Model Reports or Calculations. This Process Model Report provides a summary of process-level and abstraction models, as well as a summary of their utilization in the integrated waste package degradation model contained in the WAPDEG code.

This report also includes discussions on the features, events, and processes relevant to the performance of the waste package materials. These features, events, and processes that are deemed important to repository performance are evaluated, either as components for the Total System Performance Assessment, or as separate analyses in the Analysis Model Reports.

In addition to describing the process-level and abstraction models, this Process Model Report addresses two of the Key Technical Issues in the Issue Resolution Status Report prepared by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. These issues are the Container Life and Source Term, and the Total System Performance Assessment and Integration. Several subissues that relate directly to the waste package are discussed in this Process Model Report, along with the approach used by the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project to meet the acceptance criteria for each of the Key Technical Issues.

This Process Model Report also addresses relevant issues identified by other agencies and organizations, including the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board.

The integrated waste package model incorporated into the WAPDEG code was used to develop the results documented in this Process Model Report. The analyses have shown that both the drip shield and waste packages do not experience failures within the regulatory time period (10,000 years).

The materials selected for the drip shield and waste package outer barrier, Titanium Grade 7 and Alloy 22 respectively, are highly corrosion resistant under the repository exposure conditions.

Both the drip shield and waste package degrade by general corrosion at very low rates. However, degradation modes such as localized corrosion (pitting and crevice corrosion), stress corrosion cracking, and hydrogen-induced cracking could lead to early failure of the waste package or drip shield, if any of the degradation modes is initiated. Fortunately, the selected materials appear to be immune to localized corrosion under repository-relevant conditions. With appropriate processing, the initiation of stress corrosion cracking and hydrogen-induced cracking (in the case of Titanium Grade 7) are delayed to a point where acceptable repository performance is achieved. To preclude stress corrosion cracking, post-weld stress mitigation processes will be implemented on the closure welds of the dual-closure-lid waste package. The compressive layer that is needed to preclude stress corrosion cracking is produced by either one of two post-weld stress mitigation processes, laser peening or localized induction annealing. The life of the waste package is determined by the time required to remove the mitigated layer of material at each weld by general corrosion.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMR	Analysis Model Report
ASM	American Society for Metals
ASTM	American Society for Testing and Materials
CDF	cumulative distribution function
CLST	container life and source term
CRWMS	Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System
DCPD	direct current potential drop
DIRS	Document Input Reference System
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DTN	data tracking number
EBS	engineered barrier system
EDA	Enhanced Design Alternative
FEP	features, events, and processes
HAZ	heat-affected zone
HIC	hydrogen-induced cracking
IRSR	Issue Resolution Status Report
KTI	key technical issue
LLNL	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LTCTF	Long-Term Corrosion Test Facility
mV	millivolts
NG	Nuclear Grade
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NWTRB	Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board
PMR	Process Model Report
PND	probability of nondetection
ppm	parts per million

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

QA	quality assurance	
RH	relative humidity	
SCC	stress corrosion cracking	
SCE	saturated calomel electrode	
TSPA	Total System Performance Assessment	
TSPA-SR	Total System Performance Assessment-Site Recommendation	
TSPA-VA	Total System Performance Assessment-Viability Assessment	
YMP	Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project	

1. INTRODUCTION

A crucial element of the long-term postclosure safety strategy for the potential monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain is to contain high-level radioactive waste, and to keep that waste and its container as dry as possible. There are several degradation processes that could impact the performance of the engineered barrier system (EBS). The role of this Process Model Report (PMR) is to describe one of the process-level models (Waste Package Degradation) utilized to evaluate these degradation processes. To evaluate the postclosure performance of the monitored geologic repository proposed for construction at Yucca Mountain, a Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA) will be conducted. A set of nine PMRs, of which this document is one, is being developed to summarize the technical basis for process-level models supporting the TSPA model. These reports cover the following areas:

- Integrated Site Model
- Unsaturated Zone Flow and Transport
- Near-Field Environment
- EBS Degradation, Flow, and Transport
- Waste Package Degradation
- Waste Form Degradation
- Saturated Zone Flow and Transport
- Biosphere
- Disruptive Events.

These PMRs are supported by several Analysis Model Reports (AMRs) that contain more detailed technical information. This technical information consists of data, analyses, models, software, and other documentation necessary to defend the applicability of each model for its intended purpose. The PMR is intended to ensure the traceability of waste package degradation information from its various sources through the AMRs, PMRs, and eventually TSPA.

As described in the *Monitored Geologic Repository Project Description Document*, the recommended waste package design is *Enhanced Design Alternative II* (CRWMS M&O 2000ab, Section 1.3).

The Enhanced Design Alternative II (EDA II) waste package design is the reverse of the Viability Assessment design. In EDA II, the corrosion-resistant material protects the underlying structural material from corrosion, while the structural material supports the thinner, more expensive corrosion-resistant material. As shown in Figure 1-1, this design includes a double-wall waste package made from Alloy 22 and 316 nuclear grade (NG) stainless steel. The waste package is placed underneath a protective drip shield made of a titanium-based alloy, as shown in Figure 1-2.




Figure 1-1. Waste Package




Figure 1-2. A View of a Typical In-Drift Placement of Waste Packages

EDA II uses thermal management features (line loading, ventilation, and blending) to limit peak temperatures of cladding, the waste package shell, and the drift wall. This produces more uniform temperature along the drifts, and margin in meeting requirements for cladding integrity, drift stability, and avoidance of phase instability in the waste package materials. Figure 1-2 shows a typical layout of an in-drift placement of three types of waste packages. Note that drip shields will be placed over the waste packages just before repository closure to provide protection from dripping water and rock fall.

The purpose of this PMR is to account for the degradation of waste package materials under conditions expected at the Yucca Mountain site, which is being evaluated as a possible geologic repository for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste. Data pertaining to waste package material degradation are presented in supporting AMRs. Functional summaries of the component models and their respective output are provided in Section 1.4. This report was developed in accordance with the technical work plan *Waste Package Degradation Process Model Report for Site Recommendation* (CRWMS M&O 2000y).

Each of the process-level models described in the Waste Package Degradation PMR accounts for a different degradation process, all of which are integrated in the waste package degradation code (WAPDEG) (CRWMS M&O 2000g). Each model was developed using unique methodologies and inputs, with the determination of that model dependent on the functional requirements of the waste package component being represented.

In January 2000, the Project modified the repository design. The changes instituted involve removing backfill from the reference design and reorienting the drifts to minimize the impacts of the rockfall. AMRs impacted by the removal of the backfill include those that describe:

- Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) of the Drip Shield, the Waste Package Outer Barrier and the Stainless Steel Structural Material
- Hydrogen-Induced Cracking (HIC) of Drip Shield
- Abstraction of Models for the SCC of Drip Shield and Waste Package Outer Barrier and HIC of Drip Shield
- Features, events, and processes (FEPs) Screening of Processes and Issues in Drip Shield and Waste Package Degradation
- WAPDEG Analysis of Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation.

The affected AMRs have been revised to document additional analyses for the no backfill design option. The updated analyses indicate that any stress corrosion cracks in the drip shield will not result in the direct dripping of water onto the waste package because the cracks will become plugged with corrosion products (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5.5). While this cracking constitutes failure of the drip shield, it is expected to continue to maintain its intended design function of keeping the water away from the waste package.

1.1 OBJECTIVES

1.1.1 Objectives of this Report

The objectives of this report are to document degradation models for the waste package and drip shield material with specific regard to the data input methodologies used to construct the model, uncertainties and limitations of the modeling results, and validation of the model. This report summarizes the following:

- Sources of data input
- Methodologies used to construct the model components
- Modeling results, uncertainties, and limitations.

Assumptions that are specific to the individual models are listed in Chapter 3. Additional details of model assumptions can be found in Chapter 5 of the individual supporting AMRs.

1.1.2 Purpose of the Analysis and Model Reports

The primary purpose of the supporting AMRs is to provide detailed documentation of the process-level models necessary for predicting the performance of the waste package and drip shield materials in environments relevant to the Yucca Mountain repository. These models enable engineers and scientists to predict the release of radionuclides from the waste package, and their transport in the unsaturated and saturated zones. Figure 1-3 shows the model inputs,

outputs and the laboratory test information that forms the bases for the confidence in the model results.




Figure 1-3. Model Confidence Foundation

At the base of the model confidence foundation are the data generated from various testing programs; then, data along with other input parameters related to the repository design and expected environment are used in the development of degradation process models. The output from these models are calculated lifetimes for the waste packages and drip shields.

1.2 SCOPE

The Waste Package Degradation PMR describes processes that will lead to degradation of the waste package components within the near-field environment. Specific technical information contained in the Waste Package Degradation PMR consists of data, analyses, models, software, and supporting documents. This report also provides a technical basis for the applicability of the overall integrated model for its intended purpose of evaluating postclosure performance of the Yucca Mountain repository system.

The Waste Package Degradation PMR provides information about important factors that affect waste package and drip shield lifetimes. This PMR uses inputs from companion documents, including the license application design selection report, which describes the EDA II design and

expected temperature history for the waste package in the repository (CRWMS M&O 2000ab, Section 1.3).

Chapter 2 of this PMR describes the evolution of the waste package degradation model. Details of the individual models and analyses are provided in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 describes the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Issue Resolution Status Report (IRSR), which serves as a driver for much of the work that is discussed. Acceptance criteria and responses to these criteria are addressed in this chapter. Summary and conclusions are provided in Chapter 5.

1.3 PRINCIPAL FACTORS AND OTHER FACTORS CONSIDERED

The magnitude of the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project (YMP) and the complexities associated with both the natural and EBSs dictate that the YMP prioritize its activities and focus on the factors most important to performance, hereafter named the Principal Factors. *The Repository Safety Strategy: Plan to Prepare the Postclosure Safety Case to Support Yucca Mountain Site Recommendation and Licensing Considerations* (CRWMS M&O 2000w) has identified seven (7) Principal Factors and twenty (20) Other Factors of second-order importance. The selection of the Principal Factors was based on preliminary TSPA analyses and expert judgment, which showed that these factors significantly affect the performance of the potential repository (CRWMS M&O 2000w). The Other Factors were deemed to have minimal impact on the repository performance in terms of dose to the accessible environment. Table 1-1 lists the seven (7) Principal Factors, the twenty (20) Other Factors, and the PMRs that address each factor. Specific Principal Factors discussed in this report are:

- Performance of the Waste Package Barriers
- Performance of the Drip Shield.

Performance of the waste package barriers is a principal factor for the postclosure safety case because it defines the timing and amount of water transmitted into the waste package, and thereby controls the rate of release of radionuclides.

Performance of the drip shield is a principal factor for the postclosure safety case because it represents the diversion of seepage away from the waste package. This factor defines the timing and amount of water transmitted through the drip shield.

General guidelines dictate that the YMP bound the effects of the Other Factors, when possible, and perform analyses that are conservative. Principal Factors are to be studied and evaluated more thoroughly, using both realistic evaluations and bounding analyses.

Table 1-1. Principal Factors, Other Factors, and the PMRs Where Addressed

Principal Factor (Nominal Scenario)	Process Model Report
Seepage into drifts	Unsaturated Zone Flow and Transport
Performance of the drip shield	Waste Package Degradation
Performance of the waste package barriers	Waste Package Degradation
Solubility limits of dissolved radionuclides	Waste Form Degradation
Retardation of radionuclide migration in the unsaturated zone	Unsaturated Zone Flow and Transport
Retardation of radionuclide migration in the saturated zone	Saturated Zone Flow and Transport
Dilution of radionuclide concentrations during migration	Saturated Zone Flow and Transport
Other Factors (Nominal Scenario)	
Climate	Unsaturated Zone Flow and Transport
Net Infiltration into the mountain	Unsaturated Zone Flow and Transport
Unsaturated zone flow above the repository	Unsaturated Zone Flow and Transport
Coupled processes - effects on unsaturated zone flow	Unsaturated Zone Flow and Transport
Coupled processes - effects on seepage	Near Field Environment
Environments on the drip shield	EBS Degradation, Flow, and Transport
Environments on the waste package	EBS Degradation, Flow, and Transport
Environments within the waste package	Waste Form Degradation
Commercial spent nuclear fuel waste form performance	Waste Form Degradation
Defense high-level waste glass waste form performance	Waste Form Degradation
DOE spent nuclear fuel, Navy fuel, Pu disposition waste form performance	Waste Form Degradation
Colloid-associated radionuclide concentrations	Waste Form Degradation
In-package radionuclide transport	Waste Form Degradation
Transport through the drift invert	EBS Degradation, Flow, and Transport
Advective pathways in the unsaturated zone	Unsaturated Zone Flow and Transport
Colloid-facilitated transport in the unsaturated zone	Unsaturated Zone Flow and Transport
Coupled processes – effects on unsaturated zone transport	Unsaturated Zone Flow and Transport
Advective pathways in the saturated zone	Saturated Zone Flow and Transport
Colloid-facilitated transport in the saturated zone	Saturated Zone Flow and Transport
Biosphere transport and uptake	Biosphere
Factors For Disruptive Event Scenarios	
To be determined; see Section 3.5 for preliminary considerations (CRWMS M&O 2000w)	Disruptive Events

1.4 QUALITY ASSURANCE

The Quality Assurance program applies to this analysis. All types of waste package designs were classified as per *Classification of Permanent Items*, QAP-2-3 as Quality Level 1. This report applies to all of the waste package designs included in the Monitored Geologic Repository Classification Analyses. *Classification of the MGR Uncanistered Spent Nuclear Fuel Disposal Container System* (CRWMS M&O 1999c) is cited as an example of a waste package type.

The development of this report is conducted under the activity evaluation *1111213PM1 Waste Package Material Testing and Analysis for Site Recommendation* under the technical work plan *Waste Package Degradation Process Model Report for Site Recommendation* (CRWMS M&O 2000y), which was prepared per AP-2.21Q, *Quality Determinations and Planning for Scientific, Engineering, and Regulatory Compliance Activities*. The results of this evaluation indicate that the activity is subject to the *Quality Assurance Requirements and Description* (DOE 2000) requirements. The methods used to control the electronic management of data as required by AP-SV.1Q, *Control of the Electronic Management of Information*, was accomplished in accordance with this plan.

The Waste Package Degradation PMR was prepared in accordance with AP-3.11Q, *Technical Reports*, and reviewed in accordance with AP-2.14Q, *Review of Technical Products and Data*. The AMRs that support this PMR were prepared in accordance with AP-3.10Q, *Analyses and Models*.

The status of the data supporting this PMR is included in the supporting AMRs and in the Document Input Reference System (DIRS) database. The data are incorporated in the Technical Data Management System. Data verification and qualification were carried out in accordance with procedures AP-3.15Q, *Managing Technical Product Inputs* and AP-SIII.2Q, *Qualification of Unqualified Data and the Documentation of Rationale for Accepted Data*, respectively.

No software codes were used directly in the development of this PMR. However, this report does include the results from software codes used in the supporting AMRs.

Version 5.3 of ANSYS, which is a finite element analysis code used for thermal and stress analyses, was used to develop data cited in SCC of the Drip Shield, the Waste Package Outer Barrier, and the Stainless Steel Structural Material (CRWMS M&O 2000f).

Version 3.1 of pcCRACK is a fracture mechanics code used for stress intensity and crack growth simulation analyses. This code was also used to develop data cited in the SCC of the Drip Shield, the Waste Package Outer Barrier, and the Stainless Steel Structural Material (CRWMS M&O 2000f).

Version 4.0 of WAPDEG is used to determine waste package and drip shield failure fractions as a function of time. Version 4.0 of WAPDEG is an appropriate tool for this application, because it was specifically designed to produce drip shield and waste package degradation profiles in a manner consistent with the information requirements for implementation in the TSPA model (CRWMS M&O 2000ah). Version 4.0 of WAPDEG was used within the range of values for which it was validated (CRWMS M&O 2000g). Details of the use of this code are provided in the AMR on *WAPDEG Analysis of Waste Package and Drip Shield* (CRWMS M&O 2000g).

1.5 WASTE PACKAGE DEGRADATION PROCESS AND ABSTRACTION MODELS

The integrated model for waste package and drip shield degradation consists of several individual process-level and abstraction models, as well as some numerical analyses.

In all, eight (8) process-level models, six (6) abstraction models, and two (2) engineering calculations were developed and documented in individual AMRs or Calculations. These are

listed below. As noted later, two of the six abstraction model AMRs are not used as input to the waste package degradation analysis.

Process-Level Model Analyses:

- Analysis of Mechanisms for Early Waste Package *Failure*, Document Identifier DI # ANL-EBS-MD-000023 (CRWMS M&O 2000m)
- *Environment on the Surface of the Drip Shield and Waste Package Outer Barrier*, DI # ANL-EBS-MD-000001 (CRWMS M&O 2000a)
- *Aging and Phase Stability of Waste Package Outer Barrier*, DI # ANL-EBS-MD-000002 (CRWMS M&O 2000b)
- *General Corrosion and Localized Corrosion of Waste Package Outer Barrier*, DI # ANL-EBS-MD-000003 (CRWMS M&O 2000c)
- *General Corrosion and Localized Corrosion of the Drip Shield*, DI # ANL-EBS-MD-000004 (CRWMS M&O 2000d)
- *Stress Corrosion Cracking of the Drip Shield, the Waste Package Outer Barrier and the Stainless Steel Structural Material*, DI # ANL-EBS-MD-000005 (CRWMS M&O 2000f)
- *Hydrogen-Induced Cracking of Drip Shield*, DI # ANL-EBS-MD-000006 (CRWMS M&O 2000h)
- *Degradation of Stainless Steel Structural Material*, DI # ANL-EBS-MD-000007 (CRWMS M&O 2000e)

Abstraction Models and Calculations:

- *WAPDEG Analysis of Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation*, DI # ANL-EBS-PA-000001 (CRWMS M&O 2000g)
- *FEPs Screening of Processes and Issues in Drip Shield and Waste Package Degradation*, DI # ANL-EBS-PA-000002 (CRWMS M&O 2000s)
- *Abstraction of Models for Pitting and Crevice Corrosion of Drip Shield and Waste Package Outer Barrier*, DI # ANL-EBS-PA-000003 (CRWMS M&O 2000n)
- *Abstraction of Models of Stress Corrosion Cracking of Drip Shield and Waste Package Outer Barrier and Hydrogen-Induced Corrosion of Drip Shield*, DI # ANL-EBS-PA-000004 (CRWMS M&O 2000j)
- *Abstraction of Models for Stainless Steel Structural Material Degradation*, DI # ANL-EBS-PA-000005 (CRWMS M&O 2000o)

- *Incorporation of Uncertainty and Variability of Drip Shield and Waste Package Degradation in WAPDEG Analysis*, DI # ANL-EBS-MD-000036 (CRWMS M&O 2000p)
- *Calculation of General Corrosion Rate of Drip Shield and Waste Package Outer Barrier to Support WAPDEG Analysis*, DI # CAL-EBS-PA-000002 (CRWMS M&O 2000i)
- *Calculation of Probability and Size of Defect Flaws in Waste Package Closure Welds to Support WAPDEG Analysis*, DI # CAL-EBS-PA-000003 (CRWMS M&O 2000k)

Results from the last two AMRs (CRWMS M&O 2000o and CRWMS M&O 2000p) are not being used as input to the waste package degradation nominal case analysis (see Section 3.2.7). These two reports are omitted as input since the stainless steel inner shell is not considered to be a corrosion barrier in the waste package degradation analysis (Section 3.2.7). Thus, it is not assigned any performance credit. The AMR on uncertainty and variability requires additional data to further develop the model, and will be included in the next major revision of the PMR. For this PMR, uncertainty and variability are included in the bounding approach used for process-level and abstraction models.

Figure 1-4 shows the elements of the integrated model, and interrelationships among the various process-level models and the AMRs that comprise it. Related phenomena are logically grouped in the process-level models. For example, the process-level model for general corrosion and localized corrosion of the waste package outer barrier includes dry oxidation, humid air corrosion, and expected environment on the surface. A brief overview of each of these models is presented below. Details of the process-level and abstraction models are presented in the AMRs and in Chapter 3.

1.5.1 Environment on the Surface of Drip Shield and Waste Package Outer Barrier

Information on the surface environment provided below is based on the supporting AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000a, Section 1.2) and is discussed in greater detail in Section 3.1.3. This process-level model addresses the evolution of the chemistry of the water film on the drip shield and waste package outer barrier as a function of temperature and relative humidity (RH). The concentrations of aqueous salt solutions that can form on the hot waste package surface are being determined experimentally and theoretically (based upon chemical thermodynamics). These concentrations define the medium for testing waste package materials under a bounding scenario. An example is the development of a simulated saturated J-13 well water with an elevated boiling point (120-127°C). Hygroscopic salts may be deposited on surfaces by seepage water and episodic water flow, as well as by dust and aerosols entrained in ventilation air. The deliquescence point of these salts determines the RH at which humid-air and aqueous-phase corrosion commences.

Abstracted models are developed for the evolution of environments on the exposed surfaces of the drip shield and waste package outer barrier as a function of time and location within the repository. These abstracted models are in forms that are suitable as inputs to the WAPDEG analysis and include the uncertainty and variability of exposure conditions. Additional information on the WAPDEG is presented in Section 3.2.7.




Figure 1-4. Schematic Representation of the Elements of Process Models Interrelationships Among the Process Models and the AMRs Containing These Models

1.5.2 Mechanisms for Early Failures and Manufacturing Defects

Information on early failures provided below is based on the supporting AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000m, Section 6) and is described in greater detail in Section 3.1.2. This analysis addresses the potential for early failures of the waste package due to material defects, as well as defects from waste package fabrication processes. These fabrication processes include welding. The probability of waste package fabrication defects, their uncertainty and variability, and the consequences of the defects on waste package failure (e.g., number of manufacturing defects and size distribution) are discussed.

Abstracted calculations are developed for the occurrence and size distribution of defects in the waste package closure welds. Abstracted calculations include uncertainty and variability of the above properties.

1.5.3 Aging and Phase Stability of Waste Package Outer Barrier

Information on aging and phase stability provided below is based on the supporting AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000b, Section 6) and is described in greater detail in Section 3.1.4. This process-level model addresses degradation of the waste package outer barrier resulting from exposure to elevated temperatures. In the case of Alloy 22 and related materials, such thermal histories can result in the formation of precipitates (μ , P, σ phases) and other undesirable phases. The precipitates can form within the individual grains or at grain boundaries. Precipitation can cause embrittlement, thereby increasing susceptibility to damage by rockfall and mechanical impact. Since these precipitates may be rich in molybdenum and chromium, two of the alloying elements responsible for the high degree of passivity of Alloy 22, aging can also result in increased susceptibility to general and localized corrosion, as well as to SCC. The time-temperature-transformation curve and an expression for estimating the volume fraction of precipitates in the grain boundary have been developed for Alloy 22. Estimates of uncertainty are made. The effect of aging on corrosion has been addressed, and has been determined to be a corrosion enhancement factor of approximately 2.5 for the fully aged material.

1.5.4 General Corrosion and Localized Corrosion

Information on corrosion provided below is based on three separate supporting AMRs (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6; 2000d, Section 6; and 2000e, Section 6) and is described in greater detail in Sections 3.1.5 and 3.1.6. Three separate process-level models were developed to address general corrosion and localized corrosion of the drip shield, waste package outer barrier, and stainless steel structural support, respectively. The current design uses Titanium Grade 7 as the drip shield, Alloy 22 as the waste package outer barrier, and 316NG stainless steel as the inner structural shell. Each of these models includes sub-models for dry air oxidation, humid air corrosion, general corrosion in the aqueous phase, and localized corrosion in the aqueous phase. Note that “dry oxidation” and “dry air oxidation” are synonymous terms. While the stainless steel structural shell is not specifically intended to be a corrosion barrier, it may affect the chemistry of water entering the waste package and retard the rate of radionuclide release from the breached waste package. Given the limited availability of data for 316NG stainless steel, data for 316L stainless steel are used as representative. This is appropriate since the compositions of these two materials are very similar, and since their susceptibilities to corrosion

are known to be similar. Microbial corrosion is addressed in the section devoted to localized corrosion (Section 3.1.6.8).

1.5.4.1 Dry Oxidation

The process-level model for corrosion of the drip shield and waste package materials includes a sub-model for dry air oxidation. It is assumed that dry air oxidation can be treated as a type of general corrosion, with uniform attack. To the extent possible, the rates of dry air oxidation are estimated as a function of temperature.

1.5.4.2 Humid Air Corrosion and Vapor Phase Corrosion

The process-level model for corrosion of the drip shield and waste package materials accounts for humid air and vapor phase corrosion. These modes of corrosion are also treated as a type of general corrosion. To the extent possible, rates of humid air and vapor phase corrosion are estimated with the associated uncertainty. For the drip shield and waste package outer barrier, the same general corrosion rate distribution is used for both the humid air and aqueous phase corrosion.

1.5.4.3 Aqueous Phase Corrosion

The process-level model for aqueous phase corrosion of the drip shield and waste package accounts for both general and localized attack. Two models for the initiation of localized corrosion are considered (Methods A and B). In Method A, the threshold potential for localized attack of the material is determined from cyclic polarization data obtained with relevant test environments. These environments include simulated dilute water, simulated concentrated water and simulated acidic concentrated water at 30, 60, and 90°C, as well as simulated saturated water at 100 and 120°C. The compositions of simulated dilute water and simulated acidic concentrated water are 10X and 1,000X concentrations of J-13 well water, respectively. More recently, basic saturated water has been included in the set of standard test media. Localized corrosion rates based on literature data are invoked when the expected open circuit corrosion potential exceeds the threshold potential. Since pitting has not been observed in laboratory experiments at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the primary mode of localized corrosion is expected to be crevice corrosion. If the threshold for localized corrosion is not exceeded, it is assumed that the mode of attack is general corrosion. General corrosion rates are estimated from various sources of available test data, including weight loss measurements from the Long Term Corrosion Test Facility. In Method B, a threshold temperature for localized attack at the open circuit corrosion potential is determined from published literature data or from tests at elevated temperature and pressure. The same rates of localized corrosion are used in Method B as used in Method A. This aqueous phase corrosion model will be applied to each unit area of the waste package exterior surface.

Abstracted models have been developed to account for general corrosion of the drip shield and waste package materials. These abstractions are similar to the process-level models. The abstracted models include thresholds for initiation of various modes of corrosion, as well as the corresponding rates of penetration. The abstracted models are in forms that are suitable for input to the WAPDEG analysis. The RH threshold for initiation of humid air corrosion and aqueous

phase corrosion are included, as well as the electrochemical potential for initiation of localized attack during aqueous phase corrosion. In the case of the drip shield and waste package outer barrier, distributions of general corrosion rates are based upon data from the Long Term Corrosion Test Facility. Because no localized corrosion was observed on Alloy 22 and Titanium Grade 7 samples tested under repository-related conditions, published data are used as the basis of estimating localized corrosion rates. As discussed in Section 3.1.6.7 (Tables 3-11 and 3-12), the published data used are for highly corrosive conditions that are not expected in the repository. Both general and localized corrosion rates of 316NG stainless steel are based upon published data. Estimates of the uncertainty and variability of each quantity are provided. When localized corrosion occurs, it is assumed to occur over an entire WAPDEG patch (element).

1.5.5 Stress Corrosion Cracking

The process-level model for the SCC is documented in the corresponding AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6) and is summarized in Section 3.1.7. SCC of materials may occur when an appropriate combination of material susceptibility, tensile stress and environment are present. This process-level model accounts for the possibility of SCC of the drip shield, the waste package outer barrier, and the stainless steel structural material. This model also evaluates two alternative methods: Method A which is based on threshold stress intensity factor criterion for initiation of SCC ($K_I > K_{ISCC}$); and Method B which is based upon a threshold stress and a finite rate of SCC propagation. The rate of SCC propagation is dependent upon the local environment and the stress intensity factor at the crack tip. The stresses for initiation and propagation of SCC are due to unannealed closure welds, deformation caused by rock fall, and the weight of the waste package. This particular analysis requires appropriate stress analysis models and measurements for calculation of the through-wall stress distribution for representative cross sections of the waste package, including unwelded base metal and unannealed welds. This stress distribution is used to calculate a corresponding stress intensity factor distribution for flaws that range in size from zero to the entire thickness of the wall including the welded region. This stress intensity factor distribution is used as input for both Methods A and B. In Method A, SCC initiates at pre-existing flaws that develop during fabrication of the waste package, or at flaws that develop during localized corrosion. Values of K_{ISCC} are based upon data published in the technical and scientific literature, or measurements made with the double cantilever and compact tensions beam techniques. In Method B, SCC is initiated if the threshold stress is exceeded on a smooth surface. Then, the SCC propagation rate is calculated as a function of local environment and stress intensity factor. The time-to-failure is determined by integrating the calculated propagation rate. As previously discussed, relevant test environments include simulated dilute water, simulated concentrated water, and simulated acidic concentrated water at 30, 60, and 90°C, simulated saturated water at 100 and 120°C, and basic saturated water at 110°C.

Abstracted models have been developed for SCC of the waste package outer barrier (Alloy 22). These abstracted models include: (1) a threshold stress for initiation; (2) a crack growth rate as a function of stress and local exposure conditions; (3) crack density; and (4) crack morphology. Crack morphology includes a description of the size of openings. The abstracted models are in a form that is suitable for input to the WAPDEG analysis, and include the uncertainty and variability of the above processes.

Post-weld stress mitigation techniques are being employed to delay the initiation of SCC. The techniques under consideration include laser peening for the inner lid and localized induction annealing for the outer lid. Details for the application of the techniques are under development, and will be demonstrated with a series of mockups starting early next year. The testing data available to date and published data in the open literature are used to develop models and analyses presented in this PMR. The current models and analyses will be validated with the mockup testing data when they become available.

1.5.6 Hydrogen-Induced Cracking of Drip Shield

This process-level model establishes the conditions under which the drip shield (Titanium Grade 7) will experience hydrogen uptake, thereby leading to the threat of hydrogen embrittlement and HIC. This mode of failure is not believed to be a credible threat to Alloy 22 and has been excluded, as shown in Section 1.6 below (see FEP Number 2.1.03.04.00 in Table 1-2). This is based on the fact that the rate of hydrogen pick up is very low under repository-relevant exposure conditions. HIC may be a greater concern to the titanium drip shield because the steel ground supports (such as steel sets, rock bolts and mesh) could fall on the drip shield and establish galvanic coupling with the drip shield. As shown in Section 3.1.8, the bounding analyses have shown that the potential hydrogen uptake in the drip shield from the galvanic coupling is well below the threshold hydrogen concentration that could cause hydrogen embrittlement in Titanium Grade 7 (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 6.3.4).

1.6 SCREENING OF FEATURES, EVENTS, AND PROCESSES

The scope of the FEPs screening is to identify the treatment of the Primary FEPs affecting waste package and drip shield degradation. The FEPs that are deemed potentially important to repository performance are evaluated, either as components for the TSPA or as separate analyses in the AMR. The scope for this activity involves the following two tasks:

- Task 1: Identify FEPs that are considered explicitly in the TSPA (called included FEPs) and the AMRs in which these FEPs are addressed.
- Task 2: Identify FEPs not included in TSPA (called excluded FEPs) and provide justification for why these FEPs do not need to be a part of the TSPA model.

The initial set of FEPs has been created for the YMP TSPA by combining lists of FEPs identified as relevant to the YMP. This list consists of FEP entries from the Nuclear Energy Agency working group, FEPs from YMP literature and site studies, and FEPs identified during YMP project staff workshops. These FEPs are organized under categories based on Nuclear Energy Agency category headings, which are further broken down into primary FEPs and secondary FEPs. The FEPs have been identified by a variety of methods, including expert judgement, informal elicitation, event tree analysis, stakeholder review, and regulatory stipulation. All potentially relevant FEPs have been included, regardless of origin. This approach has led to considerable redundancy in the FEP list, because the same FEPs are frequently identified by multiple sources, but it also ensures that a comprehensive review of narrowly defined FEPs will be performed.

Each FEP has been identified as either a primary or secondary FEP. Primary FEPs are those FEPs for which detailed screening arguments are developed. The classification and description of primary FEPs strives to capture the essence of all the secondary FEPs that map to the primary. Secondary FEPs are either FEPs that are completely redundant or that can be aggregated into a single primary FEP. The primary FEPs have been assigned to associated PMRs. The assignments were based on the nature of the FEPs so that the analysis and resolution for screening decisions reside with the subject-matter experts in the relevant disciplines. The resolution of other than system-level FEPs are documented in AMRs prepared by the responsible PMR groups. This section summarizes the screening decisions associated with the FEPs that are relevant to the waste package and drip shield PMR group.

Of the original list of FEPs, twenty-eight have been identified as Primary FEPs in relationship to waste package and drip shield degradation. The approach used for this analysis is a combination of qualitative and quantitative screening. The analyses are based on the criteria provided by the NRC in the proposed 10 CFR Part 63 (64 FR 8640) and by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in the proposed 40 CFR Part 197 (64 FR 46976) to determine whether or not each FEP should be included in the TSPA. For FEPs that are excluded from the TSPA based on NRC or U.S. Environmental Protection Agency criteria, the screening argument includes a summary of the basis and results that indicate either low probability or low consequence. As appropriate, screening arguments cite work performed outside this activity, such as in other AMRs. For FEPs that are included in the TSPA, the TSPA disposition includes a reference to the AMR that describes how the FEP has been incorporated in the process models or the TSPA abstraction models.

The FEPs screening analysis results for the twenty-eight Primary FEPs relevant to waste package and drip shield degradation processes are summarized in Table 1-2. This table shows the FEP number, FEP name, screening decision (include/exclude), and a synopsis of the screening argument. Details of the screening processes and arguments are included in the supporting FEPs AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000s).

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
1.1.03.01.00	Error in waste or backfill emplacement	Exclude	Exclude based on low consequence. Deviations from the design and/or errors in waste and backfill emplacement and how they are dealt with are addressed in <i>Waste Emplacement/Retrieval System Description Document</i> , (CRWMS M&O 2000ad, Section 2.5). Table 13 of the referenced document specifies the design criterion compliance procedures and references the emplacement/retrieval component design calculations. This set of criteria serves as the quality control measures, which ensures that design deviations are addressed. In the event that an error does occur with the waste package emplacement system and a waste package is dropped or collides with another component within the drift, no damage of significance is expected to occur. Slap-down analysis of a 21-Pressurized Water Reactor waste package was performed where the waste packages were dropped on their side from a vertical position. The resulting stresses on the waste package material were less than 90% of the ultimate tensile strength of those materials (CRWMS M&O 2000z, Section 6.2). Since the impact energy (the "fall-down" height) associated with an emplacement error (CRWMS M&O 2000ad) is significantly less than that seen by a vertical tip-over, it is also not expected to result in any damage. Thus, this FEP can be excluded based on negligible consequence to the expected annual dose. This FEP is also discussed in the EBS FEPs AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000aa) and also excluded.
1.2.02.03.00	Fault movement shears waste container	Exclude	Exclude based on low probability. This FEP is outside the scope of the waste package FEPs AMR and is addressed in the Disruptive Events PMR and Disruptive Events FEPs AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000v).
1.2.03.02.00	Seismic vibration causes container failure	Exclude	Exclude based on low consequence. This FEP was originally directed at vertical emplacement of containers in boreholes. The current design is to place large containers horizontally in the drifts under titanium drip shields (CRWMS M&O 2000ab, Design Constraint 5.2.11). Seismic activity will not induce SCC of the waste packages or drip shields, regardless of magnitude, because a sustained tensile stress is required for SCC and an earthquake is only temporary in nature (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 5, Assumption 1). In addition, the Emplacement Drift System design criteria require that the drip shield be designed to withstand a Category 2 design basis earthquake without rupturing or parting between individual drip shield units and without contacting waste packages (CRWMS M&O 2000t, System Design Criteria 1.2.1.16 and 1.2.1.17). Damage to the waste package resulting from dislodgment from the emplacement pallet has been excluded. Slap-down analysis has shown that the resulting stress of a waste package falling on its side from a vertical position results in stresses that are less than 90% of the ultimate tensile strength. This stress level is insufficient to cause a waste package breach (CRWMS M&O 2000z, p. 44). Since the horizontal fall of the waste package from the emplacement pallet is at a lower energy level (the fall distance is shorter), the resulting stress level will also not result in a breach.

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
1.2.03.02.00 (Cont'd)	Seismic vibration causes container failure	Exclude	<p>Based on the above rationale, this FEP is excluded for both waste package and drip shield due to its negligible consequence to the expected annual dose. This FEP does not address damage of the contents of the waste package. Damage to the fuel rod-cladding is included in the TSPA analysis (CRWMS M&O 2000ae). This FEP is also addressed in the Disruptive Events FEPs AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000v).</p> <p>This FEP addresses container life and source term (CLST) Key Technical Issue (KTI) IRSR Subissues 2 and 6 (see Table 4-1).</p>
1.2.04.04.00	Magma interacts with waste	Include	<p>This FEP is included in the TSPA as part of disruptive events analyses. In the TSPA analysis, all waste packages that are affected by intrusion are assumed to be damaged sufficiently that they provide no further protection for the waste. This FEP is addressed in the Disruptive Events FEPs AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000v).</p> <p>This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissues 2 (see Table 4-1).</p>
2.1.03.01.00	Corrosion of waste containers	Include	<p>Corrosion is the most likely process leading to degradation and failure of waste packages and drip shields in the repository. All significant corrosion modes are included in waste package/drip shield corrosion modeling. These include dry-air oxidation, humid-air corrosion, and aqueous corrosion processes such as general corrosion and localized (pitting and crevice) corrosion, SCC, hydrogen-induced corrosion, and microbial influenced corrosion. Corrosion is included in TSPA as part of waste package degradation analyses. Waste package and drip shield corrosion is modeled with the WAPDEG (CRWMS M&O 2000ah). WAPDEG produces waste package and drip shield degradation profiles consisting of the fraction of waste packages and drip shields failed versus time and the average (per failed waste package/drip shield) number of penetration openings versus time. The degradation profiles are used as input into the TSPA model.</p> <p>This FEP is the subject of this PMR and addressed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissues 1, 2 and 6 (see Table 4-1).</p>

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.03.02.00	SCC of waste containers and drip shields	Include for waste package; Exclude for drip shield	<p>Include for waste package. SCC is one of a number of corrosion mechanisms that could potentially lead to eventual compromise of waste packages and/or drip shields. SCC is included in TSPA as part of waste package degradation analysis but is excluded in the analysis of drip shield degradation. Waste package SCC is modeled with the WAPDEG (CRWMS M&O 2000ah). WAPDEG produces waste package/drip shield degradation profiles consisting of the fraction of waste packages/drip shields failed versus time and the average (per failed waste package/drip shield) number of penetration openings versus time. The degradation profiles are used as input into the TSPA model (see FEP 2.1.03.01.00). Because, among other exposure condition parameters, tensile stress is required to initiate SCC, and because the waste package closure welds are the only places with such tensile stresses, only the waste package closure welds are considered for SCC (CRWMS M&O 2000f). The other fabrication welds of the waste package will be fully annealed before waste is loaded into the waste packages (CRWMS M&O 2000u, Section 8.1.7) and thus are not subject to SCC. Presence of stable "liquid" water is required to initiate corrosion processes (including SCC) that are supported by electrochemical corrosion reactions. A threshold RH is used in the waste package degradation analysis to simulate such a corrosion initiation condition. The threshold RH is based on the deliquescence point of NaNO_3 salt (CRWMS M&O 2000a). Therefore, under conditions with the RH below the threshold value (i.e., dry conditions), SCC will not occur.</p> <p>Exclude for drip shield based on low consequence. All fabrication welds of the drip shield will be fully annealed before being placed in the emplacement drift (CRWMS M&O 2000u, Section 8.3) and thus are not subject to SCC. The only other possible source of SCC on the drip shields is due to cold work stress and cracks caused by rockfall. However, these cracks tend to be tight (i.e., small crack opening displacement) and fill with corrosion products and precipitates such as carbonate minerals (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5.5). These corrosion products will limit transport of water, and is not expected to compromise significantly the intended function of the drip shield (i.e., preventing the dripping water from contacting the waste package). This will thus not contribute significantly to the overall radionuclide release rate from the underlying failed waste packages.</p> <p>Thermally induced stresses are addressed in FEP 2.1.03.07.00 - Mechanical Impact on Waste Container, and FEP 2.1.11.05.00 - Differing Thermal Expansion of Repository Components.</p> <p>This FEP is addressed in Section 3.1.7. This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissues 1 and 2 (see Table 4-1).</p>

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.03.03.00	Pitting of waste containers and drip shields	Include	<p>Localized (pitting and crevice) corrosion is one of a number of corrosion mechanisms that potentially lead to eventual compromise of waste packages and/or drip shields in the repository. As discussed in CRWMS M&O 2000n, localized corrosion of the waste package outer barrier (Alloy 22) and drip shield is not likely to occur under repository-relevant exposure conditions (CRWMS M&O 2000n). Localized corrosion initiation and propagation models are included in TSPA as part of waste package degradation analysis. Waste package localized corrosion is modeled with the WAPDEG (CRWMS M&O 2000ah). WAPDEG produces waste package degradation profiles consisting of the fraction of waste packages failed versus time and the average (per waste package) number of penetration openings versus time. The degradation profiles are used as input to the TSPA model (see FEP 2.1.03.01.00).</p> <p>This FEP is addressed in Section 3.1.7. This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissues 1 and 2 (see Table 4-1).</p>
2.1.03.04.00	Hydride cracking of waste containers and drip shields	Exclude for drip shield; Exclude for waste package	<p>Exclude for drip shield based on low consequence. Hydrogen generated at a cathodic site of corroding metal can migrate into the metal and form hydride phases within the metal components. This could make the metal more brittle and degrade its mechanical properties. The hydride phases cause the metal to be more susceptible to cracking. The extent of the hydride phases is determined by the amount of hydrogen uptake by the metal. HIC of the drip shield is a potential degradation mechanism that could cause the formation of cracks in the drip shield if the hydrogen uptake in the titanium drip shield is greater than the critical hydrogen concentration in the presence of sustained stress or mechanical impact (CRWMS M&O 2000h). In the current design, crevice corrosion, passive general corrosion and galvanic coupling of the drip shield are three feasible processes in the repository that could lead to HIC failure of the drip shield. Hydrogen is produced as a result of the corrosion processes, and some of the produced hydrogen can be absorbed by the titanium metal. The absorbed hydrogen then diffuses into the metal forming the hydrides in the metal. Because the drip shield will not be subject to crevice corrosion under the exposure conditions anticipated in the repository (CRWMS M&O 2000n), galvanic coupling and general corrosion are the only mechanisms that could cause HIC in the drip shield. Galvanic coupling with various metal components within the drift may lead to hydrogen uptake and consequently, HIC of the drip shield. Hydrogen embrittlement of α alloys such as the Titanium Grade-7 drip shield occur when three general conditions are simultaneously met (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 6.3): 1) a mechanism for generating hydrogen on a titanium surface; 2) metal temperature above approximately 80°C (175°F); and 3) solution pH less than 3 or greater than 12, or impressed potentials more negative than -0.7 volts (saturated calomel electrode).</p>

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.03.04.00 (Cont'd)	Hydride cracking of waste containers and drip shields	Exclude for drip shield; Exclude for waste package	<p>In the current repository design without backfill, a mechanism for generating hydrogen can occur through the galvanic coupling between the titanium drip shield surface and the steel structural components that may fall onto the drip shield. In addition, Conditions Two and Three listed above may be met at certain repository locations where temperatures are high ($\geq 80^{\circ}\text{C}$) and concentrated groundwater is present. When all three conditions are present simultaneously, local hydrided "hot spots" can be anticipated. Despite the presence of "hot spots" where hydrogen absorption into the bulk structure may occur, noticeable hydrogen embrittlement of Titanium Grade 7 is not expected. This is mainly due to the drip shield's large tolerance for hydrogen, where substantial concentrations must be achieved before any degradation in fracture toughness is observed (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 6.3). This critical concentration for titanium alloys whose performance is similar to the candidate material is well in excess of $1000\text{ }\mu\text{g/g}$ (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 6.3). The hydrogen concentration in the drip shield from passive corrosion 10,000 years after emplacement is $257\text{ }\mu\text{g/g}$ resulting from a conservative estimate and $58\text{ }\mu\text{g/g}$ from a best estimate (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 7). This is well below the threshold concentration, and thus the probability of hydrogen embrittlement within 10,000 years of emplacement is zero. Cracks in passive alloys, such as Titanium Grade 7, tend to be tight (i.e., small crack opening displacement) (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5.5). The opposing sides of through-wall cracks will continue to corrode at very low passive corrosion rates until the gap region of the tight crack opening is "plugged" by corrosion products and precipitates such as carbonate minerals. Any water transport through this oxide/salt filled crack area will mainly be by diffusion-type transport processes (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5.5). Thus, the effective water flow rate through cracks in the drip shield is expected to be extremely low, and will thus not contribute significantly to the radionuclide release rate from the underlying waste package. Therefore, since the primary role of the drip shield is to keep water from contacting the drip shield, HIC of the drip shield would not compromise its intended design purpose and is thus of low consequence.</p>

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.03.04.00 (Cont'd)	Hydride cracking of waste containers and drip shields	Exclude for drip shield; Exclude for waste package	<p>Exclude for waste package based on low consequence. HIC of the waste package outer barrier (Alloy 22) is not considered to be a possible degradation mechanism under repository-relevant exposure conditions. Handbook data (ASM International 1987, pp. 650-651) indicate that fully annealed nickel-base alloys such as Alloy 22 may be immune to hydrogen-induced embrittlement (hydride cracking). The susceptibility to hydride cracking may be enhanced only when the strength level of this alloy is increased either by cold working or by aging at a temperature of 540°C, at which point ordering and/or grain-boundary segregation can occur. The susceptibility to cracking will be reduced with decreasing strength level and correspondingly with increasing aging temperature. However, since the maximum temperature at the waste package surface is only 239°C (CRWMS M&O 2000r, Table 6-7), significant ordering and grain-boundary segregation does not occur and the degree of hydrogen embrittlement is negligible. Therefore, this FEP is excluded for the waste package outer barrier on the basis of low consequence to the expected annual dose rate.</p> <p>This FEP is addressed in Section 3.1.8. This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissue 1 (see Table 4-1).</p>
2.1.03.05.00	Microbially-mediated corrosion of waste container and drip shield	Include for waste package; Exclude for drip shield	<p>Include for waste package. Microbiologically influenced corrosion is included in TSPA as part of the waste package degradation analysis. Microbiologically influenced corrosion of waste package is modeled with the WAPDEG (CRWMS M&O 2000ah). WAPDEG produces waste package degradation profiles consisting of the fraction of waste packages failed versus time and the average (per waste package) number of penetration openings versus time. The degradation profiles are used as input to the TSPA model (see FEP 2.1.03.01.00). The potential effect of microbiologically influenced corrosion on waste package corrosion is analyzed with an enhancement factor approach, assuming microbiologically influenced corrosion increases the general corrosion rate. In this approach, the abiotic general corrosion rate is multiplied by the enhancement factor when the exposure conditions in the emplacement drift warrant significant microbial activity (CRWMS M&O 2000c).</p> <p>Exclude for drip shield based on low consequence. Quantitative data on microbiologically induced corrosion of drip shield materials such as Titanium Grades 7 and 16 are not available from the literature. However, even if the drip shield were susceptible to microbiologically influenced corrosion, it would not have significant effect on dose release as indicated by the sensitivity analysis (CRWMS M&O 2000ae). Therefore, this FEP is excluded for the drip shield based on low consequence to the expected annual dose.</p> <p>This FEP is addressed in Sections 3.1.5 and 3.1.6. This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissue 1 (see Table 4-1).</p>

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.03.06.00	Internal corrosion of waste container	Exclude	<p>Exclude based on low consequence. After being loaded with waste, the waste packages are filled with an inert gas (helium) prior to closure, displacing water and oxygen (necessary components for corrosion) from inside the package (CRWMS M&O 2000ag, p. II-30). The inert gas environment within the package will result in a negligible amount of corrosion degradation prior to the breach of the waste packages. The most likely cause of internal corrosion is the residual moisture remaining in the waste package at the time of emplacement. The source of this residual moisture is primarily from waterlogged failed fuel rods. Analyses performed by Kohli and Pasupathi (1986) indicate that the amount of moisture available to cause internal corrosion is very limited and even with very conservative assumptions, the potential for degradation of the container materials is very remote. Since the waste package has sufficient internal surfaces of carbon steel, the insignificant amount of remaining residual water will be scavenged by carbon steel corrosion. Thus, the potential for corrosion damage to the package internal surfaces is very low. In view of the above discussion, it can be concluded that insignificant corrosion damage of waste packages will occur due to any residual water present in the waste form. Thus this FEP is excluded based on low consequence to the expected annual dose.</p>
2.1.03.07.00	Mechanical impact of waste container and drip shield	Exclude	<p>Excluded based on low consequence. Mechanical damage of the waste package and drip shield by rockfall is discussed in greater detail under FEP 2.1.07.01.00 – Rockfall (large block). This FEP discussion also provides relevant references discussing the issue in greater detail. In addition, the Emplacement Drift System design criteria requires that the drip shield be designed to withstand a 13 metric ton rock fall, without rupturing the drip shield or causing individual drip shield units to separate and without contacting waste packages (CRWMS M&O 2000t, System Design Criteria 1.2.1.14 and 1.2.1.15). In view of the above rationale, this FEP is excluded based on low consequence to the annual dose rate.</p> <p>Mechanical damage of the waste package and drip shield by ground motion during seismic events is discussed in greater detail under FEP 1.2.03.02.00 – Seismic Vibration Causes Waste Container and Drip Shield Failure. In addition, the Emplacement Drift System design criteria require that the drip shield be designed to withstand a Category 2 design basis earthquake without rupturing or parting between individual drip shield units and without contacting waste packages (CRWMS M&O 2000t, System Design Criteria 1.2.1.16 and 1.2.1.17). In view of the above rationale, this FEP is excluded as low consequence to the annual dose rate.</p>

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.03.07.00 (Cont'd)	Mechanical impact of waste container and drip shield	Exclude	<p>A calculation of the maximum stress developed in the waste package due to internal pressurization as a result of fuel rod rupture at 400°C is less than the American Society of Mechanical Engineers code requirements for the allowable tensile strength (CRWMS M&O 2000z). Therefore, with the current robust waste package design, the pressurization of the internal gas under the expected repository condition would not cause mechanical damage to the waste package.</p> <p>In general, corrosion products have greater volume than the bare metal. When the corrosion products form in a tightly confined space, the volume increase by the corrosion products generates swelling pressures that could lead to mechanical damage of the surrounding material. Since the current design precludes the use of shrink fitting the outer and inner barrier components, the possibility of mechanical damage to the Alloy 22 outer barrier due to the pressure exerted by the corrosion product (Cr_2O_3) of the inner shell (Type 316NG stainless steel) seems very remote.</p> <p>Additionally, analyses cited in CRWMS M&O 2000e (pp. 32-33) indicates that even under very conservative assumptions, the growth of this corrosion product will not exceed 93 μm after 10,000 years. This oxide layer is not thick enough to produce enough pressure to cause mechanical damage to the Alloy 22 outer barrier. In the current design of waste package and EBS in the emplacement drift (CRWMS M&O 2000ab), there is no possibility of forming such a tightly confined space such that the swelling corrosion products could cause mechanical damage to the Alloy 22 outer barrier. Therefore, mechanical damages by internal gas pressure and swelling corrosion products are excluded based on low consequence to the expected annual dose.</p> <p>This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissue 2 (see Table 4-1).</p>

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.03.08.00	Juvenile and early failure of waste containers and drip shields	Include/ exclude for waste package; Exclude for drip shield	<p>Include manufacturing and welding defects in waste package degradation analysis. The major effect of pre-existing manufacturing defects is to provide sites for crack growth by SCC, potentially leading to an early failure. Among other exposure condition parameters, tensile stress is required to initiate SCC (CRWMS M&O 2000f). The effect of manufacturing and welding defects on waste package failure is addressed by including the defects in the SCC analysis (CRWMS M&O 2000f). As discussed in FEP 2.1.03.02.00 – SCC of waste containers, only the closure welds are considered for SCC. Accordingly, the defects in the closure welds are considered in TSPA analysis through the SCC analysis.</p> <p>Exclude manufacturing and welding defects in drip shield degradation based on low consequence. Because all the fabrication welds in drip shields will be fully annealed before placement in the emplacement drift, drip shields are not subject to SCC (CRWMS M&O 2000f). Also, other sources of stresses in the drip shield induced by earthquakes are insignificant to SCC (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 5, Assumption 1). Thus early failure of the drip shield is excluded from TSPA analysis based on low consequence to the annual dose rate.</p> <p>Exclude potential early failure of waste package and drip shield from improper quality control during the emplacement based on low consequence. An emplacement error may cause the waste package to be dropped or collide with another component within the drift. However, as described in FEP 1.1.03.01.00, Error in Waste or Backfill Emplacement, early failure of the waste package or drip shield from improper quality control is of negligible consequence. Slap-down analysis of a 21-Pressurized Water Reactor waste package was performed where the waste packages were dropped on their side from a vertical position. The resulting stresses on the waste package material were less than 90% of the ultimate tensile strength of those materials (CRWMS M&O 2000z, Section 6.2). Since the impact energy (the “fall-down” height) associated with an emplacement error (CRWMS M&O 2000ad) is significantly less than that seen by a vertical tip-over, it is also not expected to result in any damage. Thus, this FEP is excluded based on negligible consequence to the expected annual dose rate.</p> <p>This FEP is addressed in Sections 3.1.2, 3.1.7, 3.2.4, and 3.2.6 of the PMR. This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissues 1 and 2 (see Table 4-1).</p>
2.1.03.09.00	Copper corrosion	Exclude	<p>Exclude based on low probability (not credible). Copper is not considered for use as an engineered barrier at Yucca Mountain, and all copper materials at the site surface will be removed prior to repository closure (CRWMS M&O 1994b, Section 1.2).</p> <p>This FEP is thus excluded based on low probability (credibility).</p>

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.03.10.00	Container healing	Exclude	Exclude based on low consequence. Plugging (or healing) of corrosion holes or pits in waste package by corrosion products and mineral precipitates is a possible process in the repository. However, there are uncertainties associated with the quantification of the effect of the process on water flow and radionuclide transport through the plugged openings. Because of this, potential performance credit from the plugging (or healing) of the corrosion penetration openings are not taken into account in TSPA analysis. Therefore, this FEP is excluded based on low consequence to the annual dose rate.
2.1.03.11.00	Container form	Exclude	Exclude based on low consequence. The waste package/drip shield/repository design has been standardized for the Yucca Mountain Project (CRWMS M&O 2000ab). While there is more than one waste package design expected to be used in the proposed repository, they are all similar in their design, the fabrication methodology, and their dimensions (CRWMS M&O 2000u, Section 1). Therefore, there will be little variation in strength, dimensions, and shape of the waste packages used in the repository. Effects of different waste forms (commercial spent nuclear fuel, defense spent nuclear fuel, and defense high level waste) on heat dissipation and physical and chemical conditions in the vicinity the waste packages are indirectly included in the TSPA analysis through different thermal-hydrologic-geochemical responses and their impacts on corrosion processes. Waste package and drip shield degradation are modeled with the WAPDEG (CRWMS M&O 2000ah). The WAPDEG code makes use of several different thermal-hydrologic-geochemical "time histories" during a given simulation which encompass the variability in exposure conditions due partly to different "container forms." Based on the above discussion, this FEP is excluded based on low consequence to the annual expected dose.
2.1.03.12.00	Container failure (long term)	Include	Long-term corrosion degradation and failure of waste packages and drip shields in the repository are included in TSPA as part of waste package degradation analyses. Aspects of this FEP are also addressed in the <i>Related Primary FEPs</i> . The TSPA analyses accounts for the major degradation mechanisms and processes that are likely in the repository. The waste package and drip shield corrosion are modeled with the WAPDEG (CRWMS M&O 2000ah). WAPDEG produces waste package degradation profiles consisting of the fraction of waste packages/drip shields failed versus time and the average (per failed waste package/drip shield) number of penetration openings versus time (CRWMS M&O 2000g, Section 6). The degradation profiles are used as input to the TSPA model. This FEP is the subject of this PMR and addressed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of the PMR. This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissues 1, 2 and 6 (see Table 4-1).

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.06.06.00	Effects and degradation of drip shield	Include/exclude	<p>Include physical and chemical degradation processes in drip shield degradation. Physical and chemical degradation processes for the drip shield are included in TSPA as part of waste package and drip shield degradation analyses. The analyses account for the major degradation mechanisms and processes that are likely in the repository (CRWMS M&O 2000g). This includes corrosion-induced and other degradation and failure processes. Effects of the drip shield on heat dissipation and physical and chemical conditions in the vicinity the waste packages are indirectly included in the TSPA analysis through different thermal-hydrologic-geochemical responses and their impacts on corrosion processes. Waste package and drip shield degradation modes are modeled with the WAPDEG (CRWMS M&O 2000ah). The WAPDEG code makes use of several different thermal-hydrologic-geochemical "time histories" during a given simulation which include the effect of the presence of the drip shield. Thus, the effects of the drip shield on the disposal region environment are included in the TSPA analyses. The waste package and drip shield degradation are modeled with the WAPDEG (CRWMS M&O 2000ah). WAPDEG produces waste package and drip shield degradation profiles consisting of the fraction of waste packages/drip shields failed versus time and the average (per failed waste package/drip shield) number of penetration openings versus time (CRWMS M&O 2000g). The degradation profiles are used as input into the TSPA model. In addition, the model is designed to account for the effect on the drip shield of non-corrosion degradation processes such as rockfall or seismic motion. These effects are considered for both the intact and degraded states of the drip shield.</p> <p>Exclude rockfall in drip shield degradation based on low consequence. Mechanical damage of the drip shield by rockfall is discussed in greater detail under FEP 2.1.07.01.00 – Rockfall (large block), where it is shown that significant rockfall damage will not occur. This FEP discussion also provides relevant references that discusses the issue in detail. Exclusion screening arguments are also dealt with in the proper related primary FEPs (CRWMS M&O 2000s, Section 6.2.17).</p> <p>Exclude ground motion in drip shield degradation based on low consequence. Mechanical damage of the drip shield by ground motion during seismic events is discussed in detail under FEP 1.2.03.02.00 – Seismic Vibration Causes Waste Container and Drip Shield Failure. Mechanical damage due to seismic events are most likely to occur in the form of crack development and propagation (stress corrosion cracking). However, seismic activity will not induce SCC of the waste packages or drip shields, regardless of magnitude, since a sustained tensile stress is required for SCC and an earthquake is only temporary in nature (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 5, Assumption 1).</p> <p>In view of the above rationale, the FEP relating to rockfall and seismic ground motion is excluded due to low consequence to the expected annual dose.</p>

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.06.06.00 (Cont'd)	Effects and degradation of drip shield	Include/ exclude	<p>Exclude oxygen embrittlement in drip shield degradation. Oxygen embrittlement of titanium results from diffusion of interstitial oxygen into the metal at higher temperatures (> 340°C) (ASM International 1987, p. 681). The time to failure depends on the alloy composition, material thickness, and stress state. For the thermal hydrologic time history files used in the TSPA analyses, the waste package surface temperatures are significantly less than the threshold temperature of 340°C (CRWMS M&O 2000af, Section 6.3.1, Table 7). Therefore, oxygen embrittlement of the titanium drip shields is excluded on the basis of low consequence to the expected annual dose.</p> <p>This FEP is addressed in Sections 3.1.3, 3.1.5, 3.1.6, 3.1.8, and 3.2.7 of the PMR. This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissues 1, 2 and 6 (see Table 4-1).</p>
2.1.06.07.00	Effects of material interfaces	Include	<p>Waste package and drip shield corrosion degradation analysis includes the effects of material interfaces in the repository. The thermal-hydrologic-geochemical condition analyses in the repository include effects of materials present in the emplacement drift, including waste package and drip shield (CRWMS M&O 2000g). In the discussion of FEP 2.1.03.04.00, Hydride Cracking of Waste Containers, it is stated that structural components such as rock bolts, wire mesh, etc. may contact the drip shield surface leading to the possibility of HIC (hydride cracking). It is concluded that HIC due to this mechanism is of low consequence to the expected annual dose, due to the negligible effect of drip shield cracks on dose rate. In the discussion of FEP 2.1.07.01.00, Rockfall (large block), it is stated that the deflection of the drip shield due to rock fall is not enough to cause contact with the waste package. Therefore, it is concluded that rockfalls do not cause a material interface between the waste package and drip shield.</p> <p>The waste package and drip shield degradation are modeled with the WAPDEG (CRWMS M&O 2000ah). In the WAPDEG model (CRWMS M&O 2000g), no performance credit is taken for the waste package inner shell, thus the material interface between the waste package outer barrier (Alloy 22) and the waste package inner shell (316NG stainless steel) is not explicitly modeled. However, upon first penetration of the waste package outer barrier, inside-out corrosion of the waste package outer barrier is modeled using exposure conditions, which are based on in-package chemistry. The waste package in-package chemistry is affected by the degradation of the waste package inner shell and the waste package internals including the waste form itself. Therefore, the waste package degradation analysis includes the effects of the waste package outer barrier/inner shell interface indirectly.</p> <p>This FEP is addressed in Sections 3.1.3, 3.1.5, 3.1.6, and 3.2.7 of the PMR. This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissues 1 and 6 (see Table 4-1).</p>

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.07.01.00	Rockfall (large block) and WFCIad-Rockfall	Exclude	<p>Exclude based on low consequence. According to the <i>Rock Fall on Drip Shield</i> calculation (CRWMS M&O 2000ai), the effective rock mass over a 3-m partial length of drip shield cannot exceed 10 metric tons. As mentioned in FEP 2.1.03.07.00 – Mechanical Impact on Waste Container and Drip Shield, the design basis rock size is 13 metric tons. Even so, the effective rock size due to the stress distribution cannot exceed 10 metric tons. Thus, even were a 52 metric tons rock (which is the estimated maximum rock size) to fall on the drip shield, the drip shield would experience the same load as a 10 metric tons rock. This is due to the rock geometry and its loading distribution on the drip shield (CRWMS M&O 2000ai, Section 5.2). A finite element analysis was performed to evaluate the effects of rock fall on the drip shield (CRWMS M&O 2000ai). Using the maximum effective rock mass of 10 metric tons, results indicate that the greatest damage caused to the drip shield will be in the form of cracks 13 cm in length, rather than a large cavity type of failure. These cracks are extremely tight and with time, become plugged with corrosion products and other mineral precipitates (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5.5). This plugging process limits water transport through the drip shield to negligible amounts, and maintains the intended design function of the drip shield. Therefore, rockfall on drip shield is of negligible consequence to the annual expected dose.</p> <p>In addition, the finite element analysis shows that the deflection of the drip shield due to rock fall is not enough to cause contact with the waste package. Thus, the drip shield provides adequate protection to the waste package from rock fall. The WAPDEG analysis of waste package and drip shield degradation (CRWMS M&O 2000g, Section 6.4) shows that drip shields do not start to fail in the repository until about 20,000 years after emplacement. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the drip shield provides adequate protection to the waste package from rock fall during the first 10,000 years of emplacement. On this basis, rockfall on the waste package is excluded from consideration based on low probability, i.e., the probability of rockfall impacting the waste package is less than 1 in 10,000 during the first 10,000 years of emplacement.</p> <p>This FEP is also addressed in the Disruptive Events FEPs AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000v) and excluded based on low consequence. This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissue 2 (see Table 4-1).</p>

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.07.05.00	Creeping of metallic materials in the EBS	Exclude	<p>Exclude based on low consequence. Based on the current analyses, the maximum surface temperatures at the drip shield and the waste package will be 216°C and 239°C, respectively (CRWMS M&O 2000r, Table 6-7). Literature (ASM International 1990, p. 626) indicates that between 200 and 315°C (400 and 600°F), the deformation of many titanium alloys loaded to yield point does not increase with time. Thus, creep strength is seldom a factor for these alloys in this temperature range. No data exist for Ni-base alloys such as Alloy 22 in this temperature regime. However, the melting temperature of Ni-Cr based alloys is approximately 1370°C (Haynes International 1988). Since the maximum surface temperature is only 17.4% of the melting temperature, it is extremely unlikely for significant creep to occur. With respect to austenitic stainless steels such as Type 304, literature (ASM International 1990, p. 622) indicates that creep will not be observed in this alloy at temperatures below 370°C. In view of the above rationale, this FEP is excluded based on low consequence to the expected annual dose.</p> <p>This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissue 2 (see Table 4-1).</p>
2.1.09.03.00	Volume increase of corrosion products	Exclude	<p>Exclude based on low consequence. FEP 2.1.03.07.00 - Mechanical Impact on the Waste Container and Drip Shield also deals with corrosion products, namely, the internal and external forces caused by swelling corrosion products. The discussion provided in the FEP provides sufficient rationale for exclusion of this FEP based on low consequence to the expected annual dose.</p> <p>This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissue 2 (see Table 4-1).</p>

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.09.09.00	Electrochemical effects in waste and EBS	Exclude	<p>Exclude based on low consequence. Due to the large distances involved, it is reasonable to consider electrochemical effects between materials in the drift and more distant metallic materials to be less important to waste package materials degradation than electrochemical effects within the drift. Such long-range interactions are more appropriate for consideration in modeling processes such as radionuclide transport away from the potential repository rather than in consideration of relatively local phenomena such as waste package or drip shield degradation. The current waste package design includes an outer barrier of Alloy 22 over a 316NG stainless steel inner shell. In addition, a titanium drip shield is added to this design to provide defense in depth. No performance credit is taken for the 316NG stainless steel inner shell. Results of electrochemical polarization studies performed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories indicate that the threshold potential and corrosion potential for Alloy 22 in simulated acidified water at 90°C (this aggressive water chemistry and temperature reasonably bounds the potential repository exposure environment) will be 595 millivolts (mV) and -171 mV (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Table 4), respectively. For 316NG in simulated acidified water at 90°C, the threshold and corrosion potentials will be 304 mV and -361 mV (CRWMS M&O 2000e, Table 5), respectively. Clearly any electrochemical coupling of the Alloy 22 waste package outer barrier with the 316NG waste package inner shell will likely result in increased corrosion degradation of the 316NG waste package inner shell and enhanced performance of the Alloy 22 waste package outer barrier. The coupled 316NG waste package inner shell would serve as a sacrificial anode to the Alloy 22 waste package outer barrier.</p> <p>For Titanium Grade 7 (the drip shield material) in simulated acidified water at 90°C, the threshold and corrosion potentials will be 1340 mV and is -181 mV (CRWMS M&O 2000d, Table 4), respectively. While it is not expected that the waste package and drip shield will ever be in electrical contact, the similarity of the corrosion potentials of the materials used (Alloy 22 and Titanium Grade 7) indicates that even if electrical contact were established, it would be of little consequence to the degradation characteristics of the waste package or the drip shield. Therefore, electrochemical coupling of the Alloy 22 waste package outer barrier and the Titanium Grade 7 drip shield is of low consequence to the expected annual dose.</p>
2.1.10.01.00	Biological activity in waste and EBS	Include for waste package; Exclude for drip shield	<p>Include for waste package, and exclude for drip shield based on low consequence. This FEP, when considered from the waste package and drip shield degradation standpoint, is identical to FEP 2.1.03.05.00 - Microbially-Mediated Corrosion of Waste Container. Please see the discussion outlined in that FEP.</p> <p>This FEP is addressed in Sections 3.1.5, 3.1.6, and 3.27 in the PMR. This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissue 1 (see Table 4-1).</p>

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.11.05.00	Differing thermal expansion of repository components	Exclude	<p>Exclude based on low consequence. The coefficient of thermal expansion for Type 316L stainless steel (an analogue for the 316NG stainless steel used for the waste package inner shell) is 18.2×10^{-6} m/m-K over the temperature range of 293 to 773 K (CRWMS M&O 1999f, Section 5.3). The coefficient of thermal expansion for Alloy 22 is 13.9×10^{-6} m/m-K over the temperature range of 297 to 811 K (a comparable temperature range) (CRWMS M&O 1999f, Section 5.7). Thus, the coefficient of thermal expansion for Type 316L stainless steel will be higher than that of Alloy 22 over comparable temperature range. Currently, many scenarios with respect to waste package skirt-to-skirt spacing and ventilation time are being considered to determine the peak surface temperature. For example, calculations cited in "Drift Scale Thermal Analysis," (CRWMS M&O 2000r, p. 77) indicate that for the skirt-to-skirt spacing and ventilation time values of 0.5 meter and 50 years, the peak surface temperature will be 176°C (449 K) for no backfill case. An analysis indicates that the difference in temperature between the inside of the waste package inner shell (316NG) and the outside of the waste package outer barrier (Alloy 22) never exceeds 2°C (CRWMS M&O 2000aj, Section 6, Table 6-2). A bounding calculation using the coefficients of thermal expansion discussed above and a bounding 5°C (or 5 K) temperature difference between the waste package inner-shell inner surface and the waste package outer-barrier outer surface shows that the resulting strain is so small that thermal expansion of waste package shells will result a negligible effect on expected mean dose rate. In addition, a gap of about 1 mm between the shells will prevent the resultant stress due to the differing thermal expansion coefficients of the waste package materials from reaching a critical level that could lead to stresses in the waste package barriers. The Waste Package Operation Fabrication Process Report (CRWMS M&O 2000u, Section 8.1.8) requires a loose fit between the outer barrier (Alloy 22) and the inner shell (316NG stainless steel) to accommodate the differing thermal expansion coefficients, and so this FEP can be excluded for the waste packages based on low consequence to the expected annual dose.</p> <p>The drip shield design is presented in Attachment II (p. II-1 and II-2) of CRWMS M&O 2000al. As shown in Figure 2 in Section 6.1.1 of the report, the drip shield connectors are designed in such a way that allows for thermal expansion with no effect on drip shield performance. The drip shield segments are interlocked with a significant amount of freedom to expand and still maintain their intended purpose. Therefore, this FEP can be excluded for the drip shields based on low consequence to the expected annual dose.</p> <p>This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissue 2 (see Table 4-1).</p>

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.11.06.00	Thermal sensitization of waste containers and drip shields increases their fragility	Include	<p>Alloy 22 is known to be subject to “aging” and phase instability when exposed to elevated temperatures. The processes involve precipitation of different secondary phases and restructuring of the microstructure. The affected material exhibits increased brittleness and decreased resistance to corrosion, especially to localized corrosion SCC (CRWMS M&O 2000b). Preliminary testing results have shown that the waste package outer barrier (Alloy 22) could be subject to aging and phase instability under repository thermal conditions (CRWMS M&O 2000b). Testing and analyses of these effects are currently underway. Effects of potential thermal sensitization of the waste package outer barrier (such as thermally induced SCC, intergranular corrosion, or mechanical degradation) are included in TSPA as part of waste package degradation analysis. The effects are accounted for with a corrosion enhancement factor that is applied to the corrosion rate for the non-affected condition (CRWMS M&O 2000c). The waste package thermally induced corrosion mechanisms are modeled with WAPDEG (CRWMS M&O 2000ah). WAPDEG produces waste package degradation profiles consisting of the fraction of waste packages failed versus time and the average (per waste package) number of penetration openings versus time (CRWMS M&O 2000g). The degradation profiles are used as input into the TSPA model (see also FEP 2.1.03.01.00 – Corrosion of Waste Containers).</p> <p>This FEP is addressed in Sections 3.1.4, 3.1.5, 3.1.6, and 3.2.7 of the PMR. This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissues 1 and 2 (see Table 4-1).</p>
2.1.12.13.00	Gas generation (H ₂) from metal corrosion	Exclude	<p>Exclude based on low consequence. The Yucca Mountain repository situated in the unsaturated zone is expected to be connected to the atmosphere and to be operating under oxidizing conditions. Therefore any gases generated by metal corrosion would escape from the drifts. However, hydrogen may be evolved when passive alloys such as titanium are galvanically coupled to more active metals such as carbon steel. The possible consequence of this hydrogen evolution would be to cause HIC. However, since the titanium drip shield will not be in contact with any other active metals in the current design, the susceptibility of titanium alloys to HIC is minimal (see also FEP 2.1.03.04.00 – Hydride Cracking of Waste Containers and Drip Shields). The literature (ASM International 1987, pp. 650-651) indicate that fully annealed nickel-base alloys such as Alloy 22 may be immune to hydrogen-induced embrittlement (hydride cracking). The susceptibility to hydride cracking may be enhanced only when the strength level of this alloy is increased either by cold working or by aging at a temperature of 540°C at which ordering and/or grain-boundary segregation can occur. The susceptibility to cracking may be reduced with decreasing strength level and correspondingly with increasing aging temperature. However, since the waste package temperature will be sufficiently less than 540°C, the degree of hydrogen adsorption is negligible, and HIC of Alloy 22 will be of low consequence (see also FEP 2.1.03.04.0000 – Hydride Cracking of Waste Containers and Drip Shields).</p>

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.13.01.00	Radiolysis	Exclude	<p>Exclude based on low consequence. The dominant contributor to dose rate at the waste package surface is from gamma radiation (CRWMS M&O 2000ak, Section 6). Anodic shifts in the open circuit potential of stainless steel in gamma irradiated aqueous environments have been experimentally observed. The shift in corrosion potential was shown and subsequently confirmed to be due to the formation of hydrogen peroxide (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4.4). As the waste package is made of Alloy 22 and not stainless steel, additional studies of the threshold corrosion potentials due to gamma radiation have been performed. To determine the maximum impact of gamma radiolysis, hydrogen peroxide was added to repository-relevant solutions used for Alloy 22 corrosion testing (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4.4). As the concentration of hydrogen peroxide in simulated acidic concentrated water at 25°C approaches 72 parts per million (ppm), a value that could result only from extremely high gamma radiation levels (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4.4), the corrosion potential asymptotically approaches 150 mV versus the silver/silver chloride (Ag/AgCl) reference electrode. This is a shift in corrosion potential of about 230 mV relative to a hydrogen peroxide-free simulated acidic concentrated water solution, however, this potential is also well below any threshold where localized attack would be expected in simulated acidic concentrated water. Similarly, as the concentration of hydrogen peroxide in simulated concentrated water approaches 72 ppm, the corrosion potential asymptotically approaches -25 mV versus the Ag/AgCl reference electrode. This is a shift in corrosion potential of about 200 mV relative to a hydrogen peroxide-free simulated concentrated water solution (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4.4), however, this potential is also well below any threshold where localized attack would be expected in simulated concentrated water, and well below any level where a change in oxidation state would be expected (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4.4).</p> <p>Since extremely high radiation levels would be required to achieve such shifts in corrosion potential (i.e., 72 ppm hydrogen peroxide) and the maximum shift in potential is less than that required for breakdown of the passive film, gamma radiolysis will not result in localized corrosion of Alloy 22. Although the shift in corrosion potential for the Titanium Grade 7 drip shield material would likely differ from that of Alloy 22, the magnitude of the shift in potential due to gamma radiolysis would not be greater than that required to cause breakdown of the passive film and initiation of localized corrosion (CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.8). Gamma radiolysis will have no significant effect on general corrosion rates (CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.4.4). This FEP is excluded due to low consequence because gamma radiolysis does not initiate localized corrosion or have any significant effect on the rate of general corrosion and therefore, no significant effect on dose rate.</p> <p>This FEP is addressed in Sections 3.1.5 and 3.1.6 of the PMR. This FEP addresses CLST KTI IRSR Subissue 1 (see Table 4-1).</p>

Table 1-2. Primary FEP Summary for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (Continued)

FEP Number	FEP Title	Screening Decision	Reason for Include/Exclude Decision
2.1.13.02.00	Radiation damage in waste and EBS	Exclude	Exclude based on low consequence. The dose rate of gamma radiation (the predominant form of radiation fluence) at the surface of the waste package and drip shield will be determined by the concentration of the various radioactive isotopes within the package (as functions of age, type, and length of time the fuel was in the reactor, etc.) and the attenuation provided by the waste package. Maximum dose rates at the surface of the waste package are not expected to exceed 1,040 rem/hr (CRWMS M&O 2000ak, Section 6), which for gamma radiation is equivalent to 1,040 rads/hr. The general conclusion reached by most investigators is dose rates below 10^5 rads/hr of the type of radiation emitted from decay wastes are not adequate to degrade the metallurgical and mechanical properties of the waste package and drip shield materials, and their protective/passive layers (ASM International 1987, p. 973). The only significant effect of radiation will be the change in external environment due to groundwater radiolysis (ASM International 1987, pp. 971-974) (see FEP 2.1.13.01.00). Therefore, this FEP is excluded based on low consequence.

1.7 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER PROCESS MODEL REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS

This PMR provides information about important factors affecting waste package lifetime such as the thermal, hydrologic, and geochemical processes acting on the waste package surface. The PMR uses inputs from other documents such as License Application Design Selection report (EDA II design) and thermal analyses. The emphasis of the discussion of model inputs and outputs is on information needed for the assessment of postclosure performance. The waste package degradation PMR supports the TSPA and other major Project milestones, such as the Site Recommendation (SR) and the License Application.

While the scope of this PMR is to address degradation of the waste package and the drip shield, other PMRs (such as the EBS PMR) address other aspects of drip shield and EBS component performance. The near-field environment PMR provides thermal-hydrologic conditions for the waste packages and drip shields in the repository. The EBS PMR provides chemistry (particularly pH) of water contacting the drip shield and waste package, which is input to the WAPDEG analysis for drip shield and waste package degradation. As output, the waste package PMR provides the lifetime (or failure time) histories and subsequent degradation (i.e., the number of through-wall penetrations) histories of the drip shields and waste packages. The waste package failure time histories are used as initiation time for waste form degradation in the failed waste packages. The drip shield and waste package degradation histories (i.e., the number of through-wall penetrations) are used in the analyses for water flow and radionuclide transport through the penetration openings in the drip shields and waste packages.

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2. EVOLUTION OF THE PROCESS MODEL

2.1 BACKGROUND

As discussed in Section 1.3, the overall performance of the waste package and drip shield materials has been identified as two of the seven principal factors in the performance of the repository. It is expected that the lifetime goals for the drip shield and waste package may be increased in the future. Therefore, materials and designs that prolong service life are sought continuously.

The reference design used in the Viability Assessment has been estimated to experience first through-wall failure by pit penetration in about 2,700 years, with about 1 percent of the packages failing in approximately 10,000 years. This estimate is based upon the waste package degradation code (WAPDEG) model used as input to the Total System Performance Assessment (CRWMS M&O 1998b). However, the goals of the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project have been continuously pushed towards longer waste package lifetimes, thereby requiring that the repository exceed performance requirements of the Viability Assessment design by a significant margin. Accordingly, a selection process for alternative materials and designs intended to provide higher levels of confidence for an extended waste package lifetime was undertaken. As mentioned in the License Application Design Selection report, this process resulted in the selection of a double-walled waste package placed under a protective drip shield made of Titanium Grade 7 (CRWMS M&O 2000ab, Section 2.6.1). The outer wall of the waste package is corrosion-resistant Alloy 22, with an inner wall of stainless steel (316NG) that serves as a structural support. This new design is known as Enhanced Design Alternative II (CRWMS M&O 2000ab, Section 2.6.1). The selection of this new design configuration, coupled with the selection of new materials, has necessitated the development of new models to predict penetration rates. Individual component models (sub-models) are documented in the individual Analysis Model Reports (AMRs) (see Section 1.5 for the topics in each AMR). Each AMR is provided as an input to the waste package Degradation Process Model Report (PMR), as well as to the TSPA for Site Recommendation.

2.2 PREVIOUS TREATMENT OF WASTE PACKAGE DEGRADATION MODELING

Modeling of waste package degradation has evolved over the past decade along with changes in materials selected for its containment barriers. Early waste package designs consisted of thin-walled stainless steel canisters with heavy-walled carbon steel overpacks, and were designed for emplacement in salt, basalt or tuff repositories. The design thickness of the overpack component was the sum of the required structural thickness, plus the corrosion allowance necessary to assure that the required structural thickness will survive the required containment period. The corrosion allowance was established on the basis of the calculated temperature profile of the waste package surface during the containment period, the unexpected presence of an unlimited quantity of anoxic brine, and the resulting corrosion rate.

In late 1987, the U.S. Congress passed *The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, As Amended, With Appropriations Acts Appended* (DOE 1995), which reduced the number of potential repository sites to be characterized to one: Yucca Mountain. Prior to this event, work on the waste package design for Yucca Mountain had followed the same rationale as that for salt and basalt repositories. In fact, the initial conceptual design of the waste package developed in early 1983

was the same as that for the other two repositories. However, it was recognized that the expected conditions in Yucca Mountain were quite different from the other two in that the repository was located in the unsaturated zone. The environment in this zone, although not firmly established, was expected to be oxidizing, but dry with low humidity most of the time. The design temperature for the waste package surfaces was not expected to exceed 250°C. Liquid water was expected to be present only under transient conditions, and its composition was not expected to be very aggressive from a corrosion standpoint.

The limitations of 304L stainless steel, from the standpoint of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and localized corrosion had been recognized early on. Consequently, alternative materials were being sought. In 1993 (CRWMS M&O 1994a), the design was changed from thin-walled containers emplaced in bore holes to drift-emplaced robust multibarrier waste package. The proposed materials were Alloy 825 as the inner barrier and a corrosion allowance material “such as weathering steel” as an outer barrier. Degradation modeling of this waste package design included only aqueous phase corrosion. It was assumed that no corrosion would occur above the temperature at which liquid-phase water could not exist on the waste package surface.

Model enhancements were incorporated in 1995 (CRWMS M&O 1995) and were based upon the same double-wall waste package design that was used in 1993. This model was an initial attempt to account for humid air corrosion and aqueous phase corrosion. The aqueous phase corrosion model had components that simulated pitting corrosion and galvanic coupling of the corrosion allowance material and corrosion resistant materials. This model included estimates of the variability in waste package corrosion, including package-to-package and patch-to-patch variability (see Section 2.3). Estimates of the uncertainty in the threshold relative humidity (RH) for initiation of humid air corrosion and aqueous phase corrosion were also made. An empirical model for general corrosion and localized corrosion of the corrosion allowance materials was developed based upon published literature data. Rates of general corrosion and localized corrosion of the corrosion resistant material were based upon the collective opinion of a panel of experts (expert elicitation) (CRWMS M&O 1995). The model assumed that galvanic protection would delay localized corrosion (pitting) of the corrosion resistant material until a specified percentage of the corrosion allowance material thickness had been consumed by general corrosion.

Exposure conditions included temperature, RH, presence of liquid-phase water (dripping), water chemistry, backfill, and rock fall (CRWMS M&O 1995).

Along with the improvements in the degradation modeling, the evaluation of materials selection for the waste package barriers continued during the following several years. The corrosion resistant material, Alloy 825, was replaced with a more corrosion resistant nickel-based Alloy 625 during this period (CRWMS M&O 1996). The lifetime goals for the waste package was increased further and resulted in the selection of Alloy 22 as the corrosion resistant barrier for the Viability Assessment design. The superiority of Alloy 22 is well known and generally accepted.

Additional improvements in the waste package corrosion model were made for the Viability Assessment design (CRWMS M&O 1998a, Chapter 5). This model accounted for humid-air general corrosion and localized corrosion of the corrosion allowance material; aqueous-phase

general corrosion and localized corrosion of the corrosion allowance material; and aqueous-phase general corrosion and localized corrosion of the corrosion resistant material. Degradation of the waste package was modeled by dividing the surface into patches and populating the corrosion rates stochastically over the patches. The concept of a localization factor was used. Pitting of the corrosion allowance material was assumed to occur under alkaline conditions ($\text{pH} \geq 10$).

Microbiologically influenced corrosion and SCC were not accounted for in the TSPA models used for Viability Assessment. The effects of salt deposition and evaporative concentration of dripping water on the waste package surface were also neglected. These models were not based upon qualified experimental data from materials testing in repository-relevant environments, but relied heavily on the opinion of experts and other published data. For this PMR, a broad range of laboratory data and associated process models have been developed to more realistically approximate the degradation processes of potential significance to repository performance. Changes to the degradation models have been necessitated by the changes in waste package design and inclusion of the drip shield for Site Recommendation.

2.3 TOTAL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT - SITE RECOMMENDATION APPROACH

The approach in the Total System Performance Assessment-Site Recommendation (TSPA-SR) waste package degradation analysis is greatly enhanced version of that used in Total System Performance Assessment-Viability Assessment (TSPA-VA). (For convenience of discussion in this section, the drip shield is modeled as an integral part of waste package, and no separate discussion is given for drip shield.) The WAPDEG model, which is based on a stochastic approach, has been upgraded to include SCC and is used for the Site Recommendation waste package degradation analysis. The motivations for the stochastic approach used in the WAPDEG model are three-fold:

- To provide realistic representation of waste package degradation processes in the repository
- To capture the effects of variation and uncertainty both in exposure conditions and degradation processes over a geologic time scale
- To perform analysis within a reasonable time and within computational resources.

Abstractions of the process-level models were developed for WAPDEG in a manner that allows important features of the process-level models to be captured as explicitly as possible, and in a manner that allows the degradation processes and their characteristics to be properly represented in the waste package degradation analysis. More details of the TSPA-SR approach to waste package and drip shield degradation analysis are given in the supporting AMR entitled *WAPDEG Analysis of Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation* (CRWMS M&O 2000g).

As in the TSPA-VA analysis, effects of spatial and temporal variations in the exposure conditions over the repository were modeled by explicitly incorporating relevant histories of exposure condition into the waste package degradation analysis. The parameters that represent

exposure conditions were considered to be varying over the repository. These include RH and temperature at the waste package surface, seepage into the emplacement drift, chemistry of seepage water, and rockfall. In addition, potentially variable corrosion processes within a single waste package were represented by dividing the waste package surface into unit areas called “patches” and stochastically populating the corrosion model parameter values and/or corrosion rates over each patch. The model parameter values and corrosion rates were sampled from their distribution over the range of the expected local exposure conditions.

In the nominal case analysis, the waste package outer barrier and drip shield were included in the waste package degradation analysis. The stainless steel inner container, which is to provide structural support to waste package, is not included in the degradation analysis. Although, this inner container would actually provide some performance for waste containment after the outer barrier breach, and would also provide a barrier to radionuclide transport after the waste package is breached, the potential performance credit was ignored in the nominal TSPA-SR analysis. This is a conservative approach. However, performance credit for the stainless steel is being evaluated for future consideration.

In summary, the TSPA-SR waste package degradation analysis includes the following potentially important degradation processes:

- General corrosion
- Localized (pitting and crevice) corrosion
- SCC waste package outer barrier
- Microbiologically influenced corrosion
- Long-term aging and phase instability of waste package outer barrier and their effect on corrosion
- Pre-existing manufacturing defects in the waste package closure welds and its effect on SCC.

As previously discussed, significant improvements have been made to the general corrosion and localized corrosion models, making them superior to those used in TSPA-VA. In the analysis, the drip shield was considered to be immune to SCC because it will be fully annealed before it is placed in the emplacement drift. Likewise, all the fabrication welds in the waste package, except the welds for the closure lids, will be fully annealed and therefore not subject to SCC. Only the waste package closure weld is considered in the SCC analysis. Two alternative SCC models were considered, the slip dissolution model and the threshold stress intensity factor model. The effect of radiolysis on corrosion is expected to be insignificant under the conditions expected in the repository (see Section 3.1.6.6), and was therefore not included in the nominal case analysis. The drip shield was assumed to be immune to the microbiologically influenced corrosion. Since the bounding analyses have shown that the hydrogen uptake by the drip shield is much less than the threshold hydrogen concentration for HIC (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Sections 6.1.3 and 6.2.4), this mode of failure was not included in the drip shield degradation model.

Waste package failure requires through-wall penetration. The WAPDEG analysis tracks degradation of waste package for three penetration modes: SCC (crack penetration), localized corrosion (rapid crevice penetration), and general corrosion (slower uniform penetration). Here, localized attack is assumed to be crevice corrosion over an entire patch, which is conservative. The analysis provides, as output, the cumulative probability of waste package failure by one of the three penetration modes as a function of time and also provides the number of penetrations for each of the penetration modes as a function of time. The waste package failure time and number profiles for penetration are used as input to other TSPA analyses, such as the waste form degradation and the radionuclide release rate from waste packages.

The TSPA-SR analysis yields a more explicit representation (than previous TSPA analyses) of the uncertainty and variability in waste package degradation (i.e., waste package failure and penetration number profiles). For the corrosion models and parameters for which data and analyses are available, their uncertainty and variability were quantified and incorporated into the WAPDEG analysis. For other models and parameters for which the uncertainty and variability are not quantifiable, the variance in their value was assumed and used as uncertainty. In the TSPA-SR analysis, waste package degradation was analyzed with multiple realizations of WAPDEG for the uncertainty analysis of the uncertain corrosion parameters—each WAPDEG realization corresponding to a complete WAPDEG run to account for the waste package degradation variability for a given number of waste packages. Accordingly, each of the WAPDEG analysis outputs (i.e., waste package failure time, crack penetration number, pit penetration number, and patch penetration number) is reported as a group of curves that represents the potential range of the output values.

2.4 ISSUES RELATED TO WASTE PACKAGE DEGRADATION

This PMR also addresses related issues identified based on a review of the past two years Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste and Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB) meeting summaries and correspondences, Viability Assessment Volume 3, Sections 6.5.2 and 6.5.3 and Volume 4 Section 4.3, TSPA peer review documentation, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) comments on TSPA-VA, expert elicitation recommendations, and licensing correspondence files for the NRC, the State of Nevada, and the Nevada counties. Table 2-1 provides a summary of all identified issues and describes how each issue is addressed in this PMR. In addition, acceptance criteria from the *Issue Resolution Status Report Key Technical Issue: Container Life and Source Term* (NRC 1999a), the *Issue Resolution Status Report Key Technical Issue: Total System Performance Assessment and Integration* (NRC 2000), and the *Issue Resolution Status Report Key Technical Issue: Repository Design and Thermal-Mechanical Effects* (NRC 1999b) are separately addressed in Table 4-1 in Chapter 4 of this document.

Table 2-1. Key External Issues for the Waste Package Degradation Process Model Report

Source	Issue	PMR Approach
TSPA-VA, Volume 3, Sec. 6.5.2 (DOE 1998)	Physical events and processes such as degradation of drift with time due to chemical and mechanical effects that have a potential for affecting the waste package performance were not considered, or not sufficiently covered, within the TSPA-VA.	Degradation of the drift with time could result in rock fall, which can impact the drip shield and waste package and increase potential for SCC. Rockfall-induced SCC is applicable only for drip shield (Section 3.1.7). While the drip shield provides protection of the underlying waste package from effects of rockfall, structural analyses have been performed to account for the waste package mechanical damage due to rockfall. The results are included in TSPA-SR.
TSPA-VA, Volume 3, Sec. 6.5.2 (DOE 1998)	The panel believes that there is insufficient data to support the selection of the material for use in the final waste package design.	Selection process for waste package materials has considered and evaluated all degradation processes. Several materials have been electrochemically tested, with a clear indication that Alloy 22 and Titanium Grade 7 are more corrosion resistant than other candidate materials. Section 3.1.1 provides an overview of the waste package materials selected.
TSPA-VA, Volume 3, Sec. 6.5.2 (DOE 1998)	Uncertainties and limitations in waste package degradation models (SCC, crevice corrosion, and waste package surface chemistry) need to be verified.	In regard to crevice corrosion, experimental studies have been performed to define the crevice chemistry (pH, etc.). In regard to SCC, alternative models are employed. Stress mitigation techniques are being used as a means of eliminating SCC through elimination of the driving force (see Section 3.1.7). Details of these degradation modes are provided in the respective AMRs and PMR sections (Section 3.1.3, 3.1.6, and 3.1.7).
TSPA-VA, Volume 3, Sec. 6.5.2 (DOE 1998)	The issue states the need for additional research on water contact with the waste package, critical crevice temperatures, Np solubility and technetium sorption on degraded waste package.	Evaporative concentration experiments have been used to determine the concentrations of saturated electrolytes that may form on the surface of the hot waste package (see Section 3.1.3). Critical crevice potentials and temperatures for the waste package barrier materials have been determined and documented in the various AMRs and PMR Section 3.1.6. Np solubility and technetium sorption are not part of the scope of this PMR but are addressed in the waste form degradation PMR.
TSPA-VA, Volume 3, Sec. 6.5.3.2 (DOE 1998)	The rationale for including or excluding any potentially significant feature, event or process needs to be technically justified and clearly articulated.	Identification of FEPs is discussed in Section 1.6.

Table 2-1. Key External Issues for the Waste Package Degradation Process Model Report (Continued)

Source	Issue	PMR Approach
TSPA-VA, Volume 3, Sec. 6.5.3.3 (DOE 1998)	Modeling assumptions should be consistent across different process models, unless there is a defensible technical rationale.	The AMRs that document assumptions for waste package degradation are subject to thorough interdisciplinary reviews to help ensure consistency among assumptions made in more than one document about a given parameter. In addition, the PMR that summarizes and integrates the results of the AMRs has been subjected to a review by a single review team, one of whose main objectives is to identify inconsistencies among the PMRs. Finally, assumptions used in the AMRs that feed waste package degradation are documented in the waste package PMR document. These measures provide confidence that consistent assumptions are used as appropriate among the various models that support the waste package PMR.
TSPA-VA, Volume 3, Sec. 6.5.3.7 (DOE 1998)	Rockfall effects need to be considered in the design and performance of the Yucca Mountain repository system.	Analyses of seismically induced rockfall damage have been explicitly addressed in TSPA-SR.
NWTRB Letter to DOE (11-10-99) (Cohon 1999a)	The presentation on waste package degradation indicated that valuable information is being collected on Alloy 22 at a rapid pace. However, concern still exists about the effects on corrosion of radiolytic species, including species formed in the vapor phase. Resolving that concern may necessitate additional experimental and theoretical work.	Experiments have been performed to determine the maximum increase in corrosion potential that can be caused by hydrogen peroxide, the primary product formed during gamma radiolysis of water. The maximum increase is approximately 200 mV, which is insufficient to cause initiation of localized corrosion with materials such as Alloy 22 (Section 3.1.6).
NWTRB Letter to DOE (8-3-99) (Cohon 1999b)	Regarding the engineered repository system, NWTRB highlights four areas: the need to vigorously pursue ongoing studies of degradation associated with stress-corrosion cracking and phase instability of proposed waste package materials; the need to determine whether presently unrecognized corrosion mechanisms exist that would be important over the very long term; the need to complete experiments on the formation of radiolysis products in the near-field and to model the effects of such radiolysis products on near-field component degradation; and the need to intensify investigations into the performance of a titanium drip shield and the effect this drip shield and associated backfill would have on other elements of the engineered system.	Ongoing SCC studies are underway at the Corporate Research and Development Center of General Electric Corporation and at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. All credible modes of corrosion such as phase stability and SCC are considered in the testing program and the WAPDEG code, so that the unexpected can be accounted for. Experiments have been performed to determine the maximum increase in corrosion potential that can be caused by hydrogen peroxide, the primary product formed during gamma radiolysis of water. The maximum increase is approximately 200 mV, which is insufficient to cause initiation of localized corrosion with materials such as Alloy 22. For example, a series of cyclic polarization of Titanium Grade 7 have been performed in test solutions that are relevant to the repository (Sections 3.1.5 and 3.1.6).

Table 2-1. Key External Issues for the Waste Package Degradation Process Model Report (Continued)

Source	Issue	PMR Approach
NWTRB Letter to DOE (8-3-99) (Cohon 1999b)	Additional research is needed to determine the likelihood of new mechanisms (beyond typical localized corrosion processes) of deterioration that could affect the very-long-term stability of the passive layer for critical waste package and other engineered barrier materials, such as Alloy 22 and titanium. This work could include, for example, examination of fundamental models of passive-regime stability and the factors that may cause deviation from passive-layer dissolution behavior assumed from short-term experiments, prediction of the behavior of the alloy surface under a thick layer of previous passive dissolution products, and a search for relevant natural and archeological analogs.	A variety of cutting edge techniques are now employed to study the long-term degradation of waste package materials. For example, transmission electron microscope is used to quantify the thermal aging of Alloy 22. Such quantification is in the form of time-temperature-transformation diagrams found in this PMR. Thermal aging is important in that it may result in the precipitation of undesirable brittle phases. These precipitates can lead to embrittlement and enhanced susceptibility to localized corrosion and SCC. Atomic force microscope and X-ray photo electron spectroscopy are being employed to study passive film stability. Secondary ion mass spectrometry is used to quantify the amount of hydrogen in the titanium-based materials that will be used for construction of the drip shield. All these modes of degradation are addressed in the PMR Sections 3.1.3 through 3.1.9. No appropriate natural or archeological analogs are available for Alloy 22 or Titanium Grade 7.
NWTRB Letter to DOE (8-3-99) (Cohon 1999b)	The effects of the drip shield and backfill on the thermal and moisture regime between the drip shield and the waste package and evaluating the corrosion behavior of titanium when it is in contact with backfill or rock fall. The vulnerability of the drip-shield connections to vibratory earthquake motion also needs to be addressed.	The testing of material samples have assumed same bounding chemistry for both the drip shield and the waste package outer barrier (Section 3.1.3). The drip shield is designed to withstand expected earthquake motion and not separate. The current design does not include backfill.
TSPA Peer Review, Section II.C (Budnitz et al. 1999)	Experimental data are lacking throughout the treatment of the waste package and engineered barrier system. In particular, the effect of realistic and extreme environments to come in contact with Alloy 22 and critical temperature for crevice corrosion of Alloy 22.	Electrochemical testing has been done in a wide variety of repository-relevant test solutions, including simulated dilute water, simulated concentrated water, simulated acidic concentrated water, simulated cement-modified water, simulated saturated water, and basic saturated water. Cyclic polarization tests have been conducted in these media with artificial crevices. Long term exposure testing has been done in simulated dilute water, simulated concentrated water, simulated acidic concentrated water, and simulated cement-modified water at temperatures up to 90°C. The critical temperature for crevice corrosion initiation can be determined from localized corrosion testing that is underway in similar solutions. Experiments have been performed to quantify the extent that pH can be lowered inside crevices, formed between the Alloy 22 waste package outer barrier and the 316NG stainless steel structural material (see Sections 3.1.6 and 3.1.7).

Table 2-1. Key External Issues for the Waste Package Degradation Process Model Report (Continued)

Source	Issue	PMR Approach
TSPA Peer Review, Section IV.D (Budnitz et al. 1999)	The TSPA-VA treatment of crevice corrosion was based on the adaptation of a pitting model. While similar chemical and electrochemical processes occur as part of both modes of corrosion, the TSPA peer review panel has concluded that a direct crevice corrosion model would be more realistic.	In the case of Alloy 22, pitting is not expected. If localized corrosion does occur, it is expected to be some form of crevice corrosion. Crevice chemistry determination has been conducted and documented in the supporting AMR and PMR Section 3.1.6.
TSPA Peer Review, Section IV.D (Budnitz et al. 1999)	There is a need both to improve the models and methods for analyzing water chemistries at the metal surfaces of the waste packages under realistic conditions, and to collect experimental data to validate and verify these models and the associated analytical methods.	From the evaporative concentration experiments, the saturated electrolytes that may form on the waste package surface have been defined (Section 3.1.3).
TSPA Peer Review, Section IV.D (Budnitz et al. 1999)	As in the case of analyses of crevice corrosion, additional work will be necessary for SCC prior to the possible license application stage, especially in light of the tentative nature of the SCC model and the fact that failure mode is closely coupled to waste package fabrication procedures.	The WAPDEG code now incorporates a wide variety of plausible failure modes, including SCC (Section 3.2.7). The effects of residual weld stress in the final closure weld are now accounted for. The code has developed to a level of sophistication now able to account for stress mitigation techniques such as laser peening and induction annealing (Section 3.1.7).
TSPA Peer Review, Section IV.D (Budnitz et al. 1999)	At the present time, the corrosion behavior of waste package with backfill or rock debris covering the waste package is not well defined.	Electrochemical testing has been done in a wide variety of repository-relevant test solutions, including simulated dilute water, simulated concentrated water, simulated acidic concentrated water, simulated cement-modified water, simulated saturated water, and basic saturated water. Basic saturated water and simulated saturated water are determined to be bounding environments and cover the effects of backfill. Cyclic polarization tests are now being conducted in these media with creviced samples. Experiments have been performed to quantify the extent that pH can be lowered inside crevices, formed between the Alloy 22 waste package outer barrier and the 316NG stainless steel structural material (Sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.6).

Table 2-1. Key External Issues for the Waste Package Degradation Process Model Report (Continued)

Source	Issue	PMR Approach
TSPA Peer Review, Section IV.D (Budnitz et al. 1999)	The treatment of Alloy 22 corrosion rates and the allocation of total variance to their variability and uncertainty need to be improved prior to the anticipated license application phase.	The large number of samples involved in testing in the Long-Term Corrosion Test Facility provide estimates of uncertainty for general corrosion rates (for both humid air corrosion and aqueous phase corrosion). By performing large numbers of cyclic polarization tests with at least three replicates at each condition, similar estimates of the uncertainty in electrochemical potential measurements are obtained. Separation of uncertainty and variability is difficult with these very corrosion resistant materials. In many cases, the corrosion rates are so low that the measurement limits are exceeded. The treatment of uncertainties and variability in the data is addressed in Section 3.1.9 of the PMR.
TSPA Peer Review, p. 8 (Budnitz et al. 1999)	The analyses (WAPDEG), however, were developed to a level of complexity that extended well beyond the data that were available. This complexity may be useful for the anticipated license application phase of sufficient data on key parameters become available. If not the panel believes that attempts to apply the WAPDEG model may compromise the transparency of the treatment. Necessary changes include an updating and/or revision of the model, including better integration of the multitude of process models used for analyzing various degradation modes or engineering enhancements and the development of a stronger case to confirm the linkage between the process models and their abstractions.	This comment is not longer applicable to the current WAPDEG model which is based on new data and new process models. As discussed in Section 3.2 of this PMR, several new models and correlations have been added replacing old models. The complexities of current models (general and localized corrosion, SCC, etc.) are consistent with the available data.

3. MODELS AND ABSTRACTED MODELS

The waste package degradation process model consists of several different models: dry oxidation, humid air corrosion, aqueous phase corrosion, general corrosion, localized corrosion, microbiologically induced corrosion, stress corrosion cracking (SCC), and hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC). A generic integrated model containing the above component models is illustrated by Figure 1-4. A logic flow of the integrated model (WAPDEG model) is given in Figure 3-68. This model can be applied to the drip shield and waste package materials of interest.

3.1 MODEL DESCRIPTIONS

As stated above, the waste package degradation process model includes a number of component models. These component models are discussed in the following sections. Model parameters and definitions for the individual models are provided in the respective Analysis Model Reports (AMRs).

3.1.1 Overview of Waste Package and Drip Shield Design

As described in the license application design selection report, the recommended waste package design is Enhanced Design Alternative II (CRWMS M&O 2000ab, Section 2.6.1). This design includes a double-wall waste package underneath a protective drip shield. The drip shield is to be fabricated from Titanium Grade 7. The Enhanced Design Alternative II corrosion resistant waste package outer barrier is to be fabricated from nickel-based Alloy 22. Stainless steel 316NG is to be used for construction of the structural support container within the waste package outer barrier. The 316NG inner shell will increase the overall strength of the waste package.

3.1.1.1 Titanium Drip Shield

Titanium alloys (15-mm thick) have been considered for construction of the drip shield. The current recommendation is to use Titanium Grade 7 (Unified Numbering System for Metals and Alloys [UNS] R52400). The composition of this alloy is 0.03 percent N (max), 0.10 percent C (max), 0.015 percent H (max), 0.25 percent O (max), 0.30 percent iron (max), 0.12 - 0.25 percent Pd (max), and 0.4 percent residuals (total), with the balance being Titanium (approximately 98.7 to 98.8 percent). The nominal thickness of the drip shield is 15 mm. Properties and performance of these materials are reviewed elsewhere and cited in the respective AMRs. The unusual corrosion resistance of titanium alloys is due to the formation of a passive film of TiO_2 , which is stable over a relatively wide range of electrochemical potential and pH. A similar material, Titanium Grade 16 with 0.04 to 0.08 percent Pd, is used as an analog for Titanium Grade 7 in some parts of the testing program. The rates of general corrosion and dry oxidation (or dry air oxidation) of this material have been shown to be very low. Corrosion testing of Titanium Grade 16 has been conducted in the Long Term Corrosion Test Facility (LTCTF) of the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project (YMP) (CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.5).

3.1.1.2 Nickel-Based Waste Package Outer Barrier

Alloy 22 (UNS N06022) (20-mm thick) is now being considered for construction of the waste package outer barrier. This alloy consists of 20.0 - 22.5 percent chromium, 12.5 - 14.5 percent molybdenum, 2.0 - 6.0 percent iron, 2.5 - 3.5 percent W, and 2.5 percent Co (max), with the balance being nickel (approximately 50 - 60 percent). Other minor elements include P, Si, S, Mn, Nb, and V. Alloy 22 is less susceptible to localized corrosion in environments that contain Cl^- than Alloys 825 and 625, materials of choice in earlier waste package designs. Corrosion testing of Alloy 22 has been and continues to be conducted in the LTCTF of the YMP (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6). Nominal thickness of the Alloy 22 shell is 20 mm for the commercial spent fuel packages and 25 mm for the packages containing navy waste or co-disposal defense high-level waste.

3.1.1.3 Stainless Steel Structural Material

Stainless steel 316NG (50-mm thick) is to be used for construction of the structural support inside the waste package outer barrier. This inner cylinder of 316NG stainless steel will increase the overall strength of the waste package. Stainless steel 316L is considered to be a good analog for 316NG stainless steel because the chemical composition of the two alloys is very close, except that 316NG stainless steel has better mechanical properties than 316L. Stainless steel 316 [UNS S31603] has a composition of 16 - 18 percent chromium, 10 - 14 percent nickel, 2 - 3 percent molybdenum, 2 percent Mn (max), 1 percent Si (max), 0.03 percent C (max), 0.045 percent P (max), 0.03 percent S (max), 0.10 percent N (max) and the balance being iron (65 - 69 percent). Stainless steel 316L is less susceptible to localized corrosion in environments that contain Cl^- than stainless steel 304, but more susceptible than other corrosion resistant materials such as Alloys 22, 625 and 825 that have been considered in various waste package designs. The superior localized corrosion resistance of 316L stainless steel in comparison to 304 stainless steel is apparently due to the addition of molybdenum, which helps to stabilize the passive film at low pH values. Molybdenum oxide is very insoluble at low pH. Consequently, 316L stainless steel exhibits relatively high thresholds for localized attack (CRWMS M&O 2000e, Section 1.2).

3.1.2 Manufacturing Defects (Early Waste Package Failure)

Manufacturing defects and failure modes that might lead to early failure of a waste package are accounted for in an AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000m, Section 6) that supports this Process Model Report (PMR). The AMR on early failure includes a literature review directed towards obtaining information on the rate of manufacturing defect-related failures in various types of welded metallic containers, the types of defects that produce these failures, and the mechanisms that cause defects to propagate to failure. Types of defects applicable to the current waste package design are identified. For each applicable type of defect, the probability of its occurrence on a waste package is estimated. Potential consequences to the long-term performance of the waste package if the defect is present are discussed. Specific details on how the defect will affect waste package materials are provided in separate AMR on SCC (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6). Defects or flaws may serve as initiation sites for SCC.

3.1.2.1 Assumptions in Early Waste Package Failure Analysis

The following assumptions support the development of probabilities for various size flaws in the welds of the waste package shell and lids. Based on the similarity of the processes used for welding Alloy 22 and stainless steel, they are predicted to have the same frequency and size distributions for flaws. Information on the reliability of radiographic, ultrasonic, and dye-penetrant testing is assumed to be applicable to the materials and inspection methods that will be used for the waste package. Only the information related to ultrasonic testing was based on older reliability studies. Reliability of radiographic and dye-penetrant testing was based on Khaleel et al. (1999). It was assumed that flaws detected by post-weld inspections will be repaired, whenever the flaw size is larger than the flaw size of concern for postclosure performance. Embedded weld flaws are considered in the analysis because some of the subsurface flaws would be exposed as the weld undergoes general corrosion (CRWMS M&O 2000m, Section 6.2.1).

The probabilities of human errors have been quantified on the basis of probabilities of failing to perform tasks accomplished in a nuclear environment. Although they may not exactly correspond to the manufacturing and handling operations to be performed on the waste package, they conform to the characteristic features of these operations, and represent the highly controlled conditions under which these tasks will be done.

In developing the probability of the use of improper material in the waste package shell or lid welds, it is assumed that a field verification of the chemical composition of weld wire will be performed prior to its use in fabricating any weld and that material controls required in nuclear quality programs will be used. It is further assumed that such field verification will use state-of-the-art instrumentation. This assumption is based on the expected administrative requirements on the process qualification program.

Assumptions are used to support the development of the probability of having corrosion-enhancing surface contamination on the waste package or improper heat treatment of the waste package. These assumptions are based on the general descriptions of these activities. The assumptions support the development of event sequence trees for quantifying the probabilities of improper heat treatment or a failure in the cleaning process. The assumptions include the number of operators involved in each process, the quality assurance procedures and inspections governing the processes, and the reliability of the equipment used.

It is assumed that the probability of damaging a waste package during transport or handling at the repository is comparable to the probability of damaging spent nuclear fuel assemblies during transport or handling. The basis for this assumption is that a waste package will be subjected to about the same number of handling steps as a spent nuclear fuel assembly. It is assumed that both are handled with about the same amount of care. It is expected that the waste container manufactured at the vendor's shop will be inspected for handling damage upon arrival at the repository and before final emplacement in the drift. It is further expected that the waste package will be completely repaired or scrapped if such handling damage occurs.

3.1.2.2 Description of Early Waste Package Failure Analysis


The AMR presents the results of a literature review performed to determine the rate of manufacturing defect-related failure for various types of welded metallic containers. In addition to providing examples of the rate at which defective containers occur, this information provides insight into the various types of defects that can occur and the mechanisms that cause defects to propagate to failure. In summary, eleven generic types of defects were identified. These are:

1. Weld flaws
2. Base metal flaws
3. Improper weld material
4. Improper heat treatment
5. Improper weld flux material
6. Poor weld joint design
7. Contaminants
8. Mislocated welds
9. Missing welds
10. Handling and installation damage
11. Administrative and operational error.

Then, the eleven types of defects were reviewed for their applicability to the waste package. From this review, the following generic defect types are considered *not applicable* to the waste package: improper weld flux material, poor weld joint design, missing welds, and mislocated welds. This determination is based on the fact that the welding process for waste package fabrication does not use flux as noted in the AMR. Poor joint design is unlikely because of extensive development and testing. Missing welds and mislocated welds are easily detected and controlled by process qualification. The probability of occurrence and the effect on postclosure performance of the waste package are assessed for the remaining defects.

Using the information on linear flaw density, flaw depth distribution, flaw-location categorization in the weld, inspection reliability, and information on waste package weld lengths, frequencies of various depth weld flaws have been estimated. The procedure is the same for all the waste package welds considered. First, the total number of flaws per waste package weld was calculated by multiplying the weld length by the linear flaw density and by an adjustment factor for the weld thickness. For the welds to be subjected to ultrasonic, radiographic and dye-penetrant inspections, the base linear flaw density with credit for radiographic and dye-penetrant inspections was selected, and the flaw density for uninspected welds was used for the welds subjected to ultrasonic inspection only (or not inspected at all, which is considered to provide insight on the effect of inspections). In addition, the numbers of radially oriented flaws in the lid welds were estimated by applying a 1 percent reduction factor to the total flaw density (see Section 3.1.7.9 for detailed discussions on weld defect orientation). Next, the flaw size distribution for the relevant weld thickness was used to determine the probability that a flaw would have a depth within a given interval. An interval size of 0.5 percent of the weld thickness was used. The probability for each interval was then multiplied by the total number of flaws per weld to determine the expected number of flaws within that interval. When considering ultrasonic inspection, the expected number of flaws within each interval was reduced by multiplying by the probability of nondetection (PND) for the upper end of the interval. Because


the ultrasonic testing PND is based on a single-angle examination, and a multi-angle examination is planned for the welds (possibly as many as four different angles for the lids), the square of the PND was used. This effectively treats a multi-angle exam as two independent examinations. The expected number of flaws within a given depth zone of the weld (five considered depth zones, from inner weld surface to outer weld surface) was determined by multiplying the number of flaws in each interval by the fraction of flaws located in that depth zone. Finally, for each depth zone of the weld, the expected numbers of flaws in each interval were summed to determine a new value for the total number of flaws per weld, accounting for the ultrasonic inspections. The complementary cumulative distribution function (CDP) of flaw depth (with credit for multi-ultrasonic inspections) was also estimated. This distribution which, given a flaw depth, gives the probability that a pre-existing flaw exceeds that depth, was calculated by dividing the number of flaws of each interval by the total number of flaws. These results are summarized in Figure 3-1 for the Alloy 22 barrier shell welds, and in Figure 3-2 for the Alloy 22 barrier closure-lid welds.



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000m

NOTE: RT = radiographic test, PT = dye penetrant test, UT = ultrasonic test

Figure 3-1. Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function for Weld Flaw Depth in Waste Package Alloy 22 Shell Welds



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000m

NOTE: RT = radiographic test, PT = dye penetrant test, UT = ultrasonic test

Figure 3-2. Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function for Weld Flaw Depth in Waste Package Alloy 22 Lid Welds

3.1.2.3 Uncertainties in Early Waste Package Failure Analysis

The inputs used to estimate the probability of various defects that can potentially lead to early failure are open to interpretation and uncertainty. An uncertainty analysis was performed to develop an upper bound for an event sequence probability based on the uncertainty of modeled human actions. The analysis applies to those defects for which probabilities are estimated using event sequence trees, namely: drip shield emplacement error, waste package handling error, waste package surface contamination, thermal misload, and improper heat treatment. The method used to establish an upper bound value for event sequences combines the human error rates probabilistically. Uncertainties are considered only for human error probabilities related to failures. Probability components for success are treated at their nominal level (i.e., without uncertainty), which produces conservative results. No upper bounds were estimated for other failure probabilities related to mechanical failure or based on historical data. Accordingly, the upper bound for an event sequence probability is adjusted for human error probability uncertainties only (CRWMS M&O 2000m).

3.1.2.4 Conclusions in Early Waste Package Failure Analysis

The AMR on early failure of the waste package reviewed available literature on defect-related early failures of welded metallic components used for containment applications. Types of components examined include boilers and pressure vessels, nuclear fuel rods, underground storage tanks, radioactive cesium capsules, and dry-storage casks for spent nuclear fuel. The fraction of the total population that failed due to defect-related causes during the intended lifetime of the component is generally in the range of 10^{-3} to 10^{-6} per container. In most cases, defects that lead to failure of the component require an additional stimulus to cause failure (i.e., the component was not failed when it was placed into service). There were several

examples that indicate that even commercial standards of quality control could reduce the rate of initially failed components well below 10^{-4} per container. The literature review identified eleven generic types of defects that could cause early failures in the components examined: weld flaws; base metal flaws; improper weld material; improper heat treatment; improper weld flux material; poor weld joint design; contaminants; mislocated welds; missing welds; handling and installation damage; and administrative error resulting in an unanticipated environment. The following defect types are considered “not applicable” to the waste package: improper weld flux material, poor joint design, missing welds, and mislocated welds. The analysis estimates the probability that specific defect types will occur on a given waste package, despite a set of quality controls designed to prevent their occurrence. Results of the analysis for the remaining seven types of defects are shown in Table 3-1.

3.1.3 Environment on the Surfaces of the Drip Shield and Waste Package Outer Barrier

The waste package will experience a wide range of environments during its service life. Initially, it will be hot and dry due to the heat generated by radioactive decay. However, the temperature will eventually drop to levels where both humid air corrosion and aqueous phase corrosion will be possible. A companion AMR, *Environment on the Surfaces of the Drip Shield and Waste Package Outer Barrier* (CRWMS M&O 2000a, Section 6) defines the detailed evolution of the environment on the waste package surface. Input from this AMR includes bounding conditions for the local environment on the waste package surface, which include temperature, relative humidity (RH), presence of liquid-phase water, liquid-phase electrolyte concentration (chloride, buffer, and pH), and oxidant level. This AMR has been used to define the threshold RH for humid air corrosion and aqueous phase corrosion, as well as a medium for testing waste package materials under very aggressive “bounding” conditions. These test media are the neutral-pH simulated saturated water and the high-pH basic saturated water, with nominal boiling points of 120 and 112°C, respectively.

Crevice will be formed between the waste package and supports, beneath mineral precipitates, corrosion products, dust, rocks, cement, and biofilms. After the waste package fails, the gap between the waste package outer barrier and the stainless steel structural support can form crevices where the environment may be more severe than the near-field environment. The hydrolysis of dissolved metal can lead to the accumulation of H^+ and a corresponding decrease in pH. Electromigration of Cl^- (and other anions) into the crevice must occur to balance cationic charge associated with H^+ ions. These conditions can exacerbate subsequent attack of the waste package outer barrier and stainless steel structural material by general and localized corrosion, SCC, and other mechanisms. Crevices might also form with the drip shield. These are addressed in the general and localized corrosion discussions in Sections 3.1.5 and 3.1.6.

Table 3-1. Summary of Estimated Probabilities and Performance Consequences for Various Types of Waste Package Defects

Waste Package Defect Type		Probability per Waste Package		Possible Consequences for Postclosure Performance				
		Alloy 22 Barrier	Stainless Steel Structural Shell	Minimal Effect	Degraded Mechanical Properties	Pitting or Crevice Corrosion	Stress Corrosion Cracking	Early Water Contact
Weld Flaws		See Figures 3-1 and 3-2 for Alloy 22 barrier; see Figures in Attachment I of CRWMS M&O 2000m for stainless steel structural shell				✓	✓	
Base Metal Flaws		Factor of 10^{-4} lower than uninspected weld flaw rate				✓	✓	
Improper Weld Material		2.7×10^{-5}	1.4×10^{-5}		✓	✓		
Improper Heat Treatment		2.2×10^{-5}			✓	✓	✓	
Surface Contamination		4.5×10^{-4}	2.5×10^{-4}			✓		
Handling Damage		5.5×10^{-6}	5.0×10^{-7}			✓		
Administrative Error Leading to Unanticipated Environment	Thermal Misload of Waste Package	1.2×10^{-5} to 1.2×10^{-2}		✓				
	Drip Shield Emplacement Error	9.0×10^{-5}						✓

3.1.3.1 Threshold Relative Humidity

As represented by Equation 3-1, humid air corrosion can occur at any RH above the threshold (CRWMS M&O 2000c, 2000d, 2000e):

$$RH \geq RH_{critical} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-1})$$

Rates of humid air corrosion and aqueous phase corrosion are represented by the same CDF. Humid air corrosion is assumed to occur uniformly over each patch used in the waste package degradation code (WAPDEG). Each patch is comparable in size to that of a LTCTF test sample.


As discussed in the AMR *Environment on the Surfaces of the Drip Shield and Waste Package Outer Barrier* (CRWMS M&O 2000a, Section 6.4.2), hygroscopic salts may be deposited on the engineered barrier system (EBS) components by aerosols and dust entrained in ventilation air, backfill, seepage water that enters the drifts, and the episodic water that flows through the drifts. Hygroscopic salts enable aqueous solutions to exist at relative humidities below 100 percent. The threshold RH ($RH_{critical}$) at which an aqueous solution will form for a particular salt is defined as the deliquescence point. This threshold RH defines the condition necessary for aqueous electrochemical corrosion of the metal to occur. The deliquescence point of NaCl is relatively constant with temperature, and is in the range 74 - 76 percent RH. In contrast, the deliquescence point of NaNO_3 has a strong dependence on temperature, ranging from an RH of 75.36 percent at 20°C to 65 percent at 90°C. The equilibrium RH is 50.1 percent at 120.6°C, which is the boiling point of the saturated solution at 101.32 kPa. The evaporative concentration of simulated well J-13 water, a bicarbonate water, which has characteristics of several Yucca Mountain waters, results in a solution of Cl^- , NO_3^- , CO_3^{2-} , Na^+ , and K^+ ions. Other ions that could form salts with lower deliquescence points, such as Ca^{2+} and Mg^{2+} , are precipitated as insoluble species in these waters. It is therefore conservatively assumed that the deliquescence point of NaNO_3 determines the threshold RH. The equilibrium RH for a saturated solution of NaNO_3 as a function of temperature is shown in Figure 3-3. The experimental data fit the following polynomial in temperature:

$$RH_{critical} = -3.5932 \times 10^{-5} \times T(^{\circ}\text{C})^3 + 5.9649 \times 10^{-3} \times T(^{\circ}\text{C})^2 - 0.45377 \times T(^{\circ}\text{C}) + 81.701 \quad (\text{Eq. 3-2})$$

The goodness of fit is characterized by

$$R^2 = 0.9854$$

where R^2 is the coefficient of determination and where R is the coefficient of correlation. This correlation is shown in Figure 3-3 below. The uncertainty in $RH_{critical}$ is discussed in the AMRs on surface environment.



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000a, Section 6.4.2

Figure 3-3. Deliquescence Point for Sodium Nitrate Solutions

The evaporation of well J-13 water results in high concentrations of Na^+ , K^+ , Cl^- , NO_3^- , and CO_3^{2-} . The concentrations of F^- and SO_4^{2-} initially increase, but eventually fall due to precipitation. The simulated saturated water used for testing is an abstract embodiment of this observation. This formulation is based upon the assumption that evaporation of J-13 well water will eventually lead to a sodium-potassium-chloride-nitrate solution. The elimination of carbonate in this test medium is believed to be conservative, in that carbonate would help buffer pH in any occluded geometry such as a crevice.

3.1.3.2 Aqueous Phase Environments

At a given surface temperature, the existence of liquid-phase water on the waste package depends upon the nature of the hygroscopic salt either present on the surface or contained in water dripping on the surface. Two conditions must exist for aqueous phase corrosion: dripping water, and RH above the deliquescence point of the hygroscopic salts in the dripping water. While dripping can occur without the latter condition being met, both conditions are necessary for aqueous phase corrosion. Without this level of RH, no aqueous phase could be sustained on the surface. However, this requires that the evaporation rate of water from the surface exceeds the rate of dripping so that equilibrium conditions exist (CRWMS M&O 2000a). Under non-equilibrium conditions, aqueous solutions could result from dripping water at lower RH.

This model uses Equation 3-2 to conservatively estimate the threshold RH for aqueous phase corrosion ($RH_{critical}$). The composition of the electrolyte formed on the waste package surface is assumed to be that of simulated concentrated water below temperatures of 100°C , and that of simulated saturated water above temperatures of 100°C . Their compositions are shown in

Table 3-2 (CRWMS M&O 2000a, Section 6.12). General aqueous phase corrosion is assumed to occur uniformly over each WAPDEG patch, which is the same size as a standard LTCTF weight-loss sample. Effects of backfill are not considered on the aqueous phase corrosion threshold and rate.

Table 3-2. Composition of Standard Test Media Based upon J-13 Well Water

Ion	J-13 (mg liter ⁻¹)	Simulated Dilute Water (mg liter ⁻¹)	Simulated Concentrated Water (mg liter ⁻¹)	Simulated Acidic Concentrated Water (mg liter ⁻¹)	Simulated Saturated Water (mg liter ⁻¹)
K ⁺	5.04	3.40E+01	3.40E+03	3.40E+03	1.416E+05
Na ⁺	45.8	4.09E+02	4.09E+04	4.09E+04	4.870E+05
Mg ²⁺	2.01	1.00E+00	1.00E+00	1.00E+03	0.000E+00
Ca ²⁺	13.0	5.00E-01	1.00E+00	1.00E+03	0.000E+00
F ⁻	2.18	1.40E+01	1.40E+03	0.00E+00	0.000E+00
Cl ⁻	7.14	6.70E+01	6.70E+03	2.450+04	1.284E+05
NO ₃ ⁻	8.78	6.40E+01	6.40E+03	2.300+04	1.310E+06
SO ₄ ⁻²	18.4	1.67E+02	1.67E+04	3.860+04	0.000E+00
HCO ₃ ⁻	128.9	9.47E+02	7.00E+04	0.00E+00	0.000E+00
Si	28.5	27 (60°C), 49 (90°C)	27 (60°C), 49 (90°C)	27 (60°C), 49 (90°C)	0.000E+00
pH	7.41	8.1	8.1	2.7	7.0

3.1.3.3 Condensation Underneath Drip Shield

Moist air and liquid water flow into and within the drift over time. Although the RH underneath the drip shield increases with time, conditions for condensation on the drip shield can only occur if the drip shield is cooler than the top of the invert and the invert moisture content produces nearly 100 percent RH. This is unlikely since the surfaces of the waste package and drip shield are at a higher temperature than the invert. This assumes that the absence of hygroscopic salt deposits on the underside of the drip shield. It also assumes that water does not creep up the sides of the drip shield.

3.1.3.4 Composition of Water on Exposed Surfaces of Drip Shield and Waste Package

The YMP has used test media relevant to the environment expected in the repository. Relevant test solutions are assumed to include simulated dilute water, simulated concentrated water, and simulated acidic concentrated water at 30, 60, and 90°C, as well as simulated saturated water at 100 and 120°C (Section 1.5.4.2). The compositions of all of the environments are given in Table 3-2. While most of the solutions have been used for several years, the simulated saturated water has been recently developed. In general, anions such as chloride promote localized corrosion, whereas other anions such as nitrate tend to act as corrosion inhibitors. Thus, there is a very complex synergism of corrosion effects in the test media.

Basic saturated water represents another plausible extreme in water chemistry. The basic saturated water composition was established on the basis of results from a distillation experiment. Tables 3-3 and 3-4, show the corresponding water chemistry formulations. The total concentration of dissolved salts in the starting liquid for distillation test was approximately five-times (5×) more concentrated than that in the standard simulated concentrated water solution. It was prepared by using five-times the amount of each chemical that is specified for the preparation of simulated concentrated water. After evaporation of approximately ninety percent (~90 percent) of the water from the starting solution, the residual solution reaches a maximum chloride concentration and has a boiling point of ~112°C. The resultant basic saturated water solution contains (sampled at 112°C) 9 percent chloride, 9 percent nitrate, 0.6 percent sulfate, 0.1 percent fluoride, 0.1 percent silicate, 1 percent (total inorganic carbon from carbonate and bicarbonate), 5 percent potassium, and 11 percent sodium.

Table 3-3. Initial Basic Saturated Water Solution Recipe

Chemical	Quantity (g)
Na ₂ CO ₃ (anhydrous)	10.6
KCl	9.7
NaCl	8.8
NaF	0.2
NaNO ₃	13.6
Na ₂ SO ₄ (anhydrous)	1.4
H ₂ O	55.7

Source: CRWMS M&O 2000a, Section 6.12

Table 3-4. Modified Basic Saturated Water Solution Recipes

Chemical	Basic Saturated Water-13 Quantity	Basic Saturated Water-12 Quantity (g)	Basic Saturated Water-11 Quantity (g)
KCl	8.7 g	8.7 g	8.7 g
NaCl	7.9 g	7.9 g	7.9 g
NaF	0.2 g	0.2 g	0.2 g
NaNO ₃	13.0 g	13.0 g	13.0 g
Na ₂ SO ₄ (anhydrous)	1.4 g	1.4 g	1.4 g
H ₂ O (deionized)	66 ml	66 ml	66 ml
10N NaOH	2 ml		
1N NaOH		2 ml	
0.1N NaOH			2 ml
CO ₂ partial pressure	0	0	0
pH (measured at room temperature)	13.13	12.25	11.11

Source: CRWMS M&O 2000a, Section 6.12

NOTE: The CO₂ partial pressure can be minimized by either scrubbing laboratory air or purchasing CO₂ free air.

In order to add some soluble silica to the solution, the initial basic saturated water solution recipe was later revised to contain ~1 percent metasilicate by adding sodium metasilicate ($\text{Na}_2\text{SiO}_3 \cdot 9\text{H}_2\text{O}$). This solution is designated as basic saturated water-SC where SC indicates the presence of silicate and carbonate in the solution.

The pH of aqueous solutions is affected by the partial pressure of CO_2 in the gas phase. The implication of this is that unless an effort is made to control the pH of the basic saturated water solution, the pH may vary with test conditions and time. In order to conduct long-term testing (months to years), the test environments should be stable. Stable test solutions require that carbonate and silicate not be added. Both of these species can affect pH. Furthermore, gaseous CO_2 must be removed from the air passing above the solution. With no gaseous CO_2 in contact with the solution, and with no carbonate-bicarbonate or silicates in solution, the test environments will be stable. Sodium hydroxide is used to maintain the higher pH of the solution.

In order to maintain constant pH conditions, the basic saturated water solution was modified for corrosion tests, yielding basic saturated water-11, basic saturated water -12, and basic saturated water-13. The three solutions have pH values of approximately 11, 12, and 13, respectively. The recipes of these solutions are given in Table 3-4.

3.1.4 Phase Stability and Aging

Exposure of materials like Alloy 22 to elevated temperatures can result in the formation of undesirable phases. The phases which form in Alloy 22 are often rich in molybdenum and chromium, the two elements that are responsible for the high degree of corrosion resistance of this material. The formation of precipitates depletes these alloying elements from the surrounding areas, therefore increasing susceptibility to general and localized corrosion, as well as SCC. Formation of brittle molybdenum- or chromium-rich phases can also lead to embrittlement of the material and degradation of its mechanical properties. Long range ordering in alloys similar to Alloy 22 has been linked to an increased susceptibility to SCC and hydrogen embrittlement.

The aging of Alloy 22 is dependent on both time and temperature. While the effects of aging have been observed for exposures to elevated temperatures ($>600^\circ\text{C}$) for short time periods, it is important to know the kinetics of this process to enable prediction of aging effects for lower temperatures ($200\text{--}300^\circ\text{C}$) and much longer times (10,000 years).

This section discusses the process-level model developed to account for aging and phase stability in Alloy 22. The development of this model is presented in detail in the corresponding AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000b). Only the highlights will be presented here.

3.1.4.1 Phase Identification in Alloy 22

The long-term aging of Alloy 22 at elevated temperature can cause the precipitation of undesirable phases, if the temperature is sufficiently high. In order to provide a technical basis for the development of a model for aging effects in Alloy 22, samples were aged for a variety of times at different temperatures: for 40,000 hours at 260, 343, and 427°C ; for 30,000 hours at 427°C ; for 1000 hours at 482, 538, and 593°C ; and for 16,000 hours at 593, 649, 704, and

760°C. Samples were then examined with transmission electron microscopy. A weld sample aged at 427°C for 40,000 hours was also examined in the weld metal, in the heat-affected zone (HAZ), and in the base metal removed from the weld. Several phases were observed to form in Alloy 22: P, μ , σ , carbide, and Ni_2 (Cr, Mo) long-range ordering. At 593°C, P phase was observed only on grain boundaries. At the higher aging temperatures (649, 704, and 760°C), both μ and P phases precipitated on grain boundaries. As the aging temperature increased, more μ and P phase precipitation occurred within the grains. Grain boundary carbide precipitation was observed in samples aged at 593 and 704°C. Because of the small amount of carbide present in these samples and the small volume examined in transmission electron microscopy, it is likely that carbides also form at 649°C. A σ phase was observed in the samples aged at 704 and 760°C. The amount of σ phase observed in these samples was small compared to the amount of μ and P phases. Long range order was observed in the samples aged at 593°C for 16,000 hours and for 1,000 hours, in the sample aged at 538°C for 1,000 hours, and in the samples aged at 427°C for 40,000 hours and for 30,000 hours. These observations are summarized in Table 3-5.

Table 3-5. Intermetallic Phases Observed in Alloy 22 with Transmission Electron Microscopy

Aging Condition	Phases Observed to Form in Alloy 22
260°C for 40,000 hr	No long range ordering - No signs of grain boundary precipitation in base metal
343°C for 40,000 hr	No long range ordering - No signs of grain boundary precipitation in base metal
427°C for 30,000 hr	Long range ordering - No signs of grain boundary precipitation in base metal
427°C for 40,000 hr	Long range ordering - No signs of grain boundary precipitation in base metal
482°C for 1000 hr	No long range ordering - No signs of grain boundary precipitation in base metal
538°C for 1000 hr	Long range ordering - No signs of grain boundary precipitation in base metal
593°C for 1000 hr	Long range ordering - grain boundary films of P phase
593°C for 16,000 hr	Long range ordering - grain boundary films of P phase – Carbide precipitates at grain boundary
649°C for 16,000 hr	No long range ordering – Precipitation of P and μ phase mainly at grain boundary
704°C for 16,000 hr	No long range ordering – Precipitation of P and μ phase at grain boundary and within the grains – Carbide and σ precipitation at grain boundary
760°C for 16,000 hr	No long range ordering – Precipitation of P and μ phase at grain boundary and within the grains - σ precipitation at grain boundary

Source: CRWMS M&O 2000b, Section 6.1

3.1.4.2 Kinetics of Brittle Phase Precipitation in Alloy 22 Base Metal

Table 3-6 shows the aging times for the various stages of intermetallic precipitation in Alloy 22 base metal as a function of temperature. These times were approximated from the examination of aged samples after approximately 1, 10, 100, 1000, and in some cases 16,000 hours. The errors noted are due to the uncertainty associated with the coarse time intervals of examination, and are not due to any measurement and test equipment uncertainties, which are much smaller. For example, if precipitation was observed on twin boundaries at 100 hours, it could have begun at any time between 10 and 100 hours. In that case, the time noted for the start of precipitation on the twin boundaries would be 55 hours (halfway between 10 and 100), with upper and lower error bars of 45 hours. Because of the coarse examination intervals, there is some judgment involved in choosing the times noted in Table 3-6. These measurements are only intended as an initial estimate of the precipitation kinetics. These measurements were also used

to generate the isothermal time-temperature-transformation diagram for Alloy 22 base metal shown in Figure 3-4. Some of the data presented in Table 3-5 are also shown in Figure 3-4. The curve associated with long range ordering came from transmission electron microscopy observations. Only a limited number of samples were examined in transmission electron microscopy; therefore, it is likely that ordering occurs at shorter times than indicated in Figure 3-4. The precipitation of intermetallic phases at grain boundaries in Alloy 22 is shown in Figure 3-5 as the white phase surrounding the grains.

Table 3-6. Time Required for Precipitation of Intermetallic and Carbide Particles on the Grain Boundaries of Alloy 22 Base Metal

Temp (°C)	Time to Start on Grain Boundaries			Time to Cover Grain Boundaries		
	Lower Error	Time (hr)	Upper Error	Lower Error	Time (hr)	Upper Error
593	0	10	90	7500	8500	7500
649	1	1	9	450	550	450
704	0.5	0.5	0.5	90	100	900
760	0.5	0.5	0.5	9	10	109
800	0.5	0.5	0.5	9	10	90
Temp (°C)	Time to Start on Twin Boundaries			Time to Start Within Grains		
	Lower Error ^a	Time (hr)	Upper Error ^a	Lower Error	Time (hr)	Upper Error
593	N/A	None observed ^b	N/A	N/A	None observed ^b	N/A
649	450	550	450	7500	8500	7500
704	90	100	900	450	550	450
760	54.5	64.5	54.5	54.5	64.5	54.5
800	45	55	45	45	55	45

Source: CRWMS M&O 2000b, Section 6.2

NOTES: ^a Lower and upper errors represent the lower and upper limits for the data.
^b None observed after 16,000 hrs.





Figure 3-4. Isothermal Time-Temperature-Transformation Diagram for Alloy 22 Base Metal



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000b, Section 4.1.2

NOTE: Increased precipitation in the grain boundary after 1,000 hr of aging compared to 100 hr.

Figure 3-5. Effect of Thermal Aging at 649°C on the Precipitation of Intermetallic Phases at Grain Boundaries on Alloy 22

Nucleation and growth kinetics can be represented by an equation of the form:

$$f = 1 - \exp(-kt^n) \quad (\text{Eq. 3-3})$$


where f is the volume fraction of the precipitating phase, t is time and k and n are constants. The value of k depends on nucleation and growth rates, and, therefore, depends very strongly on temperature. This dependence is shown in Equation 3-4:

$$k = C_1 \exp(-C_2/T) \quad (\text{Eq. 3-4})$$

where C_1 and C_2 are constants, and T is the absolute temperature in Kelvins. Combining Equation 3-3 and Equation 3-4 at constant volume fraction yields:

$$\ln(t_f) = \frac{C_2}{n} \cdot \frac{1}{T} + C_f \quad (\text{Eq. 3-5})$$

where t_f is the time to reach a given volume fraction of grain boundary precipitation. Plots of logarithm of time versus reciprocal temperature for the various stages of precipitation in Alloy 22 base metal are shown in Figure 3-6. At the higher temperatures, grain boundary precipitation is predicted to start after 1 hour, which is the shortest aging time investigated thus far.



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000b, Section 6.2



Figure 3-6. Time to Reach Various Stages of Precipitation in Aged Alloy 22 Base Metal Plotted on a Log Scale as a Function of Reciprocal Temperature (see Equation 3-5)

If it can be assumed that the precipitation mechanism does not change, the lines in Figure 3-6 can be extrapolated to give the times required for the various stages of precipitation at lower temperatures. The measured times are based on examination of micrographs of samples with widely spaced aging times. Extrapolation to lower temperature is difficult since the precipitation rate is very sensitive to temperature. A small change in slope can make a very large change in the time obtained from extrapolation to low temperature. In order to make a bounding argument, however, the curves associated with grain boundary coverage and bulk precipitation in Figure 3-6 are graphically extrapolated to 10,000 years in Figure 3-7. The start of grain boundary precipitation is not plotted because of the limited amount of available data. It must be noted that all data is regarded as preliminary at the present time. Additional work is needed.

The horizontal axes in Figure 3-7 are reciprocal temperature; temperature increases to the left. If an extrapolation of the data intersects the horizontal line corresponding to 10,000 years to the left of the vertical line corresponding to 300°C, then the temperature must be held higher than 300°C to get bulk precipitation in 10,000 years. In both cases, the data indicate that intermetallic precipitation will not occur in less than 10,000 years, even if the temperature is held at 300°C. Also plotted in Figure 3-7 are lines with the minimum possible slope allowed by the error bars on the data. Even accounting for the rather large uncertainty, bulk precipitation does not appear likely in 10,000 years at 300°C. However, grain boundary precipitation might occur if the Alloy 22 stayed at 300°C for 10,000 years. Therefore, a good bounding argument would be to assume that precipitation covers the grain boundaries. As can be seen in the time-temperature-transformation diagram of Figure 3-4, samples aged in the laboratory for more than 100 hours at 700°C would produce a microstructure with precipitation covering the grain boundaries. Complete grain boundary coverage is taken to represent a fully aged material (worst case). Corrosion data obtained from Alloy 22 base metal aged in such a way should represent a worst case condition in regard to phase stability. Corrosion data obtained with aged samples are presented in Section 3.1.4.5 and are presented in greater detail in the AMR on the waste package outer barrier (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.7).


Figure 3-7a shows calculated waste package surface temperature as a function of repository storage time (CRWMS M&O 2000r). The curves shown are for the hottest (design basis) waste package with and without backfill option. It can be seen that, for the case of “no backfill,” waste package temperatures are sufficiently low that phase stability of Alloy 22 should not be an issue.

As a measure of the reasonableness of the data plotted in Figure 3-7, the activation energy can be calculated. The slopes of the lines in Figure 3-7 (after accounting for the $\log(e)$ factor) are equal to C_2/n in Equation 3-5. If these slopes are averaged and n is assumed to be equal to one, then the activation energy is 280 kJ mol^{-1} (68 kcal mol^{-1} using a gas constant $R=1.987 \text{ cal mol}^{-1} \text{ K}^{-1}$). This is close to the value of 62 kcal mol^{-1} obtained for precipitation in Alloy C-276. This value is also typical for diffusion of relevant elements in nickel. For example, the activation energy for diffusion of chromium in nickel is $272.6 \text{ kJ mol}^{-1}$, that of iron is $253\text{-}270 \text{ kJ mol}^{-1}$, and that of tungsten in nickel is $300\text{-}308 \text{ kJ mol}^{-1}$.



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000b, Section 6.2

Figure 3-7. Graphical Extrapolation of the Curves to Repository-Relevant Temperatures



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000r

Figure 3-7a. Temperature of the Waste Package Outer Barrier Surface as a Function of Time for the Hottest Waste Package

3.1.4.3 Kinetics of Intermetallic Precipitation in Alloy 22 Welds

The HAZ of a weld is the region of the base metal near the weld that is subjected to a significant thermal pulse during the welding process. Intermetallic precipitation processes in the HAZ are expected to be similar to that in the base metal, but actual rates of precipitation (kinetics) may be different. The high temperatures, approaching the melting point, seen in the HAZ of welds might trigger nucleation of intermetallic or carbide precipitates. If nuclei are already present, precipitation will proceed much faster than in the base metal where they are not present.

Very few precipitates have been observed in the HAZ of weld samples thus far, but only two weld samples have been examined: one in the as-welded condition and one after aging at 427°C for 40,000 hours. These precipitates may simply be carbides that were present in the mill-annealed (as-received) condition. Carbides are known to be present in nickel-based alloys similar to Alloy 22, but they are usually within the grains. These are generally called primary carbides to distinguish them from other secondary phases that often form on grain boundaries after an aging treatment.

Welding causes melting of the alloy and the development of an as-cast structure upon cooling. As an Alloy 22 weld solidifies, molybdenum and chromium are rejected from the solid phase causing their concentration to increase in the liquid. Therefore, the interdendritic regions, which are the last solid to form in a weld, tend to have high concentrations of these elements relative to typical values for Alloy 22. Because formation of the intermetallic phases, which are also

enriched in molybdenum and/or chromium, are favored by higher molybdenum and chromium concentrations, these phases are present in the interdendritic regions of Alloy 22 welds. Such precipitates are present in Alloy 22 welds from the beginning. Growth of the precipitate phases may affect corrosion performance of the welds. Additional data are needed to quantify the growth kinetics of the phases under repository conditions. Corrosion data available from the LTCTF to date shows no measurable difference between welded and base metal samples.

3.1.4.4 Kinetics of Ordering Reactions in Alloy 22

Long range ordering is treated in a manner similar to that discussed for intermetallic and carbide precipitation. However, very little kinetic data exist for long range ordering in Alloy 22. Thus far, long range ordering has been observed in five samples. A very fine dispersion of ordered domains was seen in Alloy 22 base metal after aging for 30,000 and 40,000 hours at 427°C, and was also seen in a weld similarly aged. The ordering in these cases was so fine that it would have been very difficult to measure the volume fraction of the ordered domains. Long range ordering was also observed in Alloy 22 base metal aged at 593°C for 16,000 hours, and at 538 and 593°C for 1,000 hours. The volume fraction of ordered domains has not been measured in these samples. No long range ordering was observed with transmission electron microscopy in Alloy 22 base-metal samples aged for 40,000 hours at 260 and 343°C, or for 1,000 hours at 482°C.

A bounding argument may be made by using two facts: Long range ordering is just beginning after aging for 30,000 hours at 427°C, and long range ordering domains are small after aging for 1,000 hours at 538°C. The corresponding points are graphed as an Arrhenius plot in Figure 3-8. Samples aged for shorter times at 427 and 538°C have not yet been examined in transmission electron microscopy. The curve in Figure 3-8 may shift to shorter times (down) after more data are collected. Because the long range ordering domains are very small after aging at 427°C for 30,000 hours, the point corresponding to this aging condition is not likely to change much (Figure 3-8). In other words, long range ordering is not likely to occur in Alloy 22 base metal at 427°C in times significantly less than 30,000 hours. After more data are collected, the data point corresponding to aging at 538°C for 1,000 hours will most likely shift down more than that corresponding to aging at 427°C for 30,000 hours. Since this shift will cause the slope to increase, the curve in Figure 3-8 represents a bounding case. This graph indicates that long range ordering may occur in less than 10,000 years at 300°C. Equation 3-6 was obtained by curve fitting and is shown in Figure 3-8:

$$\ln(t) = \ln(5 \times 10^{-7}) + \frac{17395}{T} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-6})$$

Solving Equation 3-6 for temperature T yields:

$$T = \frac{17395}{\ln(t) - \ln(5 \times 10^{-7})} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-7})$$

Based upon this analysis, it is concluded that no long range ordering will occur after 10,000 years (8.8×10^7 hours), provided that the temperature remains below approximately 260°C (530 K). More samples are being tested to confirm this conclusion.





Figure 3-8. Graphical Extrapolation of the Limited Kinetic Data for Long Range Order in Alloy 22 Base Metal

3.1.4.5 Effects of Thermal Aging on Corrosion Potential and Rate

The long-term aging of Alloy 22 at elevated temperature can cause the precipitation of undesirable intermetallic phases. Based upon the analyses discussed in the preceding section, it is recommended that the waste package surface temperature be limited to levels below 300°C. An extrapolation of the data shown in Figure 3-6 indicates that the phase stability of Alloy 22 base metal will not be a problem below this limit. The significance of the uncertainties in this data is discussed in Section 3.1.9. At temperatures above 350°C, there is unacceptable degradation of cladding on the spent nuclear fuel. With these two constraints, the impact of aging and phase instability on the corrosion of Alloy 22 should be minimal.


Samples of Alloy 22 were aged at 700°C for either 10 or 173 hours. The corrosion resistance of these aged samples is compared to that of base metal in several standardized test media. Figure 3-9 shows a comparison of cyclic polarization curves for base metal and thermally aged material in simulated acidic concentrated water at 90°C. Both curves exhibit generic Type 1 behavior (see Section 3.1.6.3). Type 1 behavior is indicative of passive film stability between the corrosion potential and the thermodynamic limit of the electrolyte (oxygen evolution). In this case, aging shifts the corrosion potential to less noble values, from -176 to -239 mV (versus a standard Ag/AgCl reference electrode). The passive current density is increased slightly, which is interpreted as a slight increase in corrosion rate. The highest non-equilibrium passive current density observed for the base metal is approximately $4 \mu\text{A cm}^{-2}$, compared to approximately $10 \mu\text{A cm}^{-2}$ for fully aged material.



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.7.1

Figure 3-9. Effect of Thermal Aging for 173 Hours at 700°C on the Corrosion Resistance of Alloy 22 in Simulated Acidic Concentrated Water at 90°C

Figure 3-10 shows a comparison of cyclic polarization curves for base metal and thermally aged material in simulated concentrated water at 90°C. In this case, aging also appears to shift the corrosion potential to less noble values, from -237 to somewhere between -328 and -346 mV versus a standard Ag/AgCl reference electrode. In all three cases, the anodic oxidation peak that is characteristic of generic Type 2 behavior is observed. See Section 3.1.6.3 for more detailed discussion. In tests with basic saturated water-13, aging also appears to shift the corrosion potential to less noble values.



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.7.1

Figure 3-10. Effect of Thermal Aging for 173 Hours at 700°C on the Corrosion Resistance of Alloy 22 in Simulated Concentrated Water at 90°C

In summary, a fully aged sample of Alloy 22 appears to exhibit a less noble corrosion potential. Typically, the corrosion potential of such a sample is shifted approximately -63 mV in simulated acidic water at 90°C; -109 mV in simulated concentrated water at 90°C; and more than -100 mV in basic saturated water at 100°C. Based on this data, it appears that E_{corr} can be corrected to account for fully aged material by subtracting approximately 100 mV from values calculated for the base metal. The shift in $E_{critical}$ (Threshold Potential 1) also appears to be approximately 100 mV in most cases. Thus, the difference $E_{critical} - E_{corr}$ is virtually unchanged. This implies that even though the corrosion potential is shifted, the susceptibility to localized corrosion remains unchanged.

The effect of thermal aging on the corrosion rate is accounted for in an enhancement factor, G_{aged} , and is based upon a ratio of the non-equilibrium passive current densities for base metal and aged material.

$$\left(\frac{dp}{dt} \right)_{effective}^{corrected} = G_{aged} \times \left(\frac{dp}{dt} \right)_{effective}^{original} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-8})$$

where dp/dt is the penetration rate for localized corrosion. The value of G_{aged} for Alloy 22 base metal is approximately one ($G_{aged} \sim 1$), whereas the value of G_{aged} for fully aged material is larger ($G_{aged} \sim 2.5$) (CRWMS M&O 2000c). Material with less precipitation than the fully aged material would have an intermediate value of G_{aged} ($1 \leq G_{aged} \leq 2.5$). Therefore, a value of 2.5 for G_{aged} is conservatively used to bound the potential aging effect. Corrosion is discussed in greater detail in the sections that follow.

3.1.5 General Corrosion


The integrated model for general corrosion of the materials of interest includes sub-models for dry oxidation, humid air and aqueous phase corrosion. Details of these sub-models are provided in supporting AMRs (CRWMS M&O 2000c, 2000d, and 2000e). A schematic representation of the integrated model for waste package and drip shield materials, as well as an augmentation of this model, are shown in Figures 3-11 and 3-12. Only a brief summary of the integrated model and component sub-models is provided here.

3.1.5.1 Dry Oxidation

Dry oxidation (dry air corrosion) occurs at any RH below the threshold for humid air corrosion:


$$RH < RH_{critical} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-9})$$

This process results in the formation of an adherent, protective oxide film of uniform thickness. The rate of dry air corrosion may be limited by the rate of mass transport through the growing metal oxide film. In such cases, the oxide thickness is expected to obey a parabolic growth law (film thickness proportional to the square root of time). This scenario has been adopted for Alloy 22 and 316NG due to the availability of data at elevated temperature to support such a model. Reasonable values of the parabolic rate constant are discussed below. It must be noted that a logarithmic law may be more applicable at lower temperatures. However, there is insufficient data to support such a model for Alloy 22 and 316NG. There is sufficient data to support the application of a logarithmic law to the dry air corrosion of titanium. It is assumed that dry air corrosion occurs uniformly over each WAPDEG patch, which is comparable in size to that of a LTCTF sample with generic weight-loss geometry. Backfill effects are not included in the model for dry air corrosion threshold and rate.



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.10

Figure 3-11. Schematic Representation of Model for General Corrosion and Localized Corrosion of Drip Shield and Waste Package Materials



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.10

NOTE: A similar strategy is used to account for aging.

Figure 3-12. Schematic Representation Showing Augmentation of Model for General Corrosion and Localized Corrosion to Account for Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion of Drip Shield and Waste Package Materials

3.1.5.1.1 Dry Oxidation of Alloy 22 and 316NG

Dry air corrosion of Alloy 22 and 316NG stainless steel is expected to occur at any $RH < RH_{critical}$ thereby forming an adherent, protective oxide film of uniform thickness. It is assumed that the protective oxide film is primarily Cr_2O_3 . The oxidation reaction is given as



The rate of dry air corrosion is limited by mass transport through this growing metal oxide film with the film thickness being proportional to the square root of time. This is represented by Equation 3-11:

$$x = \sqrt{x_0^2 + k \times t} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-11})$$

where x_0 is the initial oxide thickness, x is the oxide thickness at time t , and k is a temperature-dependent parabolic rate constant.

To facilitate an approximate calculation, published values of k can be used (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Sections 1.6 and 6.10). The highest waste package temperature in the repository is assumed to be 350°C (623 K), which corresponds to the limit for the spent nuclear fuel cladding. Note that the cladding will be hotter than the waste package outer barrier. The value of k corresponding to this upper temperature limit is $2.73 \times 10^{-24} \text{ m}^2 \text{ s}^{-1}$ (8.61×10^{-5} square μm per year). After one year, this corresponds to a growth of about 0.0093 μm . The estimated rate (9.3 nm y^{-1}) is comparable to that expected for aqueous phase corrosion at lower temperatures, based upon data presented in this PMR. The parabolic law is used to represent the dry air corrosion Alloy 22 and 316NG, and is relatively conservative.

3.1.5.1.2 Dry Oxidation of Titanium Grade 7


As discussed in the AMRs for general and localized corrosion of the drip shield (CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.1), the logarithmic growth law may be more appropriate at low temperature than the parabolic law. However, such a logarithmic expression predicts that the oxide thickness (penetration) asymptotically approaches a small maximum value. In contrast, the parabolic law predicts continuous growth of the oxide, which is much more conservative. Figure 3-13 shows a regression analysis of dry air corrosion rate data for titanium, where X is the oxide thickness at time t and X_{max} is the maximum oxide thickness.

3.1.5.2 Humid Air Corrosion

Humid air corrosion is assumed to occur above a threshold RH, provided that there are no impinging drips:

$$RH \geq RH_{critical} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-12})$$

The threshold RH for humid air corrosion ($RH_{critical}$) is assumed to obey Equation 3-2. Note that “threshold RH” and “critical RH” are synonymous terms. The existence of this threshold is due to the relationship between water adsorption and RH.



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.1

Figure 3-13. Regression Analysis of Dry Oxidation Rate Data for Titanium

It can be conservatively assumed that the rate of humid air corrosion can be represented by the same corrosion rate distribution used for aqueous phase corrosion during the period where humid air corrosion is operable. It is further assumed that the corrosion rate is constant and does not decrease with time (at times greater than two years). Less conservative corrosion models assume that the rate decays with time. The rates for aqueous phase corrosion of stainless steel 316NG, Alloy 22, and Titanium Grade 16 (analog of Titanium Grade 7) are described in detail elsewhere in this section.

3.1.5.3 Aqueous Phase Corrosion

At a given temperature, the existence of liquid-phase water on the surface of the waste package depends upon the presence of a salt deposit. In the presence of such a deposit, a thin-film liquid phase can be established at a higher temperature than otherwise possible. In the model discussed here, it is assumed that two conditions must be met for aqueous phase corrosion: RH above the deliquescence point of the deposit at the temperature of the waste package surface and drips impinging on the waste package surface. The threshold RH for aqueous phase corrosion is identical to that for humid air corrosion:

$$RH \geq RH_{critical} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-13})$$

This threshold RH for aqueous phase corrosion ($RH_{critical}$) is also assumed to obey Equation 3-2, which is based upon the AMR entitled *Environment on the Surface of Drip Shield and Waste Package Outer Barrier* (CRWMS M&O 2000a, Section 6.4.2). For the time being, the composition of the electrolyte formed on the waste package surface is assumed to be that of simulated concentrated water below 100°C, and that of simulated saturated water above 100°C.

The distributions of general corrosion rates for aqueous phase corrosion of stainless steel 316NG, Alloy 22, and Titanium Grade 16 (analog of Titanium Grade 7) are described in detail in this PMR. It is conservatively assumed that the corrosion rate is constant and that it does not decrease with time (at times greater than two years).

3.1.5.4 Rates of General and Localized Corrosion


Penetration rates based upon general corrosion are used in the model if the threshold potential ($E_{critical}$) is not exceeded. General corrosion rates have been estimated based on the weight-loss data from the LTCTF. Localized corrosion rates and failure mode characteristics (e.g., number of failure sites and opening size) must be estimated from other published data. Since pitting of Alloy 22 or Titanium Grade 16 has not been observed in the LTCTF, it is assumed that crevice corrosion is the primary mode of localized corrosion (if localized attack occurs at all). This accelerated mode of attack is assumed to occur uniformly over the entire affected WAPDEG patch. Uncertainty is accounted for in the WAPDEG stochastic simulation.

3.1.5.4.1 Rates for 316L Stainless Steel – Published Data

The samples involved in the YMP corrosion testing program do not include stainless steel specimens. Therefore, data published in the literature must be used to determine corrosion rates. Rates of localized corrosion are used if the threshold potential is exceeded. Otherwise, general corrosion rates are used. The distribution of general and localized corrosion rates were estimated from the published data for Types 304 and 316 stainless steels presented in the AMR on degradation of the stainless steel structural material (CRWMS M&O 2000e, Section 6.5). These data are shown in Figures 3-14 through 3-17. Curves are shown for general corrosion in atmospheric and aqueous-phase environments, as well as for localized corrosion in aqueous-phase environments. The corresponding distributions can be represented by the following general correlation:


$$y = b_0 + b_1x \quad (\text{Eq. 3-14})$$

where y is the cumulative probability or percentile, and x is the logarithm of the corrosion rate, which is expressed in microns per year. Parameters are given in Figure 3-15. These CDFs are truncated for any nonsensical calculated values above one-hundred percent (100 percent). These distributions do not reflect any environmental dependence, since such a correlation could not be established based upon published data. It is assumed that these distributions are primarily due to variability. In lieu of rigorous estimates of uncertainty, the uncertainty is assumed to be comparable to the variability.




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000e, Section 6.5

Figure 3-14. Range of Observed Penetration Rates for Stainless Steels 304 and 316 Shown as Cumulative Probability Distributions




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000e, Section 6.5

Figure 3-15. Range of Observed Logarithms of Penetration Rates for Stainless Steels 304 and 316 Shown as Cumulative Probability Distributions



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000e, Section 6.5

Figure 3-16. Range of Localized Penetration Rates for Stainless Steels 304 and 316



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000e, Section 6.5

Figure 3-17. Comparison of Observed Penetration Rates for Stainless Steels 304 and 316

From a comparison of the data for Types 304 and 316 stainless steels, the advantages of molybdenum additions are evident. Since Type 316 stainless steel contains more molybdenum than Type 304 stainless steel, the corrosion rates of Type 304 stainless steel are higher than comparable rates of Type 316 stainless steel. From Figure 3-14, the localized corrosion rates of Type 316 stainless steel appear to lie between 10^3 and $10^4 \mu\text{m y}^{-1}$. The general corrosion rates for aqueous phase corrosion of Type 316 appear to lie between 10^{-1} and $10^2 \mu\text{m y}^{-1}$. The general corrosion rates for humid air corrosion (atmospheric corrosion) of Type 316 stainless steel appear to lie between 10^{-3} and $10^{-1} \mu\text{m y}^{-1}$. It is assumed that the published rates for Type 316 stainless steel are representative of those for Type 316NG stainless steel. The regression line shown in Figure 3-15 is assumed to represent the combined uncertainty and variability. Figures 3-16 and 3-17 show the probability distribution of the corrosion rates and comparison of the observed penetration rates for Types 304 and 316 stainless steels, respectively.

3.1.5.4.2 Rates for Nickel-Based Alloy 22 – Weight-Loss Measurements from Long Term Corrosion Test Facility

The LTCTF provides a relatively complete source of corrosion data for Alloy 22 in environments relevant to the potential high-level radioactive waste repository at Yucca Mountain. The results from that facility are described in detail in the AMR on general corrosion of Alloy 22 (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.5.2). Testing is done in a wide range of plausible media, including simulated dilute water, simulated concentrated water, simulated acidic concentrated water, and simulated cement modified water. Simulated dilute water has ten times ($10\times$) the ionic content of J-13 well water, while simulated concentrated water has $1000\times$ the ionic content. The measured pH levels of the $10\times$ and $1000\times$ J-13 well waters are 9.5 to 10, respectively. Simulated acidic concentrated well water is acidified water that has $4000\times$ the ionic content of J-13 well water and a pH of approximately 2.7. These concentrated test solutions are intended to mimic the evaporative concentration of electrolytes on the hot waste package surface. Due to solubility limitations, not all salts in the water concentrate to the same nominal levels. However, the more soluble anions such as chloride, sulfate, and nitrate (which have the biggest effects on corrosion) do reach nominal levels.

Specimens are tested at two temperatures (60 and 90°C) in each water chemistry. Half of the specimens are fully immersed, while the remaining half are exposed to the wet vapor above the water line. A few specimens are placed right at the water line. Half of the specimens contain welds, while the remaining half are unwelded.

Crevice specimens are mounted to support racks with Teflon-coated fasteners and washers. Teflon crevice-forming washers are spring loaded to ensure that contact is maintained between the washers and specimens (crevice effects are more severe in tight crevices).

At least 144 test specimens are measured during each exposure period (6-, 12-, and 24-month, thus far). The general corrosion rates are determined from weight-loss measurements made at the end of predetermined exposure periods. These measurements are based upon ASTM G 1-81, *Standard Practice for Preparing, Cleaning, and Evaluating Corrosion Test Specimens* or the more recent ASTM G 1-90 (Reapproved 1999), *Standard Practice for Preparing, Cleaning, and Evaluating Corrosion Test Specimens*. All specimens are cleaned in accordance with applicable American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) procedures prior to making weight and

dimensional measurements. Uncertainty in the measured rates decreases with increasing exposure time. Details of the facility, sample configurations, and the procedure used for handling the samples are provided in the AMR on general and localized corrosion of Alloy 22 (CRWMS M&O 2000c Section 6.5.2).

The general corrosion (penetration) rate of an alloy can be calculated from weight-loss data with the following general formula:

$$\text{Corrosion Rate} = \frac{(K \times W)}{(A \times T \times D)} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-15})$$

where K is a constant, T is the time of exposure in hours, A is the exposed area of the sample in square centimeters, W is the mass loss in grams, and D is the density of Alloy 22 in grams per cubic centimeter. The value of K used for the LTCTF data was $8.76 \times 10^7 \mu\text{m y}^{-1} \text{h cm}^{-1}$. A sample calculation for Alloy 22 is shown below:

$$K = 8.76 \times 10^7 \text{ nm y}^{-1} \text{h cm}^{-1}$$

$$W = 0.0001 \text{ g}$$

$$A = 1.0 \text{ cm}^2$$

$$T = 4320 \text{ h}$$

$$D = 8.69 \text{ g cm}^{-3}$$

$$\text{Corrosion Rate} = \frac{(8.76 \times 10^7 \text{ nm y}^{-1} \text{h cm}^{-1})(0.0001 \text{ g})}{(1.0 \text{ cm}^2)(4320 \text{ h})(8.69 \text{ g cm}^{-3})} = 0.23 \text{ nm y}^{-1}$$

General corrosion rates based on generic weight-loss samples are independent of temperature between 60 and 90°C. Furthermore, the composition of the test medium (simulated dilute water, simulated concentrated water, or simulated acidic concentrated water) appears to have little effect. When all of the measured rates are ranked together, regardless of the test medium or temperature, the data appear to be normally distributed around a median value.

In regard to generic crevice samples, general corrosion rates are based on areas outside the crevice. In this case, the measurements are also independent of temperature and test medium. When all of the corrosion rates based on these samples are ranked together, most of the data points appear to be normally distributed around a median value. There are four samples (outliers) that have abnormally high weight losses, which yield rates up to 731 nanometers per year. No crevice attack of these four samples is evident with microscopic examination. The high weight-loss values for these samples may be due to the accidental removal of material during mechanical assembly of the crevice. These outlier rates will not lead to failure of the waste package outer barrier by general corrosion during the first 10,000 years of service.

The average corrosion rate based upon all weight-loss samples with 6- and 12-month exposure is 20 nm y^{-1} , with a standard deviation of 40 nm y^{-1} . The average corrosion rate based upon all crevice samples with comparable exposure is 71 nm y^{-1} , with a standard deviation of 89 nm y^{-1} . If the four abnormally high rates are omitted, the average rate is then calculated to be 57 nm y^{-1} .


with a standard deviation of 40 nm y^{-1} . At temperatures less than 90°C , it does not appear that the life of the waste package outer barrier will be determined by general corrosion.

It should be noted that the measured corrosion rates include some negative values. These negative rates correspond to cases where the samples actually appear to have gained weight during exposure, due to oxide growth or the formation of silicate deposits. To substantiate these interpretations, atomic force microscopy and X-ray diffraction have been used to inspect a number of samples removed from the LTCTF. Results of this study are discussed in detail in Attachment I of the AMR on the general and localized corrosion of Alloy 22 (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.5.5) and summarized later in this subsection.

Based upon these data and the associated error analysis, one conservative and defensible overall representation of the observed corrosion rates with 6- and 12-month exposure has been proposed. This approach involves combining the distributions of rates calculated from weight loss and crevice samples. These data are for samples having the generic weight-loss and crevice geometry, respectively. It is conservatively assumed that no scale formation occurs, so all negative rates are eliminated and the entire distribution is assumed to be due to uncertainty. The rate at the 50th percentile is approximately 50 nm y^{-1} , the rate at the 90th percentile is approximately 100 nm y^{-1} , and the maximum rate is 731 nm y^{-1} . Approximately 10 percent of the values fall between 100 and 731 nm y^{-1} .


Data representing 24 months of exposure has recently become available. Various CDFs generated with 24-month data alone are shown in Figures 3-18 through 3-21. The mean corrosion rate in Figure 3-21 is 10 nm y^{-1} . The rates of general corrosion do not appear to depend strongly on temperature and chemical composition of the water. Negative corrosion rates may indicate a weight gain by the specimen, even after thorough cleaning to remove corrosion products and oxides from the surface.

CDFs generated with a combined data set representing 6-, 12-, and 24-month data are shown in Figures 3-22 and 3-23. The curve shown in Figure 3-22 includes apparent negative rates, while those negative values have been eliminated from the curve shown in Figure 3-23. The curve shown in Figure 3-23 is summarized in Table 3-7. The distributions based upon the 24-month data are more narrow than comparable distributions based upon 6- and 12-month data. Since rates are calculated by dividing exposure time into the weight loss, a doubling of exposure time reduces the estimated error by a factor of two (2X). While outliers were observed in the 6-month data, as previously discussed, none were observed in the 12- and 24-month (one- and two-year) data.




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.9

Figure 3-18. Two-Year General Corrosion Rate Data from Long Term Corrosion Test Facility Based Upon Generic Weight-Loss Samples




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.9

Figure 3-19. Two-Year General Corrosion Rate Data from Long Term Corrosion Test Facility Based Upon Generic Crevice Samples




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.9

Figure 3-20. Two-Year General Corrosion Rate Data From Long Term Corrosion Test Facility Based Upon Both Generic Weight-Loss and Crevice Samples, Including Those with Apparent Negative Rates




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.9

Figure 3-21. Two-Year General Corrosion Rate Data From Long Term Corrosion Test Facility Based Upon Both Generic Weight-Loss and Crevice Samples, Excluding Those with Apparent Negative Rates



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.9

Figure 3-22. Combination of All General Corrosion Rate Data for Alloy 22 from Long Term Corrosion Test Facility, Including 6-, 12-, and 24-Month Exposures



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.9

Figure 3-23. Combination of All General Corrosion Rate Data for Alloy 22 from Long Term Corrosion Test Facility, Including 6-, 12-, and 24-Month Exposures with Negative Rates Excluded

Table 3-7. Summary of the Distribution of Rates for General Corrosion of Alloy 22 Samples

Percentile	Penetration Rate (nm y ⁻¹)
0.00	0
5.20	2.07
10.00	4.21
50.40	26.64
90.00	97.99
95.20	112.54
97.60	143.08
99.20	250.56
99.60	467.28
100.00	730.77

Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.9

In summary, the ranges of general corrosion rates measured at three time intervals (6, 12, and 24 months of exposure) are:

6-month exposure: range -0.06 to $+0.73 \mu\text{m y}^{-1}$; mean $0.05 \mu\text{m y}^{-1}$
12-month exposure: range -0.04 to $+0.10 \mu\text{m y}^{-1}$; mean $0.03 \mu\text{m y}^{-1}$
24-month exposure: range -0.03 to $+0.07 \mu\text{m y}^{-1}$; mean $0.01 \mu\text{m y}^{-1}$

The atomic force microscopy has been used to characterize the surface topographies of five weight-loss coupons of Alloy 22, which had been exposed to various environments in the LTCTF for one year (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.5.5). Having sub-nanometer vertical resolution, the atomic force microscopy is an ideal tool for detecting extremely small penetrations in corrosion-resistant materials such as Alloy 22. These samples include an unexposed control sample, a sample exposed to aqueous-phase simulated acidic concentrated water, a sample exposed to vapor-phase simulated acidic concentrated water, a sample exposed to aqueous-phase simulated concentrated water, and a sample exposed to vapor-phase simulated concentrated water. After the samples were removed from the LTCTF, they were ultrasonically agitated in deionized water, acetone, and methanol for ten minutes each. The Digital Instruments DM3100 AFM was then used for imaging. Each set of data consists of a large-area scan ($25 \mu\text{m} \times 25 \mu\text{m}$), followed by smaller-area details of the region displayed in the large-area scan.

The gross surface topography is dominated by the machining grooves, with typical heights of several hundred nanometers and typical lateral periodicities of several microns, features plainly visible on images of the control sample. Samples removed from the LTCTF exhibit varying degrees of coverage by a deposit on top of this gross topography. The atomic force microscopy images show that the most extensive deposit formation occurred on the sample exposed to aqueous-phase simulated acidic concentrated water (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Attachment 1). The next most extensive deposit formation occurred on the sample exposed to vapor-phase simulated acidic concentrated water. X-ray diffraction of all five coupons showed that the deposit is predominantly silica (SiO_2), with some NaCl appearing on the two samples which were in the simulated acidic concentrated water tank (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Attachment 1). Based upon

both atomic force microscopy and x-ray diffraction data, the two samples exposed to simulated concentrated water showed lesser degrees of coverage by the silicate deposit. In some cases, depressions can be seen in the silicate deposit. However, it is not believed that any of these penetrate to the underlying metal.

At the present time, there is insufficient data to determine the amount of silicate removed from exposed Alloy 22 samples by the standard cleaning method (CRWMS M&O 2000c). Accordingly, a worst-case estimate of the impact of SiO_2 on measured general corrosion rates can be used.

The formation of SiO_2 deposits on the surface of the Alloy 22 could bias the distributions of general corrosion rate shown in earlier sections of this PMR. From various atomic force microscopy images of Alloy 22 samples removed from the LTCTF, it appears that a typical deposit can have a thickness as great as 0.25 microns after 12 months of exposure. It is assumed that the deposit has the density of lechatelierite (amorphous SiO_2), which is approximately 2.19 g cm^{-3} . It is further assumed that the surface is completely and uniformly covered by this deposit. The estimated surface areas of the weight-loss and crevice samples are 30.65 and 57.08 cm^2 , respectively (4.75 and 8.85 in^2 , respectively). Consequently, the deposit thickness (0.25 microns) translates into a mass change of 1.678 and 3.125 mg for weight-loss and crevice samples, respectively, after 12 months of exposure. The formula used to calculate the corrosion rate from weight-loss and dimensional change is then applied to determine the impact of such a positive mass change on the calculated rate. The estimated maximum bias is $0.063 \text{ } \mu\text{m per year}$ (63 nm y^{-1}) for all weight-loss samples.

The distributions of general corrosion rate shown in previous sections can be corrected for the maximum bias due to SiO_2 deposit formation by adding a constant value of 63 nm y^{-1} to each estimated value of the general corrosion rate. This is equivalent to shifting the curves shown in figures to the right by 63 nm y^{-1} . Similar corrections could be applied to the Titanium Grade 7 data. Since the entire surface may not be covered by SiO_2 , it may be preferable to distribute the correction between 0 and 63 nm y^{-1} .

The atomic force microscopy has been used to examine areas inside and outside of Alloy 22 crevices exposed to simulated concentrated water at 90°C for 12 months. Though the images were obtained with a welded sample, the unwelded area was imaged with the atomic force microscopy. There appears to be no significant difference between the roughness of the four areas that were examined. Since it has been observed that corrosion tends to roughen the surface, it is concluded that there is no more attack inside the crevice than outside.

The observed decrease in the mean corrosion rate and in the range of data scatter with increasing exposure time from 6 months to 24 months is fully consistent with the expected corrosion behavior of passive alloys such as Alloy 22 under repository type aqueous conditions. For example, examination of very long term monitored corrosion results on passive type alloys are shown plotted in the Metals Handbook, (ASM International 1987, Volume 13, p. 911, Figure 42). As can be seen in this figure for aluminum alloys exposed to various marine environments for times up to 30 years, there is an initial higher corrosion rate at short times ($< \sim 1 \text{ year}$), and the rate drops off in a parabolic manner with increasing time. This is expected behavior for alloys where the passive film grows by a parabolic or logarithmic diffusion controlled process.

For this type behavior, the expected scatter at very short times where the rate is varying rapidly will be greater than at longer times where the rate is much lower. This type of behavior can also be seen for Alloy 22 where the extensive general corrosion test results now available from the LTCTF show a significantly larger 6-month mean rate of $0.05 \mu\text{m y}^{-1}$ as compared to a mean value of $0.01 \mu\text{m y}^{-1}$ at 24 months. Further, the observed 6-month data scatter is much greater ($-.06$ to $+0.73 \mu\text{m y}^{-1}$) than at 24 months (-0.03 to $+0.07 \mu\text{m y}^{-1}$) as expected and indicates that it is conservative to use the 24 month results to represent the much longer term general corrosion behavior of Alloy 22 under expected repository conditions.


The maximum observed rate, which is much less than 1 micron per year, clearly indicates that the life of the waste package outer barrier will not be limited by general corrosion. No evidence of localized corrosion has been observed, even after two years of exposure. Examination of plastically strained U-bend specimens, again for all three time periods, indicates no initiation of SCC in both the base material and in the welded material. Half the number of these U-bend specimens contained welds.

3.1.5.4.3 Rates for Titanium Grade 16 – Weight-Loss Measurements from Long Term Corrosion Test Facility

All general corrosion rates for Titanium Grade 16 are based on LTCTF weight-loss samples and are shown in Figure 3-24. It appears that these measurements are independent of temperature between 60 and 90°C. Furthermore, the composition of the test medium (simulated dilute water, simulated concentrated water, or simulated acidic concentrated water) appears to have little impact on the measurements. With the exception of four outliers with negative values, most of the rates plotted in Figure 3-24 are between -200 and +200 nanometers per year. The median is at approximately zero. The outliers with large negative rates are believed to represent samples where there was significant oxide growth or scale formation (CRWMS M&O 2000c).


This analysis only includes Titanium Grade 16 samples exposed for 12 months in the LTCTF. As discussed in the supporting AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.5.2), the cleaning method employed with the 6-month titanium samples caused significant metal loss, thereby yielding unusually high corrosion rates that proved to be artifacts. Very little cleaning was used for the 12-month samples, which may account for the large negative values in Figure 3-24 (scale formation).

All general corrosion rates for Titanium Grade 16 based on LTCTF crevice samples are shown in Figure 3-25 (rates based on areas outside of crevice). In this case, it also appears that the measurements are independent of temperature and test medium. Most of the rates plotted in Figure 3-25 are between -350 and +350 nanometers per year. The median is at approximately zero. The largest measured rate shown in Figure 3-25, which is less than +350 microns per year, will not lead to failure of the drip shield during the first 10,000 years of its service life. Based upon these data, it does not appear that the life of the drip shield will be limited by the general corrosion of Titanium Grade 16 (analog of Titanium Grade 7) at temperatures less than those involved in the test (90°C).



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.5.2

Figure 3-24. General Corrosion of Titanium Grade 16: 12-Month Weight-Loss Samples from Long Term Corrosion Test Facility




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.5.2

Figure 3-25. General Corrosion of Titanium Grade 16: 12-Month Crevice Samples From Long Term Corrosion Test Facility


The crevice samples were configured in such a way as to reveal crevice corrosion if it occurred. Since no obvious crevice attack was observed with the samples represented by these figures, it is assumed that all weight loss in the crevice samples was due to general corrosion outside of the crevice region (area underneath washer). However, higher scatter may indicate more variability of corrosion inside the crevice. Corrosion inside may be influenced by differential aeration, and pH changes.

One simple and defensible representation of these general corrosion rates has been proposed. The distribution of general corrosion rates determined from weight-loss samples (Figure 3-24) and the distribution of general corrosion rates determined from crevice samples (Figure 3-25) are combined into a single distribution. All negative rates are eliminated and the entire distribution is assumed to be due to uncertainty. From Figure 3-26, it can be seen that the rate at the 50th percentile is approximately 25 nanometers per year, the rate at the 90th percentile is approximately 100 nanometers per year, and the maximum rate is less than 350 nanometers per year. About 10 percent of the values fall between 100 and 350 nanometers per year. Figure 3-27 shows that the cumulative probability is a linear function of the logarithm of the observed general corrosion rates (log-uniform distribution).



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.5.4

Figure 3-26. Distribution of Positive General Corrosion Rates of Titanium Grade 16 Based Upon Weight-Loss and Crevice Samples



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.5.4

Figure 3-27. Distribution of Positive General Corrosion Rates of Titanium Grade 16 with Variability Based Upon Weight-Loss and Crevice Samples

3.1.5.5 Error Analysis for Corrosion Rates – Weight-Loss Measurements from Long Term Corrosion Test Facility

The general method used in the formal error analysis is presented in the AMR on general and localized corrosion of the waste package outer barrier (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.5.3). The methodology is important since it enables correct interpretation of the data. Only the results of that analysis are presented here. In the case of Alloy 22, the estimated error is shown in Table 3-8. The corresponding error for Titanium Grade 16 (Titanium Grade 7 analog) is shown in Table 3-9.

Table 3-8. Summary of Error Analysis for Corrosion Rates Based Upon Weight Loss of Alloy 22

Case	Assumed Weight Loss	Exposure Time	0.0001 g $\Delta y \text{ nm y}^{-1}$	0.0010 g $\Delta y \text{ nm y}^{-1}$	0.0100 g $\Delta y \text{ nm y}^{-1}$
	Sample Configuration				
1	Crevice	6 month	12	13	20
2	Weight Loss	6 month	23	25	38
3	Crevice	12 month	6	6	9
4	Weight Loss	12 month	11	12	18

Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.5.3

NOTE: Δy = error in general corrosion rate

Table 3-9. Summary of Error Analysis for Corrosion Rates Based Upon Weight Loss of Titanium Grade 16

Case	Assumed Wt. Loss	Exposure Time	0.0001 g $\Delta y \text{ nm y}^{-1}$	0.0010 g $\Delta y \text{ nm y}^{-1}$	0.0100 g $\Delta y \text{ nm y}^{-1}$
	Sample Configuration				
1	Crevice	6 month	24	26	47
2	Weight Loss	6 month	45	49	89
3	Crevice	12 month	12	13	22
4	Weight Loss	12 month	22	24	42

Source: CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.5.3

NOTE: Δy = error in general corrosion rate

It is concluded that the typical uncertainty observed in weight-loss and dimensional measurements prevents determination of corrosion rates for Alloy 22 that are less than approximately 38 nm y^{-1} . The maximum uncertainty is estimated to be between 6 and 20 nm y^{-1} in the case of crevice samples, and between 11 and 38 nm y^{-1} in the case of weight-loss samples. These estimates of probable error are believed to correspond to about one standard deviation (1σ). Any measured corrosion rate greater than 160 nm y^{-1} (4σ) should be easily distinguishable from measurement error. Any rate less than 160 nm y^{-1} will be difficult to distinguish from measurement error. The maximum error in the corrosion rate for Titanium Grade 16 is estimated to be approximately 89 nm y^{-1} , significantly larger than a comparable estimate for Alloy 22. The difference between estimated errors for Alloy 22 and Titanium Grade 16 is attributable to the differences in density.

3.1.6 Localized Corrosion

The difference between E_{corr} and $E_{critical}$ is used to determine whether or not localized corrosion will occur. If $E_{critical}$ is less than or equal to E_{corr} , localized corrosion is likely. These potentials are measured experimentally in electrolyte compositions believed to be representative of the repository environment (Section 1.5.4.3) (Tables 3-2, 3-3, and 3-4). Such electrolytes are described in a supporting AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4).

Junction potentials for the reference electrode in all test solutions of interest have been calculated and are discussed in the supporting AMR on general corrosion and localized corrosion of the waste package outer barrier (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4). Since these calculated junction potentials are not very large, it is concluded that no significant error in any measurement of potential results by neglecting to correct for the junction potential.

3.1.6.1 Threshold Potentials

The generic localized corrosion model for waste package materials assumes that localized attack occurs if the open circuit corrosion potential (E_{corr}) exceeds the threshold potential for breakdown of the passive film ($E_{critical}$):

$$E_{corr} \geq E_{critical} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-16})$$

This model of localized corrosion initiation is referred to as Method A. In some cases, the threshold potential is assumed to be the repassivation potential. The repassivation potential is the level at which a failed passive film repassivates, or heals, thereby protecting the surface. In other cases, the threshold potential is assumed to be the pit or crevice initiation potential.

3.1.6.2 Published Threshold Potentials for Alloy 22


Compared to materials proposed for use in earlier waste package designs, Alloy 22 has superior resistance to localized corrosion. The AMR on general and localized corrosion of the waste package outer barrier includes published repassivation potentials found in the literature (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4). These data show that the threshold potential for localized corrosion of Alloy 22 is far greater than that of Alloy 625, thereby substantiating the claim that Alloy 22 is superior to the corrosion resistant materials used in earlier waste package designs.

3.1.6.3 Cyclic Polarization in Synthetic Concentrated J-13 Waters

Pitting and crevice corrosion are usually associated with the breakdown of passivity. Tests for evaluating the susceptibility of a material to pitting and crevice corrosion include cyclic polarization. These tests can be used to detect pit and crevice initiation potentials (where they exist), and repassivation potentials if losses in passivity are observed. Most recently, the procedure described in ASTM G 61-86 (Reapproved 1998) 1987, *Standard Test Method for Conducting Cyclic Potentiodynamic Polarization Measurements for Localized Corrosion Susceptibility of Iron-, Nickel-, or Cobalt Based Alloys* has been developed for conducting cyclic polarization measurements of iron- or nickel-base alloys in chloride environments.


Cyclic polarization measurements are based on a procedure similar to ASTM G 5-94, *Standard Reference Test Method for Making Potentiostatic and Potentiodynamic Anodic Polarization Measurements* with appropriate and necessary deviations. For example, ASTM G 5-94 calls for an electrolyte of 1N H₂SO₄, whereas simulated dilute water, simulated concentrated water, simulated acidic concentrated water, and simulated saturated water are used here. Furthermore, aerated solutions are used, unlike the procedure that calls for de-aerated solutions. A baseline curve with Pt in simulated concentrated water is shown in Figure 3-28. Representative cyclic polarization curves are shown in Figures 3-29 through 3-37. The shapes of these cyclic

polarization curves are categorized as Type 1, 2, 3, or 4, as explained in the following paragraphs.




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4

Figure 3-28. Baseline-Platinum in Simulated Concentrated Water at 90°C




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4

Figure 3-29. Type 1-Alloy 22 in Simulated Acidic Concentrated Water at 90°C




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4

Figure 3-30. Type 2-Alloy 22 in Simulated Concentrated Water at 90°C




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4

Figure 3-31. Type 3-316L in Simulated Saturated Water at 100°C



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4.2

Figure 3-32. Alloy 22 in Various Repository Media – Comparison of Cyclic Polarization Data



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4.2

Figure 3-33. Potentiostatic Polarization of Alloy 22 in Simulated Concentrated Water at 90°C and 200 mV Versus Ag/AgCl





Figure 3-34. Cyclic Polarization Curve for Alloy 22 in 110°C Basic Saturated Water – Thermally Aged at 700°C for 10 Hours



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.9.2

Figure 3-35. Cyclic Polarization Curve for Alloy 22 in 110°C Basic Saturated Water – Thermally Aged at 700°C for 173 Hours





Figure 3-36. Titanium Grade 7 in Simulated Saturated Water at 120°C



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.4.3

Figure 3-37. Titanium Grade 7 in Simulated Concentrated Water at 90°C

A generic Type 1 curve exhibits complete passivity (no passive film breakdown) between the corrosion potential and the point defined as Threshold Potential 1. This interpretation was verified by visual inspection of samples after potential scans. Photographic documentation is maintained for some of the samples (all samples are held in the archives at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]). Threshold Potential 1 is in the range where the onset of oxygen evolution is expected and is defined by a large excursion in anodic current. This particular definition of Threshold Potential 1 is specific to Type 1 curves. Type 1 behavior has only been observed with Alloy 22 and is illustrated by Figure 3-29. The interpretation of Type 1 curves as exhibiting no passive film breakdown is consistent with Chapter 7 of ASTM G 61-86 (Reapproved 1998) 1987.

A generic Type 2 curve exhibits a well defined oxidation peak at the point defined as Threshold Potential 1. Threshold Potential 2 is in the range where the onset of oxygen evolution is expected, and is defined by a large increase in anodic current. These particular definitions of the threshold potentials are specific to Type 2. Repassivation Potentials 1 and 2 are defined as the points where the hysteresis loop passes through a current levels of 4.27×10^{-6} and 10^{-5} amps, respectively (not shown). Repassivation Potential 3 is determined from the first intersection of the hysteresis loop (reverse scan) with the forward scan. Type 2 is observed with both Alloy 22 and Type 316L stainless steel. In the case of Alloy 22, this behavior is illustrated by Figure 3-30. Definitions of the threshold and repassivation potentials are somewhat subjective, and may vary from investigator to investigator. The threshold potential for initiation of crevice corrosion on Alloy 22 is defined as the point during the potential scan in the forward direction where the current density increases to a level of 10^{-6} to 10^{-5} A cm⁻². The repassivation potential is defined as the point during the potential scan in the backward direction where the current density drops to 10^{-6} to 10^{-7} A cm⁻². This definition is comparable to that of Repassivation Potential 3. The basis for these current densities is discussed in detail in the AMR on general and local corrosion of the waste package outer barrier (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4).

As previously discussed, a representative curve for platinum in simulated concentrated water at 90°C is shown in Figure 3-28. The cyclic polarization measurements of Pt were made to serve as a basis of comparison for similar measurements with Alloy 22 and other materials of interest. From such comparisons, it is concluded that the anodic oxidation peak observed in Type 2 curves (between 200 and 600 mV) for Alloy 22 is due to an anodic reaction of the passive film. No anodic oxidation peak is observed in the curve for platinum. X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy measurements of the passive film polarized at potentials above and below the anodic oxidation peak have shown that the anodic reaction increases the oxidation state of metal cations in the film, which remains intact.

A generic Type 3 curve exhibits a complete breakdown of the passive film and active pitting at potentials relatively close to the corrosion potential (E_{corr}). In this case, Threshold Potential 1 corresponds to the critical pitting potential. Type 3 behavior has only been observed with stainless steel 316L in simulated saturated water and is illustrated by Figure 3-31. SSW is a saturated sodium-potassium-chloride-nitrate electrolyte, formulated to represent the type of concentrated electrolyte that might evolve on a hot waste package surface. This formulation has a boiling point of approximately 120°C at ambient pressure. In contrast to the Type 3 behavior exhibited by stainless steel 316L in simulated saturated water, Alloy 22 maintains passivity at potentials up to the reversal potential (1,200 mV versus Ag/AgCl).

A composite of the cyclic polarization data for Alloy 22 is shown in Figure 3-32. It should be noted that the axes of this figure are changed in comparison to previous figures. The initial portions of these curves show that passivity is maintained at potentials at least as high as 400 mV versus Ag/AgCl in all cases. The lowest potential at which any electrochemical reactivity of the passive film is observed is approximately 200 mV versus Ag/AgCl. Based upon data presented here, it is concluded that pitting attack of Alloy 22 should not occur under conditions expected in the repository. To further substantiate this conclusion, it is noted that no pitting of Alloy 22 has yet been observed in samples removed from the LTCTF after two years of exposure to simulated dilute water, simulated concentrated water, and simulated acidic concentrated water at 60 and 90°C.

In regard to Type 2 polarization curves for Alloy 22 in simulated concentrated water, the electrochemical process leading to the anodic oxidation peak (leading edge at approximately 200 mV versus Ag/AgCl) cannot be determined from the cyclic polarization data alone. As previously discussed, this peak is due to some change in oxidation state of the passive film and probably has very little to do with any loss of passivity. To augment these potentiodynamic measurements, potentiostatic polarization tests have been performed. Figure 3-33 shows the observed transient current when an Alloy 22 sample is polarized at 200 mV versus Ag/AgCl in simulated concentrated water at 90°C, close to the potential where the leading edge of the anodic oxidation peak is located. The current density initially increases to a maximum of approximately $25 \mu\text{A cm}^{-2}$ (the sample size is approximately 0.96 cm^2) at 9 hours. This corresponds to a typical non-equilibrium passive current density measured for Alloy 22 at this potential and in the absence of the anodic oxidation peak. For example, see a Type 1 polarization curve for Alloy 22 in simulated acidic concentrated water. It is therefore concluded that the anodic oxidation peak observed in Type 2 polarization curves does not define any localized corrosion or loss in passivity. Threshold Potential 1 (leading edge of the anodic oxidation peak at approximately 200 mV versus Ag/AgCl) should not be used as the basis for switching on localized corrosion of Alloy 22. In such cases, it should be assumed that Threshold Potential 2 (oxygen evolution) represents the lower bound for breakdown of the passive film.

Several cyclic polarization measurements have now been made with basic saturated water electrolytes and are summarized in Table 3-10 and Figures 3-34 and 3-35. As previously discussed in Section 3.1.4.5, extreme aging of Alloy 22 can shift the corrosion potential in a less noble (cathodic) direction by approximately 100 mV. This is accompanied by a slight increase in non-equilibrium passive current density. There is some evidence of an anodic oxidation peak, characteristic of Type 2 curves. For the present time, we will classify these cyclic polarization curves as intermediate Type 1-2.

Examples of cyclic polarization data for Titanium Grade 7 in simulated saturated water and simulated concentrated water are shown in Figures 3-36 and 3-37, respectively. Both cyclic polarization curves are Type 4, showing little evidence of passive film breakdown over a very wide range of potential.

Table 3-10. Electrochemical Potentials Determined from Cyclic Polarization of Alloy 22 in Basic Saturated Water

Sample ID	Aging Time (hours)	Aging Temp. (°C)	Medium	Temp. (°C)	Reversal Potential (mV)	Corrosion Potential (mV)	Threshold Potential 1 (mV)	Cyclic Polarization Curve Type
DEA158	10	700	Basic Saturated Water	110	1200	-233	418	Type 1-2
DEA159	10	700	Basic Saturated Water	110	1200	-257	419	Type 1-2
DEA208	173	700	Basic Saturated Water	110	1200	-345	394	Type 1-2
DEA209	173	700	Basic Saturated Water	110	1200	-372	361	Type 1-2

Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.9.2

The University of Virginia has recently generated some cyclic polarization data with very tight crevices and concentrated electrolytes consisting of 5 M LiCl, 0.24 to 0.024 M NaNO₃, 0.026 to 0.26 M Na₂SO₄, and HCl. Testing was conducted at two temperature levels, 80 and 95°C. The crevices were formed with a multiple crevice former, and an applied torque of 70 inch pounds. Under these circumstances, some electrochemical activity indicative of crevice corrosion was observed at potentials ranging from 71 to 397 mV versus Ag/AgCl, depending upon the composition of the electrolyte. Using a current density criterion for repassivation of 10⁻⁵ A cm⁻², repassivation potentials were determined to be slightly above, but relatively close to the open-circuit corrosion potential.

The concentrated lithium-chloride based electrolytes used in the University of Virginia tests are not relevant to those conditions anticipated in the repository. Unlike compositions based upon J-13 well water, these electrolytes have no buffer ions *per se*. Continued testing is underway with samples configured like those used by University of Virginia and test media relevant to the repository (basic saturated water). In these tests, it has been found that simulated repository waters with buffer inhibit the type of crevice corrosion observed in tests with electrolytes based upon lithium chloride, even at the boiling point of saturated solutions. As more data become available, correlation equations for the corrosion and threshold potentials should be updated, expressing these quantities in terms of temperature, pH, and the concentrations of various ions. The University of Virginia approach appears ideally suited for determining repassivation potentials when they exist.

Conclusions from tests with University of Virginia-type samples and basic saturated water are corroborated by other measurements. Relatively wide crevices (110 to 540 microns) formed from passive Alloy 22 and filled with simulated concentrated water do not appear to undergo significant increases in hydrogen ion concentration (pH suppression) at reasonable electrochemical potentials. These potentials are generally below the thresholds determined by cyclic polarization. Finally, Alloy 22 and Titanium Grade 16 crevices exposed in the LTCTF do

not indicate significant crevice corrosion. Recall that Titanium Grade 16 is considered to be an analog of Titanium Grade 7.


In the case of 316 stainless steel data shown in Figure 3-31 and Figures 3-14 and 3-15 suggest that localized corrosion may be likely under certain conditions. However, even if the material fails by localized corrosion (pitting) the structural shell will retard the ingress of water into the waste package as the pits are narrow and deep. Nevertheless, the stainless steel structural material is not used as a containment barrier at this time to provide for a conservative approach.

3.1.6.4 Correlation of Potential Versus Temperature Data for Various Test Media

Values of corrosion and threshold potentials for the three waste package materials of interest have been correlated as a function of temperature for repository-relevant test media. In general, it has been found that these potential versus temperature data can be represented by the following simple regression equation:


$$y = b_0 + b_1x + b_2x^2 \quad (\text{Eq. 3-17})$$

where y is either the corrosion or threshold potential (mV vs. Ag/AgCl) and x is the temperature ($^{\circ}\text{C}$). Parameters for Equation 3-21 are found in Figures 3-38 through 3-48. These parameters were used to calculate values of E_{corr} and $E_{critical}$ for waste package materials in simulated dilute water, simulated concentrated water, simulated acidic concentrated water, and simulated saturated water at 10°C intervals. These calculations and tabulations of the parameters are found in the supporting AMR documents (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4.3, 2000d, Section 6.4.3, 2000e Section 6.4.3.).




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000e, Section 6.4.3

Figure 3-38. Potentials versus Temperature – Stainless Steel 316L in Simulated Acidic Concentrated Water




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000e, Section 6.4.3

Figure 3-39. Potentials versus Temperature – Stainless Steel 316L in Simulated Concentrated Water




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000e, Section 6.4.3

Figure 3-40. Potentials versus Temperature – Stainless Steel 316L in Simulated Saturated Water




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4.3

Figure 3-41. Potentials versus Temperature – Alloy 22 in Simulated Dilute Water




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4.3

Figure 3-42. Potentials versus Temperature – Alloy 22 in Simulated Concentrated Water




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4.3

Figure 3-43. Potentials versus Temperature – Alloy 22 in Simulated Acidic Concentrated Water




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4.3

Figure 3-44. Potentials versus Temperature – Alloy 22 in Simulated Saturated Water




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.4.3

Figure 3-45. Corrosion and Threshold Potentials of Titanium Grade 7 in Simulated Saturated Water




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.4.3

Figure 3-46. Corrosion and Threshold Potentials for Titanium Grade 7 in Simulated Acidic Concentrated Water



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.4.3

Figure 3-47. Corrosion and Threshold Potentials for Titanium Grade 7 in Simulated Concentrated Water



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.4.3

Figure 3-48. Corrosion and Threshold Potentials for Titanium Grade 7 in Simulated Dilute Water

All correlation equations for stainless steel 316NG are found in Figures 3-38 through 3-40. The correlation for E_{corr} and the most conservative correlation for the threshold potential, $E_{critical}$, are labeled. In the case of Type 2 cyclic polarization curves, the selected threshold potential is determined by the position of the observed anodic oxidation peak, and may not result in any actual loss of passivity. In the case of Type 3 cyclic polarization curves, the measured threshold potentials are scattered. The transparent square in Figure 3-40 therefore represents the range of potential and temperature where pitting attack is believed to be possible. The lower boundary of the square appears to be very close to the line representing the corrosion potential. Note that these very low threshold potentials are entirely consistent with the published temperature-dependent pitting potentials. These data are represented by Equation 3-17 where $b_0 = 547.76$, $b_1 = -6.617$ and $b_2 = 0$. As this correlation is extrapolated to 100°C, the pitting potential approaches the lower boundary of the transparent box used to bound the threshold potentials.

All correlation equations for Alloy 22 are found in Figures 3-41 through 3-44. The correlation for the corrosion potential (E_{corr}) and the conservative correlation for the threshold potential ($E_{critical}$) are labeled. While calculated values of y are believed to have only three significant figures, coefficients in that regression equation are given with more figures. The correlation equations for Titanium Grade 7 are found in Figures 3-45 through 3-48. The data presented in these figures clearly show that the threshold potentials for localized corrosion of Titanium Grade 7 and Alloy 22 are not exceeded under conservatively assumed media.


In an ideal case, the crevice corrosion temperature can be estimated from the intersection of the lines representing the corrosion and threshold potentials at elevated temperature. Such intersection is evident in Figure 3-38. Better correlations of E_{corr} and $E_{critical}$ with material history, water chemistry, and temperature may ultimately allow precise prediction of the crevice corrosion temperature. Improved correlations would provide rigorous statistical estimates of uncertainty and variability in E_{corr} and $E_{critical}$. The precise determination of uncertainty and variability in E_{corr} and $E_{critical}$ would enable designers to determine the impact of accepting 100 percent of the supplied waste package material on repository performance. In the meantime, crevice corrosion can be forced to occur in the model by equating E_{corr} and $E_{critical}$ over temperature ranges of uncertainty (90-120°C). This assumption would provide a conservative estimate of the crevice corrosion temperature. Improved localized corrosion models with accurate temperature dependence will allow a precise sensitivity study, assessing the impact of various waste package design changes on the radiological dose at the site boundary.

There are precedents for using electrochemical measurements as the basis of water chemistry and materials specifications in the nuclear industry. For example, measurements of corrosion potential are indicative of dissolved oxygen and can be used to assure adequate deaeration in various regions of the steam cycle. The role of electrochemical potential on SCC has been well documented (CRWMS M&O 2000c).

3.1.6.5 Prediction of Critical Temperatures for Pitting and Crevice Corrosion


As previously discussed, a threshold temperature (critical temperature) can be used as an alternative to a threshold potential for the initiation of localized corrosion. This initiation model for localized corrosion is referred to as Method B. In an ideal case, the critical temperatures for

pitting and crevice corrosion can be estimated from the intersection of the lines representing the corrosion and threshold potentials as functions of temperature. This intersection occurs at elevated temperature, as illustrated by Figure 3-38. The critical temperature for pitting of stainless steel 316L is illustrated by Figures 3-49 and 3-50. To force crevice corrosion to occur in the model, E_{corr} and $E_{critical}$ can simply be equated above the critical temperature.



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000e, Section 6.4.5

Figure 3-49. Effect of Molybdenum on the Critical Pitting Temperature of Stainless Steels in Ferric Chloride Solution




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000e, Section 6.4.5

Figure 3-50. Effect of Pit Resistance Equivalence Number on the Critical Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Temperature of Stainless Steels in Ferric Chloride Solution

3.1.6.6 Effect of Gamma Radiolysis on Corrosion Potential

Anodic shifts in the open circuit corrosion potential of stainless steel in irradiated aqueous environments have been experimentally observed (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4.4). It is now accepted as fact by much of the engineering community that this observation is due to the generation of hydrogen peroxide by the radiation. The localized corrosion experiments performed at ambient temperature with 316L samples in 0.018-M NaCl solution during exposure to 3.5-Mrad hr⁻¹ gamma radiation have shown that the corrosion potential shifts in the anodic direction by approximately 200 mV. It was concluded that there is very little increase in the corresponding corrosion current density. However, the separation between the corrosion potential and the threshold for localized attack decreased slightly. This shift in corrosion potential was shown to be due to the formation of hydrogen peroxide. This finding was subsequently confirmed by another independent localized corrosion experiment with 316 stainless steel at ambient temperature in acidic 1.5-M NaCl solution (pH~2) during exposure to 0.15-Mrad hr⁻¹ gamma radiation. A 100-mV anodic shift in the corrosion potential was observed in this case, with very little effect on the corrosion current density. Note that these experiments were performed on stainless steels, not Alloy 22.


To determine the maximum impact that gamma radiolysis could have on the corrosion potential of Alloy 22, hydrogen peroxide was added to electrolytes used for testing waste package materials. Experiments at 25°C are illustrated by Figures 3-51 and 3-52. As the concentration of hydrogen peroxide in simulated concentrated water approaches 72 ppm (calculated from number of added drops of H₂O₂), the corrosion potential asymptotically approaches 150 mV versus Ag/AgCl, well below any threshold where localized attack would be expected in simulated acidic concentrated water. Similarly, as the concentration of hydrogen peroxide in simulated concentrated water approaches 72 ppm, the corrosion potential asymptotically approaches -5 mV versus Ag/AgCl, well below any threshold where localized attack would be expected in simulated concentrated water. This change in corrosion potential is also below any level where a change in oxidation state of metal cations in the passive film would be expected (anodic oxidation peak in Type 2 polarization curves). Gamma radiolysis is not expected to exacerbate the localized corrosion of Alloy 22 since the maximum shift in corrosion potential induced by hydrogen peroxide additions is less than that required for breakdown of the passive film.



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4.4

NOTE: The numbers above the curve correspond to parts per million (ppm) H_2O_2 .

Figure 3-51. Effect of Hydrogen Peroxide on Corrosion Potential of Alloy 22 in Simulated Acidic Concentrated Water at 25°C



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.4.4

NOTE: The numbers above the curve correspond to ppm H_2O_2 .

Figure 3-52. Effect of Hydrogen Peroxide on Corrosion Potential of Alloy 22 in Simulated Concentrated Water at 25°C

3.1.6.7 Crevice Corrosion

3.1.6.7.1 Deterministic Models of Crevice Chemistry

Crevices can form at points of contact between the waste package and other solid objects. These occluded geometries can lead to differential aeration of the crevice solution (electrolyte). Dissolved oxygen can become depleted deep within the crevice, while the concentration near the crevice mouth remains relatively high. Cathodic reduction of dissolved oxygen at the crevice mouth may create a sufficiently high electrochemical potential to drive anodic processes inside the crevice, thereby causing an anodic current to flow along the crevice towards the crevice mouth. Anodic processes inside the crevice are therefore expected to occur at a rate that corresponds to the local passive current density. Given this scenario, two primary electrochemical processes can lead to acidification of the solution in a crevice: (1) the preferential transport of anions into the crevice from the mouth, driven by the electric field that accompanies the crevice current, and (2) hydrolysis reactions of dissolved metal cations.

Chloride anion will be driven into the crevice by the potential gradient, as discussed in the literature and summarized in the AMR. The concentration in the crevice is governed by Equation 3-18:


$$[Cl^-] = [Cl^-]_0 \exp\left[-\frac{F}{RT} \Phi(x)\right] \quad (\text{Eq. 3-18})$$

where $[Cl^-]_0$ is the concentration at the crevice mouth, $\Phi(x)$ is the potential in the crevice relative to that at the mouth, and (x) is the distance from the crevice mouth. Field-driven electromigration of Cl^- (and other anions) into the crevice must occur to balance cationic charge associated with H^+ ions, as well as the charge associated with Fe^{2+} , Ni^{2+} , Cr^{3+} , and other cations. If such conditions do develop inside Alloy 22 crevices, accelerated attack of this material by localized corrosion or SCC may be possible.

A detailed deterministic model has been developed to calculate the spatial distributions of electrochemical potential and current density in waste package crevices, as well as transient concentration profiles of dissolved metals and ions (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.6.4). These quantities are calculated with the transport equations, which govern electromigration, diffusion, and convective transport. First, the axial current density along the length of the crevice is calculated by integrating the wall current density. The electrode potential along the length of the crevice can then be calculated from the axial current density. The partial differential equations that define transient concentrations in the crevice require determination of the potential gradient, as well as the local generation rates for dissolved species. The concentrations of dissolved metals at the crevice mouth are assumed to be zero. Computations are facilitated by assuming that the crevices are symmetric about a mirror plane where the flux is zero. This model has been used to estimate the extent of pH depression in waste package crevices due to the simultaneous hydrolysis and transport of dissolved iron, nickel, chromium, molybdenum, and tungsten. The experimental measurements discussed below were used for validation.


3.1.6.7.2 Experimental Determinations of Crevice pH and Current

In crevices made of steels containing more than 20 weight percent chromium, very acidic pH levels have been observed ($\text{pH} < 2$). The effect of chromium content on the ultimate crevice pH in a number of commercial and binary iron-chromium alloys is illustrated by Figure 3-53, while the increase in concentration of dissolved metals in such crevices is illustrated by Figure 3-54 (CRWMS M&O 2000e, Section 6.7). Based upon experimental work with passive crevices without buffer, it is believed that the applied potentials required for significant acidification ($\text{pH} < 5$) are not plausible (CRWMS M&O 2000c). Therefore, a minimum crevice pH of about 5 should be assumed in the absence of buffer and inhibitor ions.



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000e, Section 6.7.1

Figure 3-53. Effect of Chromium Content in Nickel-Chromium Alloys on Ultimate Crevice pH




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000e, Section 6.7.1

Figure 3-54. Concentrations of Dissolved Metals in Stainless Steel 304 Crevice Exposed to 0.1 N NaCl

The local crevice environments for Alloy 22 and other relevant materials have been determined experimentally (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.6.5). Crevices were constructed from square metallic samples, 2 inches on each side and 1/8 inch thick (same size as crevice samples used in the LTCTF). The samples were masked with plastic tape, thereby forming an exposed square area, 1.7 inches on each side. The exposed area was placed underneath a clear plastic window with an access port for a pH sensor in the center. In this case, the sensor was a miniature reference electrode separated from the crevice solution with a thin glass membrane. A second pH sensor was located at the mouth of the crevice, in close proximity to a Saturated Calomel Electrode (SCE). In parallel experiments, paper strips with a pH-sensitive dye (pH paper) were sandwiched between the clear plastic window and photographed with a digital electronic camera in a time-lapse mode to add confidence to the measurements made with pH sensors. Spectroscopic-grade graphite counter electrodes were also placed in the electrolyte lying outside the mouth of the crevice. A potentiostat was then used to control the electrochemical potential at the mouth of the crevice. Temperature, potential, current, and pH were then recorded electronically during the course of the experiment.

An example of the pH measurements inside a crevice formed from Type 316L stainless steel is shown in Figure 3-55. The electrolyte was 4M NaCl and was maintained at ambient temperature. Since this electrolyte contained no buffer ions, it was considered to be a far more severe medium than media representative of various concentrations of J-13 well water. The electrochemical potential at the mouth was maintained at 200 mV vs. Ag/AgCl. Crevice corrosion could be seen initiating near the crevice mouth and propagating towards the pH sensor, which was located about 0.5 cm inside the crevice mouth. When the corrosion front reached the pH sensor, the pH dropped from the initial value (pH~7) to a very low value (pH~1). The fixed




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000e, Section 6.7.5

Figure 3-55. Stainless Steel 316L, 4M NaCl, 200 mV and 23°C – Crevice pH versus Time

one-liter volume of electrolyte outside of the crevice became slightly alkaline. In similar experiments with 316L exposed to simulated concentrated water, no significant lowering of the pH was observed. In crevices formed between the waste package outer barrier and the stainless steel structural material, a low pH is expected only if buffer and inhibitor ions are removed from the electrolyte.

Measurements of pH inside crevices formed with Alloy 22 surfaces are shown in Figure 3-56 for a 4M NaCl electrolyte. The data illustrate the effect of incrementally increasing the applied potential, eventually exceeding the threshold required for localized breakdown of the passive film. The corresponding measurements of crevice current can be found in the supporting AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.6.5). At an applied potential of 400 mV, the steady-state crevice pH remained close to neutrality (pH~6.1). As the potential was stepped to 1000 mV, the crevice current increased dramatically and the pH dropped below one. At an applied potential of 1100 mV, extreme localized attack of the Alloy 22 was observed at the crevice mouth, with a crevice pH measurement near zero. In similar experiments with Alloy 22 in simulated concentrated water, no crevice attack and no significant lowering of the pH was observed. Elevations of the electrochemical potential due to gamma radiolysis (~700 mV) are insufficient to drive the crevice pH to low levels, even in the absence of buffer and inhibitor.




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.6.5

Figure 3-56. Alloy 22, 4M NaCl at 23°C – Crevice pH versus Time

Figure 3-57 is a summary of several experiments where crevice pH was determined in situ as a function of applied potential. These data are represented by the following polynomial:

$$y = b_0 + b_1x + b_2x^2 \quad (\text{Eq. 3-19})$$

where x is the potential applied at the crevice mouth (mV versus Ag/AgCl) and y is the steady-state pH inside the crevice. Coefficients for the above equation are shown in the figure for both Alloy 22 and 316L, under a broad range of conditions. The correlations for 4M NaCl and simulated concentrated water could be used to bound the crevice pH, using interpolation based upon the concentration of buffer ion between the two limits. Similar behavior is expected in titanium alloys. Additional testing with titanium-based materials is planned to confirm this.



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.6.5

Figure 3-57. Determination of Crevice pH for Waste Package Materials

In conclusion, there was no visible evidence of localized corrosion inside crevices at applied potentials less than the threshold. However, even though crevices remained passive at potentials below the threshold, the passive current density and imposed electric field within the crevice were sufficient to cause significant acidification of 4M NaCl at higher applied potential. The buffer and inhibitor ions found in simulated concentrated J-13 waters prevent acidification of crevices, even at high applied potential. In many of the experiments described here, both the applied potential and the test medium are more severe than those expected in the repository. It is concluded from these results that the conditions required for initiation of localized corrosion of Alloy 22 and Titanium Grade 7 will not be present in the repository and, therefore, degradation of these materials by localized corrosion is not a credible mechanism.

3.1.6.7.3 Estimated Localized Corrosion Rate of Alloy 22 and Titanium Grade 7

If the threshold potential or temperature for localized attack is exceeded, a corrosion rate representative of localized corrosion must be assumed. Due to the outstanding corrosion resistance of Alloy 22, very little data exists for such localized corrosion under plausible conditions. Work summarized in the AMR indicates that the corrosion rate of Alloy 22 in 10 wt. percent FeCl_3 at 75°C might be as high as $12.7 \mu\text{m}$ per year. This rate is significantly higher than those measured in the LTCTF, and may be representative of the rates expected for localized corrosion in the absence of inhibitor and buffer ions, including crevice corrosion. In a solution composed of 7 vol. percent H_2SO_4 , 3 vol. percent HCl , 1 wt. percent FeCl_3 , and 1 wt. percent CuCl_2 , a penetration rate of $610 \mu\text{m}$ per year was observed at 102°C . Alloy C-276 has a composition similar to that of Alloy 22, and is therefore considered to be an appropriate analog. In other work, the corrosion rate of Alloy C-276 in dilute HCl at the boiling point is somewhere

between 5 and 50 mils per year (127 and 1270 μm per year). Comparable rates would be expected for Alloy 22. The highest passive current density found for Alloy 22 is approximately $10 \mu\text{A cm}^{-2}$, which corresponds to a corrosion rate of approximately $100 \mu\text{m}$ per year. It is expected that the logarithm of the localized corrosion rate of Alloy 22 can be based on the aforementioned data and is normally distributed, as shown in Table 3-11. This distribution reasonably bounds those extreme penetration rates found in the literature, and is centered about the rate corresponding to the passive current density.

Table 3-11. Distribution of Localized Corrosion Rates for Alloy 22

Percentile	Localized Corrosion Rate (μm per year)
0 th	12.7
50 th	127
100 th	1270

Source: CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.6.6

Like Alloy 22, Titanium Grade 7 has outstanding corrosion resistance. Therefore, relatively little data exists for localized corrosion under plausible conditions. The published literature cited in the AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.7) discusses a crevice corrosion depth of 250 microns, which was observed in a crevice formed from Titanium-0.2 percent Pd and Teflon after a 582-day exposure in deaerated brine at 90°C ($157 \mu\text{m}$ per year). In a metal-metal crevice, a crevice corrosion depth of $70 \mu\text{m}$ was observed in a crevice formed from Titanium-0.2 percent Pd after 489 days ($52 \mu\text{m}$ per year). Other more severe values are shown in Table 3-12 below. A rectangular distribution based on this table is assumed for the localized corrosion of Titanium Grade 7.

Table 3-12. Distribution of Localized Corrosion Rates for Titanium Grade 7

Percentile	Localized Corrosion Rate (μm per year)	Conditions
0th	490	19% HCl + 4% FeCl ₃ + 4% MgCl ₂ at 82°C
100th	1120	Boiling 3:1 Aqua Regia

Source: CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.7

3.1.6.8 Microbial Corrosion

It has been observed that nickel-based materials such as Alloy 22 are relatively resistant to microbiologically influenced corrosion (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.8). Furthermore, it is believed that microbial growth in the repository will be limited by the availability of nutrients. For example, H^+ is known to be generated by bacterial isolates from Yucca Mountain. Furthermore, thiobacillus ferrooxidans oxidize Fe^{2+} , while geobacter metallireducens reduce Fe^{3+} . Other microbes can reduce SO_4^{2-} and produce S^{2-} . Ultimately, the impact of microbiologically influenced corrosion should be accounted for by adjusting E_{corr} , E_{critical} , pH and the sulfide concentration. The possible acceleration of abiotic corrosion processes by microbial growth is accounted for here. Horn et al. (CRWMS M&O 2000c) have shown that

microbiologically influenced corrosion can enhance corrosion rates of Alloy 22 by a factor of two (2×). Figure 3-11 is a schematic representation of the corrosion model for the Alloy 22 outer barrier. The augmentation of corrosion rates due to microbiologically influenced corrosion is accounted for in the model as shown in Figure 3-12. The enhancement factor, G_{MIC} , is defined by Equation 3-20.

$$\left(\frac{dp}{dt} \Big|_{\text{effective}} \right)_{\text{corrected}} = G_{MIC} \times \left(\frac{dp}{dt} \Big|_{\text{effective}} \right)_{\text{original}} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-20})$$

This factor is calculated as the ratio of corrosion rates (microbes to sterile). Horn et al. (CRWMS M&O 2000e, Section 6.9) have shown that microbiologically influenced corrosion can enhance corrosion rates of 304 stainless steel by a factor of about ten (×10). The value of G_{MIC} for 304 stainless steel in sterile media is about one ($G_{MIC} \sim 1$), whereas the value of G_{MIC} for 304 stainless steel in inoculated media is larger ($G_{MIC} \sim 10$). It is assumed that microbiologically influenced corrosion will have the same effect on 316NG stainless steel. The value of G_{MIC} for Alloy 22 in sterile media is about one ($G_{MIC} \sim 1$), whereas the value of G_{MIC} for Alloy 22 in inoculated media is larger ($G_{MIC} \sim 2$).

The principal nutrient-limiting factor to microbial growth in situ at Yucca Mountain, has been determined to be low levels of phosphate. There is virtually no phosphate contained in J-13 groundwater. Yucca Mountain bacteria grown in the presence of Yucca Mountain tuff are apparently able to dissolve phosphate contained in the tuff to support growth to levels of 10^6 cells ml^{-1} of groundwater. When exogenous phosphate is added (10 mM), the levels of bacterial growth increase to 10^7 to 10^8 cells ml^{-1} . The difference of one to two orders-of-magnitude in bacterial growth with and without the presence of exogenous phosphate is not considered to be significant with respect to effects on corrosion rates. Therefore, nutrient limitation was not factored into the overall microbiologically influenced corrosion model. It may be noted, however, that the 2-fold correction for microbiologically influenced corrosion ($G_{MIC} \sim 2$) included in the model was in the presence of sufficient phosphate to sustain higher levels of bacterial growth (in an effort to achieve accelerated Alloy 22 attack).

Other environmental factors that could effect levels of bacterial growth include temperature and radiation. However, these factors are closely coupled to RH. As temperature and radiation decrease in the repository, RH is predicted to increase. There are some types of micro-organisms that can survive elevated temperatures ($\leq 120^\circ\text{C}$) and high radiation doses. However, if there is no available water, bacterial activity is completely prevented. Thus, water availability is the primary limiting factor for microbiologically influenced corrosion. Water availability is as expressed by RH and is used as the primary gauge of microbial activity. This factor is coupled to other less critical limiting factors.

A conservative approach is to assume that a critical mass of bacteria exists for microbiologically influenced corrosion. Bacterial densities in Yucca Mountain rock have been determined to be on the order of 10^4 to 10^5 cells g^{-1} of rock. In absolute terms, this is almost certainly above the threshold required to cause microbiologically influenced corrosion. Further, bacterial densities have been shown to increase one to two (1 to 2) orders-of-magnitude when water is available. More germane concerns are the types of bacteria present, their abundance, and how their relative numbers are affected when water is available for growth. Corrosion rates will be affected on some waste package materials if organic acid producers compete more aggressively than sulfate reducers or inorganic acid producers for available nutrients, provided that water is sufficient to support growth. No data is currently available regarding the composition of the bacterial community over the changing environmental conditions anticipated during repository evolution. Instead, this issue has been addressed in the current model by determining overall corrosion rates under a standardized set of conditions, in the presence and absence of a defined set of characterized Yucca Mountain bacteria.

3.1.7 Stress Corrosion Cracking

3.1.7.1 Background

One of the potential failure modes of the drip shield, the waste package outer barrier, and the stainless steel structural material is the initiation and propagation of SCC. Such environmental cracking may be induced by appropriate combination of metallurgical susceptibility, corrosive environment, and sustained tensile stress. The drip shield and the stainless steel structural material are excluded from this SCC evaluation. The major sources of stress in the drip shield are residual stress from manufacturing, loading due to earthquakes, and cold-work stress by rockfall. Because the drip shield is fully annealed before it is placed in the emplacement drift, the residual stress from manufacturing is discounted. The earthquake induced stresses will not cause SCC because the stresses are temporary in nature. As discussed in CRWMS M&O (2000ai), rockfall could generate cold-work stresses in the drip shield, which could lead to SCC of the drip shield. Through-wall cracks are also possible in the drip shield if the rocks are large enough (CRWMS M&O 2000ai). However, rockfall-induced through-wall cracks and SCC cracks are not considered in the SCC analyses because the cracks will be “plugged” by the corrosion product particles and mineral precipitates (Section 3.1.7.11, also CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5.5). Any water flow through the oxide/salt filled cracks would be extremely low and should not contribute significantly to the overall radionuclide release rate from the underlying failed waste package. SCC of the drip shield would not affect significantly the intended function of the drip shield, which is to keep water from contacting the waste package.

The stainless steel structural shell is excluded from this SCC evaluation since no corrosion performance is claimed for the inner shell. The purpose of this section of the PMR is to provide a detailed description of the process-level models that can be used to predict the performance of the waste package outer barrier in repository-relevant environments that may be capable of causing SCC.

As mentioned above, the three driving forces for SCC are metallurgical susceptibility, a corrosive environment, and static (or sustained) tensile stresses. Environments that cause SCC are usually aqueous and can be either condensed layers of moisture or bulk solutions. The SCC

of a particular alloy is usually caused by the presence of a specific chemical species in the environment. For example, the SCC of copper alloys is almost always due to the presence of ammonia in the environment. Chloride ions cause SCC in stainless steels and aluminum-based alloys. Sulfides are known to cause SCC in nickel-based alloys such as Alloy 22. Changes in the environmental conditions, which include temperature, dissolved oxygen, and ionic concentrations, will normally influence the SCC process.

The effects of stress on the propagation of SCC can be characterized by the stress intensity factor (K_I). The definition and detailed calculations of the stress intensity factor are described in the AMR on SCC (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2).

The SCC evaluation is focused on the waste package outer barrier closure weld because the residual stress in this weld cannot be relieved completely as other container welds. This region of the waste package is potentially susceptible to SCC since welding will produce high-tensile residual stress in close proximity to the weld and since pre-existing flaws due to fabrication and welding have much higher distribution in the weld than in the base metal. An effective approach to eliminate the threat of SCC and resultant through-wall cracking in the closure weld is to implement a post-weld stress mitigation process to either remove residual tensile stresses in the weld region, or reduce them below threshold values for SCC initiation and growth. The initial process selected to mitigate SCC in the waste package outer barrier closure weld was single-pass laser peening. The laser peening process utilizes a rapidly pulsed, high energy density laser beam rastered across the surface region of the closure weld to induce a compressive surface layer. Testing data indicate that a compressive layer with a thickness (depth) of 2-3 mm can be produced, thus removing the potential for SCC initiation in the compressive layer (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2). However, the rate of removal of this compressive layer by general corrosion indicated that it would be eliminated in an unacceptably short time leading to possible SCC initiation and through-wall growth. The closure design was therefore modified to include two lids (inner and outer lid) with two separate post-weld stress mitigation processes; laser peening of the inner lid and induction annealing stress relief of the outer lid weld. During the induction annealing process, the weld region is very rapidly heated to the solution annealing temperature to remove weld residual stresses and rapidly cooled to avoid precipitation of potentially deleterious intermetallic phases (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2).

Two alternative process-level models that deal with SCC and the effect of stress on cracking propensity are described and evaluated in the supporting AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Sections 6.3 and 6.4). The first model, Method A, is based on the theory that there exists a threshold value of the stress intensity factor (K_{ISCC}) such that no growth occurs in a crack having a stress intensity factor (K_I) less than the threshold value. This model is described in a subsequent section.

The second model, Method B, relates crack advance to the metal oxidation that occurs when the protective film at the crack tip is ruptured. This slip dissolution or film rupture model is described in a subsequent section. In this case, the existence of a nominal threshold stress for SCC initiation on a smooth surface ($\sigma_{\text{threshold}}$) is assumed.

Leakage can occur if SCC propagates to the point where a crack penetrates the container wall. Since the model predictions indicate that SCC can lead to waste package outer barrier breach, it is necessary to mitigate stress as described to lower the potential of cracking.

3.1.7.2 Overview of Two Alternative Models for Stress Corrosion Cracking

3.1.7.2.1 Model A – Stress Corrosion Cracking Threshold Model

The concept of a threshold stress intensity factor (K_{ISCC}) has been commonly used to assess the susceptibility of material to SCC, as described in the SCC AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.3). The applicability of this model to Alloy 22 (the material to be used for the waste package outer barrier) has been studied experimentally LLNL.

3.1.7.2.2 Model B – Stress Corrosion Cracking Slip Dissolution or Film Rupture Model

The theory of slip dissolution or film rupture has been successfully applied to assess the SCC crack propagation for light water reactors at high temperature (approximately 288°C). The detailed description of the SCC model based on the theory of slip dissolution or film rupture can be found in the AMR devoted to SCC (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4). This model has been adopted to assess the SCC capability of the material to be used for the waste package outer barrier. In this case, the existence of a nominal threshold stress for SCC initiation on a smooth surface is assumed.

3.1.7.3 Stress Analysis

No software codes were used directly in the development of this PMR. However, this report does include the results from software codes used in the supporting AMRs.

ANSYS, Version 5.3, which is a finite element analysis code used for thermal and stress analyses, was used to develop data cited in SCC AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000f).

pcCRACK, Version 3.1, is a fracture mechanics code used for stress intensity and crack growth simulation analyses. This code was also used to develop data cited in the SCC AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000f).

3.1.7.4 Parameters and Inputs for Stress Corrosion Cracking Models

3.1.7.4.1 Material Properties

The specific properties of the waste package materials are important in the determination of the residual stress in the closure weld. The properties used in this evaluation are documented in the AMR supporting the SCC model (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 4.1.1).

3.1.7.4.2 Welding Parameters

In evaluating weld-induced stress, the effect of each weld pass was determined by simulating the heat being deposited by the welding process over a prescribed time interval. Key parameters needed for this evaluation include the rate of electrical energy input, weld speed, and heat

transfer. This information presented in the AMR supporting the SCC process-level model was used to determine the heat generation rate for the elements that represent each weld pass (bead).

3.1.7.4.3 Threshold Stress Intensity Factor

K_{ISCC} values for Alloy 22 were evaluated by using precracked wedge-loaded double cantilever beam specimens in deaerated acidic brine (pH 2.7) at 90°C. Duplicate samples of each material were loaded at four initial levels of the stress intensity factor (K_I) with values ranging from 20 to 39 ksi in^{1/2} (or 22 to 43 MPa m^{1/2}) (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.3.2). Both metallography and compliance methods were used to determine the final crack length. The final stress intensity factor for SCC (K_f) was computed from the measured final wedge load on the double cantilever beam specimens and the average crack length. The final stress intensity factor K_f was taken to be the SCC threshold value, K_{ISCC} (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.3.2). Studies are now underway to determine K_{ISCC} using reversing direct current potential drop technique, by which the value of K_I is determined at zero crack velocity.

3.1.7.4.4 Input for Slip Dissolution Model

As discussed in Section 3.1.7.8.2, the slip dissolution model has four parameters: β , \hat{u} , K_I , and $S_{\text{threshold}}$, where β and \hat{u} can be derived from A and n , respectively. The stress intensity factor K_I has already been discussed. The parameter n in the crack growth equation for the slip dissolution model was obtained from reverse direct current potential drop tests of Alloy 22 at 110°C, and at a stress intensity factor of 30 MPa·m^{1/2} (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 4.1.4). The parameter “ n ” can be determined from the data for crack growth rate and crack tip strain rate (or applied stress intensity factor in the case of constant load). SCC crack growth test results for Alloy 22 at 110°C and $K_I = 30 \text{ MPa} \cdot \text{m}^{1/2}$ in a concentrated mixed salt environment for 3585 hours indicated the crack growth rate varying from $2.1 \times 10^{-8} \text{ mm/s}$ to $7.6 \times 10^{-9} \text{ mm/s}$. This input source resulted in the upper and lower bound values of 0.92 and 0.843, respectively, for the parameter “ n ” of the slip dissolution model (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 4.1.4).

3.1.7.4.5 Stress Mitigation

Residual stress in waste package outer barrier can be mitigated by the multiple-pass laser peening technique. Preliminary measurements indicate that single-pass laser peening of an Alloy 22 plate (1-inch thick) is capable of producing a compressive surface layer that is about 1.5-mm deep, with compressive stress in the range of 20 to 60 ksi. Compression can be achieved at greater depths with multiple-pass laser peening, or localized induction annealing. If this stress mitigation approach is used, the life of the waste package will be limited by the time required to remove the compressive layer by general corrosion.

3.1.7.5 Assumptions in Stress Corrosion Cracking Models

In regard to SCC of the waste package outer barrier, the only stress that is significant is the residual stress in the closure weld. Dead-load stress is insignificant. Seismic stress is temporary in nature.

Only the waste package outer barrier will be subjected to SCC susceptibility. Potential rockfall induced SCC and through-wall cracks in the drip shield are not included in the current evaluation because of the reasons discussed in Section 3.1.7.1. Also, the stainless steel structural shell is not considered in the current SCC evaluation (see Section 3.1.7.1). For the waste package outer barrier, only the closure welds will be considered for performance assessment. Unlike seam welds, the closure weld will not be stress-relieved at the time of fabrication. Welding procedures can produce very high tensile stress in the weld region, and pre-existing flaws from fabrication and welding may have much higher distribution in the weld. Without post-weld stress mitigation, this region of the waste package will be susceptible to SCC.

The SCC models have been applied to the single-lid waste package outer barrier design with and without laser peening. This initial application demonstrated the methodology. The model has more recently been applied to the dual-lid waste package outer barrier design. To remove deleterious residual tensile stresses, the closure weld in the outer lid will be treated by localized induction annealing, while the closure weld in the inner lid will be treated by multiple-pass laser peening. The dual-lid concept has been adopted for the waste package outer barrier to prolong the design life based on experience learned from previous unmitigated closure-weld designs, where both calculated and measured residual weld stress were found to be high.

For the waste package closure welds, the flaw orientation most likely susceptible to crack propagation is assumed to be that of either a circumferential flaw (parallel to weld) or a radially oriented flaw (perpendicular to weld). A radially oriented flaw would be driven by hoop stress, whereas a circumferentially oriented flaw would be driven by the radial stress. The distribution of flaw orientation is discussed in Section 3.1.7.9.

In the Performance Assessment, only radial cracks will be considered because the driving force (stress intensity factor) for a radial crack is much higher than the driving force for a circumferential crack. About one radial crack per closure weld patch was considered for the WAPDEG analysis (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 5).

The slip dissolution mechanism (Section 3.1.7.8.2, Equation 3-28) relies on the crack-tip strain rate (which encompasses the effects of mechanics parameters), as well as the repassivation rate, (which encompasses the effects of material characteristics and water chemistry). Because of the expected similarity in SCC behavior and mechanical response of face centered cubic alloys, the same crack-tip strain rate formulations that were employed for quantitative prediction of SCC in austenitic 304 or 316 stainless steels in 288°C high-purity boiling water reactor water can be used for this analysis.

The rate of repassivation is captured by the parameter n , the repassivation slope. A characteristic of the slip dissolution or film rupture model is that SCC susceptibility decreases with increasing values of n (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 5). For stainless steels, which are more susceptible

to SCC than Alloy 22, test data indicates that $n = 0.54$. Recent test results for SCC crack growth in Alloy 22 provide the upper and lower bound values of 0.92 and 0.843, respectively, for the parameter “ n ” of the slip dissolution model (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 4.1.4).

Although the slip dissolution model assumes crack growth can initiate at any surface defect that can generate a stress intensity (K_I), regardless of defect size and tensile stress, examination of the relevant SCC literature indicates that there is a threshold stress ($S_{threshold}$) below which SCC will not initiate on a “smooth” surface. This threshold stress is conservatively estimated to be between 10 and 40 percent of the yield stress, based on published SCC initiation data for susceptible stainless steels (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5.2). This range of threshold values is supported by data for drop evaporation tests at 200°C found in Uhlig’s Corrosion Handbook (Erbing Falkland 2000). Types 304 and 316 stainless steels have thresholds of 10 percent of the yield stress, whereas the other more SCC-resistant materials have thresholds ranging from 40 to 90 percent of the yield stress. While the highly SCC-resistant Alloy 22 would be expected to have a threshold in the 40 to 90 percent yield stress range, a very conservative distribution of 10 to 40 percent yield stress is assumed for the Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA) expected case. If the stress is less than 10 percent yield stress, SCC does not initiate and the crack velocity (V_I) is set to zero. Below the threshold stress, the film rupture model is not invoked.


The supporting AMR on SCC (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5.2) also discusses published threshold stress values for susceptible stainless steels in boiling solutions of magnesium chloride (~155°C). These values tend to indicate a less conservative range of 20 to 30 percent yield stress. This range has also been used in some TSPA cases.

3.1.7.6 Stress Analysis and Stress Intensity Factor Calculations

During the evaluation of the process-level model for SCC, two waste package closure designs were considered: a single-lid design for waste package outer barrier, and a double-lid design for waste package outer barrier. Due to the relative simplicity of the single-lid design, it is used in the initial discussion to illustrate the approach used to model SCC. Insight gained from evaluations of the single-lid waste package outer barrier lead to a more robust double-lid design, which is addressed in performance assessment calculations shown in Section 3.2.7.

3.1.7.6.1 Calculation of Stress Intensity from Weld Residual Stress

Determining the residual stress in the closure weld is a problem that can best be solved using finite element methods. The ANSYS Version 5.3 finite element model was used for developing data in support of the SCC model. As mentioned previously, the methodology and approach used to calculate the weld residual stresses and stress intensities will be demonstrated initially for the unmitigated and mitigated (laser peened) single-lid design. Then, calculated values specific to the dual-lid (longer life) design are reviewed. The mesh used to represent the unmitigated single-lid waste package outer barrier closure weld is shown in Figure 3-58. Results of the analysis are shown in Figures 3-59 and 3-60 for the radial and hoop stresses, respectively (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2.2).




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2.2

Figure 3-58. Finite Element Model for the Initial Waste Package Outer Barrier Design and Selected Cross Sections for Stress Plots (single-lid design)

As previously discussed, the flaw orientations in the closure welds of the waste package outer barrier most susceptible to crack propagation are circumferential (parallel to weld) and radial (perpendicular to weld). Figure 3-61 shows these flaw orientations in relationship to the closure weld. A radially oriented flaw is driven by the hoop stress, whereas a circumferentially oriented flaw is driven by the radial stress.


3.1.7.6.2 Impact of Corrosion on Stress and Stress Intensity Factor

The initial results presented in the AMR on SCC of the waste package outer barrier (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6) are for the as-built condition. This analysis assumes the full thickness for all waste package components. In order to simulate the effect of wall thinning caused by general corrosion, a layer of elements from the outside surface of the outer lid is removed. The thickness of this layer is 0.125 inches, which is equivalent to 12.7 percent of the thickness of the outer lid. The maximum corrosion rate of Alloy 22 is very small, and is approximately 0.07 μm per year (from 2 year data; see Section 3.1.5.4, Figure 3-21). At this rate, more than 45,000 years would be required to remove the outer layer of mesh elements. This estimate is by assuming that there is no corrosion enhancement due to aging (Section 3.1.4) and microbiological activities (Section 3.1.5).




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2.2

Figure 3-59. Radial Stress - Initial Waste Package Outer Barrier Outer Lid at 125°C Plots (single-lid design)



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2.2


Figure 3-60. Hoop Stress - Initial Waste Package Outer Barrier Outer Lid at 125°C Plots (single-lid design)



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2.2

Figure 3-61. Flaw Orientations for Lid Welds

Figure 3-62 shows the stress intensity factor distributions for the circumferential crack. This figure shows the stress intensity factor as a function of absolute distance from the outside surface. This figure demonstrates that the overall effect of general corrosion is small, but can make the stress intensity factor slightly higher.



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2.4


Figure 3-62. Stress Intensity Factor for Radial Crack in Initial Waste Package Outer Barrier Outer Lid (single-lid design)

3.1.7.6.3 Mitigation of Weld Residual Stress

Examination of the predicted stress distribution at the closure weld of the initial waste package outer barrier design (Figures 3-59 to 3-60) reveals, as expected, that tensile stresses may exceed 20 percent of the yield stress (~ 10 ksi) in both the radial and circumferential directions. This indicates that SCC initiation in unacceptably short times cannot be precluded with the as-welded design. Furthermore, examination of Figure 3-62 indicates that, at least for radially-oriented cracks, through-wall propagation is possible once a crack initiates. Since high residual tensile stresses are generated in the as-welded closure, it is necessary, as discussed previously, to implement a post-weld process to mitigate these potentially deleterious driving forces. This process can be implemented after the closure weld is made, thereby extending waste package lifetime.

To reduce residual weld stresses below the SCC initiation threshold, Waste Package Department has been evaluating improved designs of the waste package outer barrier (such as the dual-lid concept shown in Figure 3-63), welding techniques that generate low residual stress, and post-weld stress mitigation techniques such as localized induction annealing and laser peening. The specific selections of laser peening and localized induction annealing are based upon preliminary tests, published data, and the analyses presented here. Experimental measurements were made to quantify the stress-reduction benefit derived from laser peening. Figure 3-64 shows the effect of laser peening on the hoop stress profile in the single-lid closure weld. The corresponding stress intensity factor profile is shown in Figure 3-65. Evaluation of the time required to initiate SCC with a single-lid design led to the conclusion that a dual-lid design was needed, with both laser peening and localized induction annealing. This new design promises adequate performance (first breach beyond 10,000 years), with enough margin to allow for the unexpected. The thermal cycle used for localized induction annealing involves increasing the temperature of the weld region to 1120°C in 35 seconds, while maintaining a gradual temperature gradient between the induction heated weld region and the remainder of the waste package outer barrier. The imposed temperature distribution is held constant for 10 seconds. The surface temperature is then lowered to room temperature in 30 seconds, thereby simulating the effect of quenching. The heat is dissipated by conduction within the waste package. Simulation indicates that steady state is approached after five minutes (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2.4).


As can be seen by examination of the predicted stress distributions, both processes are capable of reducing the residual stress to below 10 percent of the yield stress (lower bound of the SCC initiation threshold) at depths down to 2 to 3 mm for laser peening, and at least 6.5 mm for post-weld induction annealing. Figure 3-64 illustrates the effect of laser peening. However, as discussed previously, since general corrosion of the waste package outer barrier may eventually corrode away the compressive surface layer with mitigated weld stress, it was deemed prudent to further modify the closure-weld design, incorporating two separate Alloy 22 lids with the weld in the outer lid being induction annealed, and the weld in the inner lid laser peened (Figure 3-63).



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2.4

NOTE: Figure modified from that in the AMR (Single-Lid Design)

Figure 3-64. Measured Hoop Stress with and without Single-Pass Laser Peening Compared to the Median Threshold Stress for SCC



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2.4

NOTES: Figure modified from that in the AMR (Single-Lid Design).
Median threshold stress intensity factor for SCC is also shown.

Figure 3-65. Calculated Stress Intensity Factor for Hoop Stress with and without Laser Peening Compared to the Median Threshold Stress Intensity Factor

3.1.7.7 SCC Method A – The Threshold Stress Intensity Factor Model

For SCC to occur three factors have to exist: tensile stress; a susceptible microstructure; and a material-specific corrosive environment. Flaws can exacerbate SCC by concentrating the tensile stress. Such flaws (both surface and embedded defects) can be formed during manufacture, localized corrosion, or other in situ processes. Once a crack is initiated, the crack will grow by SCC when the applied stress intensity factor, K_I , is equal to or larger than SCC resistance parameter, K_{ISCC} .

$$K_I \geq K_{ISCC} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-21})$$

K_{ISCC} is a material- and environment-dependent property which can be obtained through fracture mechanics testing of the material in the specified environment.

The stress intensity factor K_I is usually defined as a function of stress (\mathbf{s}) and crack depth (a):

$$K_I(a, \mathbf{s}) = \mathbf{b} \mathbf{s} \sqrt{\pi a} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-22})$$

where \mathbf{b} is a geometry factor dependent on the shape of the crack and the configuration of the structural component, and \mathbf{s} is the stress in a given direction.

According to the current design, the material to be used for the waste package outer barrier is Alloy 22. Currently, the only existing source of K_{ISCC} values for Alloy 22 and Titanium Grade 7 is the experimental work performed at LLNL as described in the AMR on SCC (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.3).

The final stress intensity factor (K_f) obtained by examining double cantilever beam samples at the end of the test period is interpreted as K_{ISCC} , although it may represent only an upper bound of this threshold and may therefore not be conservative. The K_f values for the eight Alloy 22 specimens are 27.96, 28.73, 28.78, 29.58, 29.66, 30.94, 31.98, and 32.39 ksi in^{1/2} (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.3.2). If a normal distribution is assumed, the mean value ($K_{ISCC}|_{MEAN}$) and the standard deviation can be calculated:

$$(K_{ISCC}|_{MEAN}) = 30 \pm 1.6 \text{ ksi in}^{1/2} \text{ or } 33 \pm 1.8 \text{ MPa m}^{1/2} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-23})$$

The K_{ISCC} value can vary in accordance with different environmental conditions. In the absence of more data needed for the assessment of the variability of K_{ISCC} , the values given here are used. These values are considered conservative in regard to test environment since acidic NaCl solutions were used.

The mean value of K_{ISCC} is 33 MPa m^{1/2} for an Alloy 22 lid. The maximum values of K_I calculated for circumferential flaws in the closure welds are 22 MPa m^{1/2} for the outer lid and 13 MPa m^{1/2} for the inner lid. Since the mean value of K_{ISCC} is less than the values of K_I associated with circumferential flaws, SCC initiation at these flaws is not a significant concern. However, the maximum value of K_I for the hoop stress in either lid may exceed the threshold value. This is illustrated for the outer lid in Figure 3-62 where K_I for the hoop stress can exceed 80 MPa m^{1/2}.

3.1.7.8 SCC Method B – The Slip Dissolution or Film Rupture Model

3.1.7.8.1 Background on Slip Dissolution or Film Rupture Model

As stated previously, environmental cracking has historically been separated into “initiation” and “propagation” phases. This distinction is almost always arbitrary, for initiation is invariably defined as the time at which a crack is detected, or when the load has relaxed a specific amount (in a strain-controlled test): Initiation, therefore, corresponds to a crack depth of significant metallurgical dimensions (e.g., > 2 mm) (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4.1).

A lifetime prediction model should be based on a fundamental understanding of the cracking mechanism. The formulation of such a crack propagation model requires a working hypothesis for the cracking mechanism and the evaluation of the parameters of importance in the mechanism. For the systems of interest, the slip dissolution or film rupture mechanism has been chosen. This cracking mechanism has been successfully applied to model the SCC for stainless steel, low-alloy steel, and nickel-based alloys in light water reactor environments as described in the SCC AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4). The model is described in detail in the AMR on SCC.

3.1.7.8.2 Application to Stainless Steel in Boiling Water Reactor

The slip dissolution mechanism is represented by Equation 3-24, which shows the dependence of crack propagation rate (V_t) on the crack tip strain rate ($\dot{\epsilon}_{ct}$) (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4.2):

$$V_t = A \left(\dot{\epsilon}_{ct} \right)^n \quad (\text{Eq. 3-24})$$

As discussed above, the parameters A and n depend upon the material and environment at the crack tip. These two parameters can be determined from the measured rate of repassivation. Such measurements are made by rapidly straining wires that are fabricated from the material of interest.

The initial application of the slip dissolution model was the quantitative prediction of crack extension in Type 304 or 316 stainless steel in 288°C high-purity water, representative of that used in a boiling water reactor. These extensive investigations led to a quantification of the model parameters:

$$A = 7.8 \times 10^{-3} (n)^{3.6} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-25})$$

Equations 3-24 and 3-25 have been combined to yield Equation 3-26:

$$V_t = 7.8 \times 10^{-3} (n)^{3.6} \left(\dot{\epsilon}_{ct} \right)^n \quad (\text{Eq. 3-26})$$

where V_t has the unit of cm s^{-1} and $\dot{\epsilon}_{ct}$ has the units of s^{-1} . The crack tip strain rate in Equation 3-26 is related to the engineering stress (or stress intensity) parameters via the formulations given in the SCC AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4.2). The relationship for constant load is:

$$\dot{\epsilon}_{ct} = 4.1 \times 10^{-14} K_I^4 \quad (\text{Eq. 3-27})$$

where K_I is the stress intensity factor in the units of $\text{MPa m}^{1/2}$. Since the stress in the waste package closure weld (load) is essentially constant with time, substitution of Equation 3-27 for constant load into Equation 3-26 yields the following alternative expression:

$$V_t = \bar{A} (K_I)^{\bar{n}} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-28})$$

where

$$\bar{A} = A (4.1 \times 10^{-14})^n \quad (\text{Eq. 3-29})$$

and

$$\bar{n} = 4n \quad (\text{Eq. 3-30})$$

3.1.7.8.3 Application To Waste Package Outer Barrier Material

There is ample reason to hypothesize that SCC of nickel-based Alloy 22 occurs by the same fundamental mechanism characterized by the slip dissolution model described in Section 3.1.7.8.2, (i.e., Equations 3-24 through 3-30). The only question that remains is that associated with the quantification of the repassivation rate, which is represented by the parameter n (repassivation slope).

A characteristic of the slip dissolution model is that SCC susceptibility decreases as the repassivation slope increases. For stainless steels, test data indicate that $n = 0.54$ (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4.3). The parameter “ n ” can be determined from the data for crack growth rate and crack tip strain rate (or applied stress intensity factor in the case of constant load). SCC crack growth test results for Alloy 22 at 110°C and $K_I = 30 \text{ MPa}\cdot\text{m}^{1/2}$ in a concentrated mixed salt environment for 3585 hours indicated the crack growth rate varying from $2.1 \times 10^{-8} \text{ mm/s}$ to $7.6 \times 10^{-9} \text{ mm/s}$. This input source resulted in the upper and lower bound values of 0.92 and 0.843, respectively, for the parameter “ n ” of the slip dissolution model (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 4.1.4).

In the smooth metal components dealt with in this PMR, the size of an incipient crack is expected to be exponentially distributed with a maximum possible size of $50 \mu\text{m}$ and a median size of $20 \mu\text{m}$. The orientation of this crack will be either circumferential or radial, as shown in Figure 3-61. Only one crack per weld patch (WAPDEG element) is suggested in the waste package SCC degradation analysis. Based on the relatively high stress intensity factors for radial cracking in the outer lid of the initial waste package design, it is evident that the slip dissolution

model predicts eventual through-wall radial cracking. A modified waste package design with dual-lids and stress mitigation in the closure welds has been developed to provide greatly enhanced service life.

It is generally assumed that crack initiation will not occur if the stress is below a threshold value. Available data suggested that the threshold stress lies between 10 and 40 percent of the yield stress.

3.1.7.9 Orientation of Flaws

In considering the potential effects of weld defects on SCC, the presence of planar defects in the region of the weld and HAZ where weld-induced residual tensile stress exists can lead to SCC initiation and growth. However, only defects oriented normal to the direction of the weld center line (radially oriented defects) have sufficient calculated stress intensity to drive a stress corrosion crack through-wall. Weld defect types and expected defect orientation for the closure weld case are described below.

The closure weld will be made in the hot cell facility using the narrow groove tungsten arc welding process, which eliminates the lack of fusion defects between beads since it is a multi-pass process. The other defects such as tungsten inclusion (caused by the flaking of the tungsten electrode) and porosity (caused by the loss of gas coverage) are easily detectable by monitoring systems that will be built into the welding system. This leaves only nonfusion defects, which are detectable by ultrasonic testing. All of the above defects are either rounded or in the direction of the weld seam. None are oriented in the radial direction. These statements are supported by the limited data available from the YMP on the lid welds on 4-inch thick carbon steel cylinder mock-up using multiple passes. Overall, sixteen indications were detected by ultrasonic testing on the bottom lid weld. Thirteen of these were classified as potential lack of fusion defects because of their location at the weld fusion zone and their orientation parallel to the weld groove orientation. The other three indications were due to laminations in the base metal. Similarly, on the top lid weld of the same cylinder, three indications were detected, and all were classified as lack of fusion very near the base of the weld root. The orientation of all of these indications was planar with respect to welding direction (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section-6.5).

The defect description above is consistent with the brief comment on flaw orientation in CRWMS M&O (2000m, Section 6.2.1): "No information was found in the literature regarding angle of the flaw from a line parallel to the direction of the weld. However, most planar defects, such as lack of fusion and slag inclusions would logically be expected to be oriented within a few degrees of the same direction in which the weld head is moving." This flaw description is also consistent with Shcherbinskii and Myakishev (1970) that describes a statistical treatment of weld flaw orientations based on analysis of a significant data set of ultrasonic flaw orientation measurement and concludes that planar type weld defects detected ultrasonically tend to be predominately oriented in the direction of the weld center line. It appears that more than 98 percent of the defects fall within ± 16 degrees of the weld center line in the case of steam pipe welds, e.g., the tails of the distributions shown fall to less than 2 percent probability as the azimuth approaches 90 degrees (Shcherbinskii & Myakishev 1970, Figure 1). A similar conclusion, drawn from the data for plate welds (Shcherbinskii & Myakishev 1970, Figure 2),

indicates that statistical distribution of the defects with respect to the orientation angle approximated by a centered normal distribution with a maximum standard deviation of 5 degrees yields a probability of 99 percent that the defects are located within about ± 13 degrees. This suggests that much less than one percent of these flaws have a potential to undergo SCC as radial cracks. Visual inspection of both figures suggests a maximum probability of less than 2 percent at azimuth between 12 and 16 degrees. It is important to note that there appears to be an obvious typographical error in the figures. This reference is an English translation of a Russian publication. The frequencies given as 1.8 and 2.5 Hz should read 1.8 and 2.5 MHz, typical of those used in ultrasonic testing.

As discussed above, manufacturing defects, especially those due to welding could occur, would appear most likely on the inside (or bottom) surface of the weld due to imperfect welding procedures and would likely be oriented depending on the weld direction. When initiated, the propagation of cracks tend to follow the direction perpendicular to the maximum principle stresses whether the cracks are propagating due to fatigue or stress corrosion. In structures where shear stress is not significant (i.e. thin wall pipes or plates), the maximum principle stresses are the same as the three directional component stresses. Thin wall pipes are usually defined by a R/t ratio greater than 10, where R and t are the radius and wall thickness of the pipe, respectively. For an axisymmetric structure or model, there is no shear stress in the hoop direction. Also stresses in the through-wall direction (which would drive laminations) are usually the lowest among the three stress components.

Due to the orthogonality effect of stresses, once an oblique-oriented crack (measured with respect to the direction of loading) turns into the direction perpendicular to the maximum stress, the stresses in the other directions have little effect on turning the crack from that direction. Thus, oblique oriented flaws turning to become perpendicular to the maximum stress cannot be ruled out. However, once this occurs, the orientation will not change. Likewise, a circumferential flaw, which is already oriented perpendicular to the maximum stress, will remain circumferentially oriented.

In addition, cracks tend to propagate in the direction that offers the least resistance. If a crack initiates at the bottom of the weld, near or in the HAZ, it tends to propagate, in the HAZ, parallel to the fusion line between the weld and base metal instead of turning into the base metal at an oblique angle. Therefore, any crack, initiated and oriented in any direction at its very early stage, would adjust its direction and tend to align and propagate in the hoop or circumferential orientation, whichever results in the largest stress intensity factor.

Based on the flaw orientation measurement data given in Shcherbinskii and Myakshev (1970), there is a strong dependence of the flaw orientation on the direction of welding. This is consistent with the expected behavior that most defects are associated with the application of the weld metal and would tend to be oriented along the interface of deposited beads. Although it is unlikely to observe flaws at significant oblique angles to the direction of the weld travel direction, this circumstance cannot be entirely ruled out. Depending on the quality of the welding and weld procedures, a more uniform distribution with regards to angular orientation may be obtained. However, it is expected that very tight controls will be in place when the waste package closure weld is applied. If flaws are present that make a significant oblique angle with

the direction of the weld placement, it would not be surprising to see the flaw direction turn towards the radial direction.

The potential for flaws turning or not turning towards the radial direction can be studied by determining the stress intensity factor for a crack in a plate, with an angle θ to the direction of the load, subjected to a constant stress. As an example, for an arbitrary stress and crack length, the ratio of the stress intensity factor for a flaw at an angle θ (zero at $\theta = 0$) with the direction of the load to the stress intensity factor oriented perpendicular to the stress direction (maximum stress intensity factor) can provide some insight to the expected behavior of flaws. Bounding analyses demonstrate that for a circumferentially oriented flaw in the waste package closure welds, subjected to hoop stress, the stress intensity factor would be very low as denoted by a very low stress intensity factor (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5). The ratio of the stress intensity factor for a flaw oriented perpendicular to the load to a flaw oriented parallel to the load is very low for angles of 5 and 10 degrees to the load direction subjected to hoop stress. The ratio is 0.03 and 0.05 for flaws at 5 and 10 degrees to the load direction, respectively. This demonstrates a very low driving force for the crack to change orientation from circumferentially oriented to radially oriented. This same circumferential flaw would be oriented close to 90 degrees (perpendicular) to the radial stress. The figure shows that the ratio of the stress intensity factors is at least 95 percent of a flaw perpendicular to the load direction ($\theta = 90$). Thus, there is a significant driving force to keep the flaw in its circumferential direction. Combined with the presence of the HAZ, it is unlikely that these flaws would turn radially.

Combining the test results regarding flaw orientation from Shcherbinskii and Myakishev (1970) and the stress intensity factor ratio discussed above, it is concluded that the probability of an expected circumferentially oriented flaw turning radially is very unlikely. A flaw that is oriented at a greater angle (say 45 degrees with the load direction) may turn in the radial direction, however, this is unlikely since the probability that such a flaw exists is very small (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5).

Based on the above discussion, it is considered highly unlikely that circumferentially oriented flaws in the waste package closure welds would turn radially. Essentially all flaws will be oriented towards the direction of the welding (circumferentially). An investigation of the stress intensity factor for flaws at oblique angles to the load direction supports the conclusion that flaws oriented to within approximately ± 15 degrees of the loading direction will not be subjected to sufficient driving force to cause the flaw to turn radially. Supporting this conclusion also is the fact that the flaw would need to turn away from the path of least resistance, the HAZ, to grow into the base or weld metal. It should be noted that if a flaw were to occur and be oriented an angle greater than ± 15 degrees, the flaw orientation may change such that the flaw will become radially oriented. However, as noted earlier, the probability of such flaws occurring is small relative to flaws orienting within ± 15 degrees of the welding direction.

All the discussions given above indicate that a correction factor for weld flaw orientation for the embedded flaw density in the outer quarter of the thickness should be applied and used in the SCC analysis for waste package lifetime calculations. Based on the welding process and the inspection techniques to be employed for the closure welds and the narrowness of the flaw orientation distributions presented in Shcherbinskii & Myakishev (1970), it is recommended that

a multiplication factor of 0.01 to be used on total number of flaws of any given size for the subsurface flaws.

Ultrasonic examinations have now been performed on three actual waste package welds on two mock-ups. These were unannealed closure welds, one on Alloy 625 and two on Alloy 22. The total length of weld was approximately 45 feet, and no defects were detected (CRWMS M&O 1998c). Therefore, the probability of defects for actual closure welds is not inconsistent with low defect densities that will result from this recommendation.

3.1.7.10 Estimate of Crack Opening

Leaking through cracks can occur if the cracks grow into through-thickness cracks. A comprehensive, finite-element analysis may be used in the future to estimate the crack opening. However, a simplified approach is described here. The following assumptions are made for this simplified approach:

1. A given crack in the waste package outer barrier closure weld is either circumferential (perpendicular to the radial stress) or radial (perpendicular to the hoop stress). A circumferential crack has a semi elliptical shape with depth a and length $2c$. A radial crack has a semi-circular shape ($a = c$).
2. The crack length $2c$ of a circumferential crack remains unchanged, but the final length of a through-wall crack is at least twice the wall thickness. Under this assumption, most cracks will grow in both directions of the minor (depth a) and major (length $2c$) axes and assume the semi-circular shape (i.e., $a = c$) when they become through-wall cracks. According to fracture mechanics, a tends to grow faster than c because the stress intensity factor tends to have a maximum value at the end of the minor axis and a minimum value at the end of the major axis. Eventually, a semi-elliptical crack will become a semi-circular crack. The crack length $2c$ will remain unchanged only for very long cracks, with initial crack length greater than twice the wall thickness. For such long cracks, the occurrence rate is usually very low. The length of a semi-circular crack will always be equal to twice the crack depth.
3. The crack opening has an elliptical shape with length $2c$ and a gap d

The AMR on SCC (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5.4) shows that the opening of a crack in an infinite sheet is given for plane stress condition as:

$$d = \frac{(4c)s}{E} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-31})$$

where δ is the crack opening, $2c$ is the crack length, s is the stress and E is Young's modulus. The opening area for an elliptical crack, A_{cr} , can then be estimated with Equation 3-36:

$$A_{cr} = \frac{p}{4} d(2c) = \frac{(2p^2)s}{E} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-32})$$

When Equations 3-35 and 3-36 are used to estimate the crack opening(δ) and opening area (A_{cr}), the stress (σ) is either the radial stress (for a circumferential crack) or the hoop stress (for a radial crack).

3.1.7.11 Oxide Plugging of Through-Wall Stress Corrosion Cracks in Drip Shield

As indicated in Section 3.1.7.1, SCC may be initiated in the drip shield due to residual stress produced by rock fall. Residual stress due to rock fall, unlike weld residual stress, can not be mitigated. Incipient cracks or preexisting fabrication flaws in the drip shield may grow to through-wall cracks as a result of SCC. However, stress corrosion cracks in passive alloys such as Titanium Grade 7 and Alloy 22 tend to be very tight (small crack opening displacement) by nature. A repetitive process of the stress-induced passive film rupture, repassivation and re-rupture at the crack tip results in a relatively high effective crack tip corrosion rate as compared to the unstressed sides of the crack. The analogous repetitive process of hydride precipitation, hydride fracture and reprecipitation of hydride at the crack tip would result in a tight crack in hydride induced cracking. As the crack grows through-wall, the tensile stresses normal to the crack walls are relieved, and the resulting crack faces continue to corrode by general and/or crevice corrosion. Effectively, a tight stress corrosion crack represents a crevice. Depending on the corrosion potential of the outer wetted surface compared to the critical crevice potential (or repassivation potential), the crack faces may corrode at either the generally very low passive corrosion rate or, if the potential is high enough, at the more accelerated crevice corrosion rate (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5.5).

As described in CRWMS M&O 2000c (Sections 6.4 and 7), Alloy 22 exposed to the expected range of waste package and drip shield surface environments will not suffer accelerated crevice corrosion. In a similar manner, the even more corrosion resistant Titanium Grade 7 drip shield material will not suffer accelerated crevice corrosion (CRWMS M&O 2000d, Sections 6.4 and 7). Thus, the opposing sides of through-wall stress corrosion cracks in the drip shield will continue to corrode at the very low passive corrosion rate with a median value of 0.03 $\mu\text{m}/\text{year}$ (CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.5.4). Based on the calculated through-wall residual stress profiles remaining in the rock contact region following a large (>4 metric tons) rock drop, the minimum crack opening displacement is expected to be 130 μm (CRWMS M&O 2000ai, Section 6). The crack opening displacement of 130 μm is based on Equation 3-31, where the crack length $2c$ is 13 cm (CRWMS M&O 2000ai, Table 6-1), the stress σ is about 20 percent of the yield strength of Titanium Grade 7 (CRWMS M&O 2000ai, Section 6), and the Young's modulus E is 106.87 GPa (CRWMS M&O 1999f, Section 5.12). The minimum yield strength of Titanium-7 is 275 MPa (CRWMS M&O 1999f, Section 5.12). Thus, the dense passive corrosion oxide film growing normal to each opposing crack face would need to grow until it fills the 130- μm gap.

While the crack faces are corroding passively but before the corrosion film grows to a thickness where it will completely fill the crack, there may be a small amount of water transport by surface diffusion into the crack and through the drip shield. However, the small heat flux present across the drip shield wall will result in evaporation of the slowly flowing water and a resultant scale deposit will form over the crack where it intersect the upper drip shield surface as well as within the crack. In the case of concentrating J-13 well water, calcite precipitation is the first stage of the concentration process (CRWMS M&O 2000a, Sections 6.4.2, 6.5, and 6.7). Consequently,

evaporation of J-13 well water slowly flowing through a 130- μm crack opening would lead to rapid scaling by calcite deposition. The rate of plugging would be proportional to the volume flow rate through the crack. Because the crack wall surface area to crack solution volume ratio for a 130- μm wide crack through a 15 mm thick drip shield wall is very large, scale deposition would be an efficient process involving the need for only a small volume flow through the crack; i.e. crack plugging should occur for only minor crack leakage.

Because of the expected high density of the calcite deposits and lack of a pressure gradient to drive water through the crack, the probability of solution flow through the plugged crack would approach zero. Since the Alloy 22 waste package outer surface is expected to be covered with areas of adherent particulates that settle out as crushed tuff, "dust," vapor phase carryover, etc. and because of the likely deliquescent nature of anionic impurities such as chlorides and nitrates trapped in the particulates, they are likely to adsorb a water film from the ambient, high humidity environment. Thus, the contribution of the extremely small amount of water that might migrate through a tight plugged drip shield stress corrosion crack and be transported to the waste package surface as compared to the total expected water that is likely to be present in the deliquescent water film already at the surface is expected to be negligible and can be ignored in TSPA calculations.

3.1.7.12 Summary of Stress Corrosion Cracking Model

Two alternative models that deal with SCC have been developed for the performance assessment of the materials to be used for the waste package outer barrier. The first model (Method A) is based upon the concept of a threshold stress intensity factor at a pre-existing surface-breaking flaw, whereas the second model (Method B) is based upon the concept of a threshold stress at a "smooth" surface. Method B assumes crack propagation via the slip dissolution model, provided that the threshold stress is exceeded.

The first model (threshold stress intensity factor concept) is based on the theory that there exists a threshold value (K_{ISCC}) for the stress intensity factor such that there is no growth of a crack having a stress intensity factor less than the threshold value (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.3). The concept of threshold stress intensity factor (K_{ISCC}) has been commonly used to assess the susceptibility of materials to SCC. The applicability of this model to Alloy 22 (the material to be used for the outer shell of the waste package) has been studied experimentally.

Preliminary results based on Method A show that the initial waste package design is able to arrest circumferential SCC, but not radial SCC. For circumferential flaws in the closure welds, the maximum values of K_I are less than the mean values of K_{ISCC} . Therefore, SCC should not initiate (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.3.2). The mean values of K_{ISCC} are 33.00 $\text{MPa}\cdot\text{m}^{1/2}$ for the outer lid and 20.54 $\text{MPa}\cdot\text{m}^{1/2}$ for the inner lid. The maximum value of K_I estimated for a circumferential flaw initiated at the outer surface is 22 $\text{MPa}\cdot\text{m}^{1/2}$ for the outer lid. However, based on the threshold value, through-wall, radial cracking can occur.

Method B (slip dissolution or film rupture concept) relates crack advance to the metal oxidation that occurs when the protective film at the crack tip is ruptured. In this case, the theory of slip dissolution was successfully applied to predict the SCC propagation rate in light water reactors at high temperature. This model was adopted to assess the SCC susceptibility of the materials to be

used for the waste package outer barrier (Alloy 22). Method B also predicts eventual through-wall radial cracking, based on the high radial K_I value calculated for the outer weld in the initial design.

3.1.7.13 Mitigation or Elimination of Stress Corrosion Cracking

Since the crack growth analyses produced by either SCC model indicate that through-wall radial cracking is a potential threat to the waste package, it is necessary to implement post-weld stress mitigation processes to eliminate the driving force for SCC.

As mentioned previously, two methods have been identified for localized treatment of the closure weld region. One of these involves use of induction heating coils to affect a localized annealing of the weld region. This process has been used successfully in the annealing of weld stresses in large components such as girth welds in large-diameter casings of solid-fuel rockets. This process is expected to neutralize the residual tensile stress initially present in the closure weld at substantial depths. This post-weld process may be able to mitigate stress to greater depths than laser peening. However, there are several concerns associated with this approach. Calculations indicate that temperature gradients experienced during cool down tend to shift the location of the tensile stresses to another adjacent region of the waste package, making that region potentially vulnerable to SCC. A second concern is that the process may heat the waste to unacceptably high temperatures. As discussed earlier, both possibilities were analyzed using the finite element code ANSYS. The results of this analysis show that localized annealing by induction heating is a viable approach for producing low tensile stresses (less than 20 percent yield stress at depths greater than 7 mm).

The second method involves the use of laser peening, where a high-powered laser beam is used to cause shock waves in the surface of the material. These pulses produce compressive stresses in the surface. Multiple-pass laser peening can be used to increase the depth of the compressive stress layer. This process has been successfully demonstrated at LLNL on sample weldments (Figure 3-64). It has been shown that compressive stress can be produced at depths of 2 to 3 mm with multiple-pass laser peening. Additional depth may be possible, but has not been demonstrated. As discussed, a shortcoming of this approach is that this process only delays the potential initiation of SCC. Below the layer of compressive stress, the weld region is still under tensile stresses. When the compressive layer of material is lost due to corrosion, the remaining material is still vulnerable to SCC. This applies to both mitigation techniques laser peening and induction annealing.

An optimized closure weld design was developed based on ANSYS stress analysis. Through-wall residual stresses have been calculated for two post-weld stress mitigation processes with the ANSYS computer program (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6). Based on these analyses, a dual-lid waste package design employing both stress mitigation processes was developed to maximize the expected waste package lifetime, which appears to be limited by SCC at the closure welds.

3.1.7.14 Uncertainty in Stress Distributions for Closure Welds

In this PMR, weld residual stress uncertainty limits of ± 10 percent of yield are recommended for use in the calculations to estimate time to first SCC through-wall cracking. This uncertainty range is based on the close degree of control anticipated for the Alloy 22 material, the welding process for the closure, and the post-weld stress mitigation processes. In contrast, weld residual stress uncertainty limits for axially oriented stresses as high as ± 35 percent of yield stress around the mean yield value are described in the literature (Mohr 1996). This high degree of uncertainty was empirically developed by bounding the measured scatter in residual stress developed for a large number of welded carbon-steel pipes covering a range of thicknesses, welding processes, weld joint configurations, weld heat inputs, yield strengths, etc. In the case of the final closure weld, the various parameters contributing to residual stress variation will be closely controlled. This includes close, automated control of the welding process parameters, the allowable material and the weld wire yield strength range, the weld joint configuration and spacing, etc.

In contrast to the high degree of scatter noted in the carbon-steel paper (Mohr 1996), data available for shot-peened Incoloy 908, a high-performance nickel-based alloy, indicate a relatively narrow scatter (Pasupathi 2000). Data are for as-welded and as-welded plus shot-peened material with 1-sigma values of ± 3 percent of the measured mean stress value. This corresponds to an uncertainty range of about ± 9 percent at the 3-sigma level. In comparison, the residual stresses measured in a peened surface with X-ray diffraction showed a measurement uncertainty of about ± 15 MPa, which is about 5 percent of the Alloy 22 yield strength (SEM 1996). The data given by Pasupathi (2000) are for both welded and non-welded samples (peened and unpeened), many of which also contain some cold work due to tube reduction drawing. Thus, they represent a good sampling of the entire range of material conditions that may be encountered. Since shot peening is analogous to laser peening in its effect on metals, the peened data are also relevant to the peened case for the inner lid. A stress variation similar to the peened case would be expected for material processed by localized induction annealing. During the induction annealing process cycle, all the residual weld stress in the heated weld region is fully relieved at $\sim 1120^{\circ}\text{C}$, and the remaining post-process stresses are produced during the cool-down portion of the thermal cycle. Since it is planned to control this cool-down process in a reproducible manner, we expect to see residual stress variations similar to those for laser and shot peening.

Weld residual stress uncertainty limits of ± 10 percent of the yield strength is considered realistic. In the case of the waste package closure weld, x-ray diffraction measurements of residual stress will be made of the final Alloy 22 material with post-weld stress mitigation. These measurements will be made in the near-surface region of the weld and HAZ. If stresses are found to deviate from the specified range, the weld will either be reprocessed, repaired, or scrapped. Thus, for a well controlled optimum case, a defensible range of uncertainty in the stress distribution of ± 5 percent of the yield stress is achievable (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2.5). Additionally, an uncertainty range of ± 30 percent of the yield strength may be used for a case of extremely conservative consideration (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2.5). All three ranges of uncertainty are used for WAPDEG SCC calculations.

3.1.8 Hydrogen-Induced Cracking

As discussed in Sections 3.1.5 and 3.1.6, the drip shield is to be fabricated from a titanium-based alloy and is highly resistant to general and localized corrosion. Other degradation mechanisms do not appear to be life-limiting. The material has been shown to be susceptible to SCC under certain conditions. As discussed in Section 3.1.7, mitigation of residual weld stress makes this an unlikely mechanism. Another possible failure mechanism for titanium and its alloys under waste disposal conditions is via hydrogen absorption, which can lead to HIC. HIC is also called hydrogen embrittlement and, can cause a decrease of the fracture toughness or ductility of a metal due to the presence of atomic hydrogen. The usual failure mode for a ductile material is the ductile tearing observed during slow crack growth. The decrease of fracture toughness can also cause fast crack growth (brittle fracture) of a normally ductile material under sustained load. During slow crack growth, material will fail as the stress intensity factor K_I reaches a value K_{IS} , the stress intensity factors for ductile rupture. During fast crack growth, the same material will fail as the stress intensity factor K_I reach a value K_{IH} , the stress intensity factors for brittle fracture, which is less than K_{IS} .

It has been observed that the passive oxide film on titanium acts as an excellent barrier to the absorption of hydrogen under open-circuit conditions. However, hydrogen absorption may be too slow to observe analytically during practical tests (up to tens of years). This absorption could lead to a significant accumulation of hydrogen and the danger of HIC during exposures of 10^3 to 10^5 years.

Under Canadian waste repository conditions, a very simple approach was adopted to predict when HIC might become a potential failure process in a waste container. In essence, this model is a susceptibility model or the equivalent of an initiation model for localized corrosion processes such as pitting and crevice corrosion. The basic premise of the model is that failure will occur when the concentration of hydrogen in the titanium exceeds a critical value (H_c). Combinations of stress intensity factor and hydrogen concentration that lead to brittle fracture or ductile rupture are discussed in AMR on HIC (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 6.1.3).

This model is presented in the AMR and is very conservative because it assumes that, when the environmental and material conditions can support cathodic hydrogen-charging processes, and when the hydrogen concentration in the drip shield exceeds a critical value, failure will be effectively instantaneous. In reality, the hydrogen concentration above the critical value causes embrittlement of the drip shield, not necessarily cracking. HIC of the drip shield requires presence of sustained stress or mechanical impact. In the current evaluation, the hydrogen embrittlement and HIC are used interchangeably. This is the conservative approach.

Clearly, the propagation of a corrosion pit, a crevice, a stress corrosion crack, or a hydrogen-induced crack does not proceed instantaneously to failure. However, if the rate of propagation is fast on the geologic time scales being considered, then the process can be thought of as instantaneous. Another factor ignored in this analysis is the impact of propagation-limiting processes. For example, repassivation may occur with a pit or crevice; or crack blunting could occur with a stress corrosion crack. In the HIC model described below, no crack initiation or crack blunting processes are considered.

3.1.8.1 Model Description

The model can best be summarized as follows:

1. The passive oxide is assumed to be permeable to atomic hydrogen.
2. Atomic hydrogen is generated at the surface of the Titanium alloy. This is described by a hydrogen generation rate, which is taken to be proportional to the general corrosion rate of the passive material.
3. A fraction of the hydrogen is absorbed into the oxide and assumed to directly enter the alloy. The remainder combines to yield hydrogen gas, which is lost to the surroundings. The rate of absorption is taken to be directly proportional to the hydrogen generation rate multiplied by an absorption efficiency coefficient.
4. Once in the alloy, the hydrogen is transported throughout the entire thickness of the material to yield a uniform distribution of hydrogen. In other words, transport processes within the alloy are rapid compared to the rate of absorption.
5. The hydrogen content of the alloy is allowed to increase until a critical level is reached. The material then fails immediately. The model allows for the calculation of hydrogen content and for comparison with the critical concentration.

3.1.8.2 Elements of the Model Assumptions

3.1.8.2.1 The Oxide is Assumed to be Permeable to Hydrogen

The potential repository at Yucca Mountain will not achieve anoxic conditions. During the early stages of repository operation, the temperature will be high, but the oxygen and water content will be low. Since water is the only significant source of hydrogen (due to reaction with the titanium), hydrogen absorption rates should be lower during the initial stage of repository operation than during subsequent periods. Oxidizing conditions and an open-circuit corrosion potential too positive to allow the redox transformations in the oxide will eventually be established. Under oxidizing conditions, any exposed intermetallic or noble-metal particles (Ti_2Ni in Titanium Grade 12; Titanium and Pd in Titanium Grades 16 and 7) will be passivated by a surface oxide film. Consequently, their catalytic properties for hydrogen production and absorption may be lost.

The oxide film remains impermeable to hydrogen until the electrical potential becomes sufficiently negative that the oxide becomes chemically unstable. When this occurs, Titanium(IV) within the TiO_2 oxide is reduced to Titanium(III) and hydrogen can be incorporated as a doping defect. When this process becomes possible, it is conservatively assumed that the oxide becomes permeable to hydrogen. Absorbed hydrogen then has free access to the alloy; in other words, any hydrogen entering the oxide can be rapidly transported to the metal (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 6.1.5).

Several mitigating factors indicate that this is a very conservative scenario. First, experimental evidence suggests that total permeability is not established as soon as this oxide transformation

begins. Second, in the absence of specific unexpected reducing reagents, it is unlikely that such redox transformations could be induced in the passive film.

Assuming that the maximum temperature at which an aqueous condition can be sustained on the titanium is 125°C, a pH > 13 would be required for significant hydrogen absorption (CRWMS M&O 2000g). Therefore, it would be judicious to assume that hydrogen absorption is possible within the temperature range of approximately 100 to 125°C. This range effectively defines a window of susceptibility for hydrogen absorption.

The probability of hydrogen absorption by titanium alloys at Yucca Mountain is low but cannot be ruled out entirely.

3.1.8.2.2 Hydrogen is Generated at the Surface of the Titanium Alloy

The only feasible source of absorbable hydrogen appears to be the reaction of Titanium with water. The direct absorption of radiolytically produced hydrogen requires a combination of high dose rate ($> 10^4 \text{ R h}^{-1}$) and high temperature ($> 200^\circ\text{C}$) and a steam or aqueous environment. This combination of conditions seems extremely unlikely at Yucca Mountain. Under open-circuit conditions, the rate of hydrogen production will be directly related to the general corrosion rate. In the presence of dissolved oxygen, this rate has been shown to be extremely low and effectively immeasurable by standard procedures such as weight change measurements. Consequently, the rate of hydrogen production (the essential model boundary condition) will also be extremely low.

Further, oxidizing conditions expected in the repository will not lead to a significant enhancement of general corrosion; the process will be blocked by the excellent protective properties of the passive TiO_2 film. Under these oxidizing conditions, the intermetallic precipitates should be covered by a passive oxide film and their catalytic properties severely degraded.

Thus under Yucca Mountain repository conditions, the corrosion rate of titanium alloys (with the possible exception of Titanium Grade 12), and, hence, the rate of hydrogen production, will most likely be slow and transitory. Evidence suggests that even when corrosion, in the form of film growth, is initially accelerated under oxidizing conditions, the accumulation of mineral precipitates leads to the eventual blocking of corrosion processes.

3.1.8.2.3 A Fraction of the Hydrogen is Absorbed into the Metal

Even if the oxide film present on the titanium surface provides just a semi-impermeable barrier to hydrogen absorption into the metal, only a fraction of the hydrogen produced will actually be absorbed into the metal, and hence, contribute to the eventual embrittlement of the alloy. This critical fraction must be known. A consistent single value may not represent the real absorption efficiency of the alloy because this efficiency would be expected to change as the condition of the surface changed. The initial surface could be relatively free of absorbed hydrogen, and the initial absorption efficiency could be high. Subsequently, it would be expected to decrease as the number of available surface sites for absorption become saturated. These absorption sites could be the usual defects and dislocations known to trap hydrogen and, in addition, noble metal intermetallic particles, which would have a high solubility for hydrogen. Alternatively, the

formation of surface hydrides could lead to a change in the mechanism of proton reduction and a decrease in the rate of hydrogen absorption into the alloy.

The concern remains that in the temperature range extending from 100°C to 125°C and in the presence of an aggressive saline solution, the passive oxide film may be degraded and the hydrogen absorption efficiency increased. The rate of passive film growth (rate of hydrogen production), as well as the hydrogen absorption rate for Titanium Grade 12 in extremely saline solutions at 25 and 100°C, are discussed in the AMR on HIC (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 6). These values for passive film growth rate and hydrogen absorption efficiency of 0.03 $\mu\text{m}\cdot\text{y}^{-1}$ and 10 percent, respectively, would be conservatively appropriate for Titanium Grade 7 in a degraded passive condition.

3.1.8.2.4 Hydrogen is Uniformly Distributed in Titanium Alloy

Once hydrogen is in the metal, its fate becomes dependent on the diffusion rate. The diffusivity is affected by the microstructure of the material, as well as the strength and distribution of stresses within the material.

It was assumed that, because the rate of absorption of hydrogen into the metal would be very slow, its transport throughout the bulk would be comparatively rapid. Hence, absorbed hydrogen would be uniformly distributed throughout the alloy. At the high absorption rates experienced during electrochemical experiments, absorbed hydrogen can lead to the formation of a surface hydride layer. Since the presence of such a layer appears to impede the further absorption of hydrogen, its presence may actually reduce the absorption efficiency of the material (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 6.1).

However, hydrogen accumulates at the titanium surface. A conservative assumption is that it remains available for transport into the alloy. When the temperature is low enough so that the transport rate can be assumed to exceed the absorption rate (below 100°C), the thickness of the hydride layer will decrease as the hydride is redissolved in the alloy. The layer of hydride on the surface serves as a source of hydrogen for infusion into the bulk material. The hydride continues to redissolve until the surface layer is depleted.

3.1.8.2.5 Hydrogen Concentration Increases to Critical Level where Failure Occurs

The slow strain rate tests (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 6.2.3) show that titanium can tolerate substantial amounts of hydrogen before it becomes susceptible to cracking. This critical hydrogen concentration is not related to the solubility of hydrogen in the alpha matrix of the alloy but to the number density of precipitates, which must be capable of supporting a crack propagation process through the material. Values for critical hydrogen concentration (H_c) were obtained from published literature for Titanium Grades 2, 12 and 16 (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 6.2.2). The high value for Titanium Grade 16 (greater than 1,000 μg per gram) appears to be due to the ability of the intermetallics to soak up hydrogen, thereby preventing them from forming hydride precipitates in the alloy.

Whichever process is assumed for the dispersion of hydrogen throughout the titanium alloy, failure is assumed to occur once this critical value is achieved. However, this remains a very

conservative approach because slow strain rate tests have determined the point at which the necessary stress level will inevitably be achieved. Also, the critical value is a threshold value, representing the lowest concentration at which influence of hydrogen is observed. It is feasible that much higher concentrations of hydrogen could be tolerated before failure actually occurs.

3.1.8.3 Determination of the Critical Hydrogen Concentration

Using the slow strain rate technique on precracked compact tension specimens precharged with known amounts of hydrogen, it has been shown that fracture toughness of Titanium Grade 2 and that of Titanium Grade 12 is not significantly affected until their hydrogen content exceeds a critical value, H_c . The as-received materials, containing 20 to 50 μg per gram of hydrogen, are very tough and fail by ductile overload under high stress. This ductile tearing is also observed during slow-crack growth for both materials. The hydrogen concentration above which slow-crack growth is no longer observed and only fast-crack growth occurs is defined as H_c .

Critical hydrogen concentrations (H_c) of 1,000 to 2,000 $\mu\text{g/g}$ were reported for Titanium Grade 16 (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 6.2.2). Critical hydrogen concentrations are not available for Titanium Grade 7. The value of H_c for Titanium Grade 7 is conservatively assumed to be at least 1,000 $\mu\text{g/g}$ which is the lower bound value observed for Titanium Grade 16, as indicated previously (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 6.1.3). Titanium Grades 7 and 16 are expected to behave similarly because of their close chemical compositions (CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 1.2; CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 1.1). As discussed at the beginning of this section, embrittlement of the titanium alloys from hydrogen uptake (above the critical value) and HIC of the alloys are used equivalently

3.1.8.4 Determination of Hydrogen Concentration

Analytical formulas can be derived to represent the hydrogen concentration in the metal as a function of time of emplacement of the container. There are two processes by which hydrogen could be produced, and possibly absorbed, under passive conditions: (1) direct absorption of hydrogen produced by water radiolysis and (2) absorption of atomic hydrogen produced by the corrosion process to produce oxide. The direct absorption of radiolytically produced hydrogen does not appear to be significant except at high dose rate ($>10^2$ Gy/hr) and high temperature ($>150^\circ\text{C}$). This condition is clearly unattainable under Yucca Mountain conditions, and will not be considered, leaving the corrosion process as the only feasible source of hydrogen for absorption.

The rate of hydrogen absorption will be controlled by the rate of the corrosion reaction, which dictates the rate of production of absorbable hydrogen. Since titanium oxide, TiO_2 , is extremely stable and protective in the repository environment, the corrosion reaction will be effectively limited to an oxide film growth reaction.

While the rate of hydrogen production and absorption is directly proportional to the rate of film growth, the fraction of hydrogen absorption needs to be determined. Available test data suggest 0.1 and 0.02 for fractional efficiency for absorption values, f_h to represent high and low hydrogen absorption efficiencies for titanium alloys. The low value would appear most appropriate for Titanium Grade 2 since the passive film is a good transport barrier to hydrogen absorption. For

Titanium Grades 7 and 16 in which intermetallic formation is very limited or avoided, the lower value is also appropriate (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 6.1.5).

Based on a constant film growth rate, and hence the corrosion rate, the concentration of hydrogen in the metal, H_A , can be calculated as a function of time of emplacement (t in years) from the expression,

$$H_A = 4(\rho_{Ti}/10^3) f_h R_{uc} t [M_{Ti} (d_o - R_{uc} t)]^{-1} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-33})$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} H_A &= \text{hydrogen content (g/mm}^3\text{)} \\ \rho_{Ti} &= \text{density of Ti (g/cm}^3\text{)} \\ f_h &= \text{fractional efficiency for absorption} \\ R_{uc} &= \text{rate of general passive corrosion (mm/yr)} \\ t &= \text{time of emplacement in years (yr)} \\ M_{Ti} &= \text{atomic mass of Ti = 47.9} \\ d_o &= \text{original corrosion allowance (mm) = container wall} \\ &\quad \text{thickness(mm)} \end{aligned}$$

The units of atomic mass are grams per gram-atom, which for hydrogen is 1.0 grams per gram-atom and for titanium is 47.9 g/gram-atom. Since there is 1 gram of hydrogen per gram-atom, the values of H_A in (g/mm³) and in (g-atoms/mm³) are equal (to within less than 1 percent).

Considering a Titanium Grade 7 plate with 1 mm² surface area, it is noted in Equation 3-33 that hydrogen in grams produced by the general corrosion after t years of emplacement is based on the reaction:



The derivation of Equation 3-37 is based on a constant general corrosion rate. It was noted that the assumption of constant corrosion rate is conservative and less conservative corrosion models assume that the rate decays with time. (CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.5.4)

The rate of general passive corrosion, R_{uc} , can be calculated from the rate of oxide film thickness, R_{ox} , by the following formula:

$$R_{uc} = R_{ox} (\rho_{ox}/M_{ox})(\rho_{Ti}/M_{Ti})^{-1} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-34})$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \rho_{ox} &= \text{density of the oxide in g/cm}^3 \\ M_{ox} &= \text{molecular mass of the oxide} \end{aligned}$$

Since the value of $(\rho_{ox}/M_{ox})(\rho_{Ti}/M_{Ti})^{-1}$ is always greater than unity, it is conservative to assume that $R_{uc} = R_{ox}$.

3.1.8.5 Hydrogen Concentration in Drip Shield

The general corrosion rates reported for Titanium Grade 7 at the 50th percentile is approximately 25 nm/yr, the rate at the 90th percentile is approximately 100 nm/yr, and the maximum rate is less than 350 nm/yr (CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.5.4).

The fractional efficiency for absorption, based on previous discussion, is $f_h = 0.02$ for Titanium Grade 7. The rate of general passive corrosion is $R_{uc} = 100 \times 10^{-6}$ mm/yr (90th percentile value) or 25×10^{-6} mm/yr (50th percentile value). The time of employment is $t = 10,000$ years. One half of the minimum wall thickness (15 mm) is assumed for d_o , i.e., $d_o = 7.5$ mm, to account for corrosion on both sides (upper and under sides) of the drip shield.

Case 1: Conservative Estimate $R_{ox} = 100 \times 10^{-6}$ mm/yr (90th percentile value)
 $f_h = 0.02$
 $d_o = 7.5$ mm
 $t = 10000$ yr
 $H_A = 257 \mu\text{g/g} < H_c = 1,000 \mu\text{g/g}$

Case 2: Best Estimate $R_{ox} = 25 \times 10^{-6}$ mm/yr (50th percentile value)
 $f_h = 0.02$
 $d_o = 7.5$ mm
 $t = 10000$ yr
 $H_A = 58 \mu\text{g/g} < H_c = 1,000 \mu\text{g/g}$

The hydrogen concentration in the drip shield at 10,000 years after emplacement is $257 \mu\text{g/g}$ resulting from a conservative estimate and $58 \mu\text{g/g}$ from a best estimate. The estimated hydrogen concentration in either case is significantly less than the conservatively selected critical hydrogen concentration of $1,000 \mu\text{g/g}$ for Titanium Grade 7. These results indicate that there exists a big margin of safety for the drip shield against the effects of HIC and this degradation mechanism is not credible under repository conditions.

3.1.8.6 Hydrogen-Induced Cracking Due to Galvanic Coupling with Steel Ground Support

In the current drip shield design without backfill, hydrogen generation may be caused by the galvanic couple between the titanium drip shield surface and ground structural components (such as rock bolts, wire mesh, and steel liners used in the drift), which may fall onto the drip shield surface. Therefore, HIC or hydrogen embrittlement of the drip shield due to galvanic couple can not be ruled out since the conditions associated with metal temperature and water or moisture pH (or corrosion potential) as described above are certainly attainable under the repository conditions.

3.1.8.6.1 Qualitative Assessment

Given the expected evolution of ground waters potentially contacting the drip shield and the temperature regime within the repository (CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 1.3), the required conditions for hydrogen absorption by the titanium drip shield are clearly present when

galvanically coupled to sections of the steel components. If occurring while temperatures are high ($\geq 80^{\circ}\text{C}$) and concentrated ground waters are present, then localized hydrided areas are possible. These areas will only occur at those sites where both contact to carbon steel and the establishment of lasting (at least periodically) aqueous conditions are achieved. Their formation is likely to be promoted if the contact points coincide with abraded or scratched areas of the shield caused by the impact of collapsing sections of the ground support structure.

At higher temperature, hydrogen will be more rapidly absorbed and transported into the bulk structure to produce the hydride distribution required for extensive crack propagation. It is less likely that a hydride layer will be retained at the surface. As the temperature falls, the formation of surface hydrides becomes more likely as the rate of hydrogen transport into the bulk of the metal decreases. The formation of surface hydrides tends to reduce the efficiency of subsequent hydrogen absorption (Noel et al. 1996), and their presence has little effect on structural integrity.

However, the efficiency of Fe-Ti galvanic couples to cause hydrogen cracking in the repository will be limited for a number of additional reasons as discussed below (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 6.3.2).

- The contact area is likely to be small, and the anode to cathode area (area of steel and titanium, respectively) low. Since relatively low volumes of groundwater are likely to contact both metals simultaneously, anode to cathode areas close to one seem likely. If a couple with a small anode to cathode area ratio was established (i.e., a small piece of steel in contact with a large area of drip shield), then one would expect the couple to be more rapidly exhausted as the steel is consumed. Under these conditions, the amount of hydrogen absorbed would be limited.
- While temperatures are high ($> 80^{\circ}\text{C}$), the intermittent nature of seepage dripping onto the drip shield should lead to only limited periods of the aqueous conditions required to sustain an active galvanic couple, thereby limiting hydrogen absorption while temperatures are high enough to drive hydrogen transport into the metal. For temperatures below 80°C , even galvanic polarization below the potential threshold of -0.6 V (vs SCE) produces only innocuous surface hydride films (Schutz and Thomas 1987). Also, at these lower temperatures, the small amounts of dissolved O_2 in the solutions forming the galvanic couples will make it very difficult to achieve polarization of the galvanic potential to less than -0.6 V (vs SCE). Additionally, the intermittent wetting and drying cycles anticipated on the drip shield will lead to the ready formation of calcareous and other mineral deposits, which are well known to dramatically suppress galvanic currents, thereby stifling hydrogen absorption (Lunde and Nyborg 1993).
- Conditions in the repository will be oxidizing, making it less likely that the couple will sustain water reduction, and hence hydrogen absorption. However, at high temperatures in concentrated saline solutions, the amount of O_2 dissolved in the solution forming the couple will probably be too low to displace water reduction as the primary cathodic reaction. However, the ferrous ion product of steel dissolution will be homogeneously oxidized to ferric species by dissolved O_2 . If conditions remain neutral, this should lead to the formation of insoluble Fe(III) oxides/hydroxides, and little influence would be

exerted on the galvanic couple. However, any tendency for acidification or the development of alkaline conditions will increase the ferric ion solubility. Under evaporative conditions, this could lead to quite high dissolved ferric ion concentrations and the establishment of a galvanic potential sufficiently positive to avoid hydrogen absorption into the titanium. It is well documented that only parts per million concentrations of multivalent transition metal cations such as Fe(III) are required to polarize titanium to passive conditions (Schutz and Thomas 1987).

- Titanium has a large tolerance for hydrogen (see Section 3.1.8.3 for critical hydrogen concentration), and substantial concentrations must be achieved before any degradation in fracture toughness is observed. This concentration level, as indicated in Section 3.1.8.3, has been measured to be in the range of 400 to 1,000 $\mu\text{g/g}$ for Titanium Grades 2 and 12. Recent measurements suggest that the tolerance for hydrogen of Titanium Grade 16 (a titanium alloy very similar to Titanium Grade 7 in chemical composition) may be in the 1,000 to 2,000 $\mu\text{g/g}$ range (Ikeda and Quinn 1998, p. 7). As discussed in Section 3.1.8.3, the critical hydrogen concentration for Titanium Grade 7 is 1,000 $\mu\text{g/g}$.

Given the high critical hydrogen concentration, the large volume of available titanium in the drip shield into which absorbed hydrogen can diffuse, and other reasons stated above, hydrogen embrittlement of the titanium drip shield is highly unlikely.

3.1.8.6.2 Bounding Analysis for Hydrogen Absorption and Diffusion in Drip Shield

As discussed in the previous section, hydrogen absorbed in the Titanium Grade 7 drip shield through the contact area of a galvanic couple may diffuse to the rest of the drip shield. Bounding parametric analyses were conducted to estimate the hydrogen concentration in the drip shield due to a galvanic couple between the drip shield and a carbon steel ground support segment. Assumptions employed in the bounding analyses are:

- The drip shield is treated as an infinite flat plate.
- The contact plane between the drip shield surface and the carbon steel segment is circular in shape.
- Hydrogen is absorbed into the drip shield through the contact plane and immediately reaches the other surface. The initial region of the drip shield with hydrogen absorption has the shape of a circular disk.
- As hydrogen starts to diffuse in the drip shield, the radius of the circular region will expand at a constant speed.

Details of the analyses are discussed in CRWMS M&O (2000h Section 6.3.3). The analysis results demonstrate that, in all cases of the parametric study, the hydrogen concentration, which is in the range of 160-330 $\mu\text{g/g}$, does not exceed the critical hydrogen concentration of 1,000 $\mu\text{g/g}$ for Titanium Grade 7 by a comfortable margin. The results of the parametric analysis also appear to be consistent with the qualitative assessment presented in Section 3.1.8.6.2. The

choice of the conceptual model and the parameter values in the parametric analyses is considered conservative and bounding.

3.1.8.7 Results for Hydrogen-Induced Cracking Model

In the description of the HIC model presented in the corresponding AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 6), extensive evidence has been provided to support a qualitative assessment of Titanium Grade 7 as an excellent choice of material for the drip shield with regard to degradation caused by HIC. Quantitative evaluation based on this model indicates that the drip shield material (Titanium Grade 7) is able to sustain the effects of HIC. The estimated hydrogen concentration is in the range of 58-257 $\mu\text{g/g}$, which is less than the critical hydrogen concentration of 1000 $\mu\text{g/g}$ for Titanium Grade 7.

In the current drip shield design without backfill, hydrogen generation may be caused by the galvanic couple between the titanium drip shield surface and ground structural components (such as rock bolts, wire mesh, and steel liners used in the drift), which may fall onto the drip shield surface. A qualitative assessment of HIC due to effects of galvanic couple concludes that, given the high critical hydrogen concentration, the large volume of available titanium in the drip shield into which absorbed hydrogen can diffuse, hydrogen embrittlement of the drip shield is highly unlikely under the repository conditions. Bounding parametric analyses have shown that hydrogen concentration in the drip shield due to a galvanic couple, which is in the range of 160-330 $\mu\text{g/g}$, will not exceed the critical value.

3.1.9 Model Uncertainties

Uncertainties in each of the process models were identified in the discussion of the models in the previous sections and in the individual AMRs. The approach used in dealing with these uncertainties is to be conservative and bound the uncertainties. A review of the uncertainties in the various models is presented below. For all the corrosion processes considered in the TSPA analysis, testing and analyses are underway to address and quantify effects and uncertainties associated with long-term stability of the passive film on Alloy 22 and Titanium Grade 7 under repository-related exposure conditions. Also, analyses are in progress to address and quantify effects and uncertainties associated with a “low” temperature repository design option.

3.1.9.1 Thermal Aging

A graphical approach to bounding the uncertainty in the aging model is illustrated in Figure 3-7. The line representing a “best fit” to the data for “complete grain boundary coverage” predicts that more than 10,000 years at 300°C will be required to completely cover the grain boundaries of Alloy 22 with intermetallic precipitates. However, the line with the “minimum slope possible within the error bars” shows that complete grain boundary coverage might occur in as little as 100 years (very unlikely bounding case). The “best fit” line is the most likely scenario. In the case of bulk precipitation, none is predicted with the line representing the minimum possible slope. Thus, we conclude with reasonable certainty that no bulk precipitation will occur after 10,000 years at 300°C.

From Figures 3-9 and 3-10, it appears that a fully aged sample of Alloy 22 could change the observed corrosion potential. For example, corrosion potential was shifted in a less noble (negative) direction by 63 mV in simulated acidic water at 90°C. This potential was shifted in a less noble (negative) direction by 99 mV in simulated concentrated water at 90°C. Full aging of Alloy 22 (complete coverage of the grain boundaries) does not appear to significantly alter passive film stability.

Thermal aging of Titanium Grade 7 at 300°C is expected to have little impact on the corrosion resistance of this material. Since no credit is claimed for the corrosion resistance of 316NG, the TSPA calculation is insensitive to the uncertainty associated with the corrosion of 316NG.

3.1.9.2 Dry Oxidation

In the case of Alloy 22, the rates of dry air corrosion are very small (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.1). Therefore, uncertainty in the dry air corrosion rate is not expected to have any significant impact on the performance of these materials. The current model is based upon published data, and does not include estimates of uncertainty (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.1).

3.1.9.3 Humid Air and Aqueous Phase Corrosion

The threshold RH is represented by Equation 3-2. This correlation represents the deliquescence point of NaNO_3 and has an excellent fit of the data (correlation coefficient of 0.9854). Uncertainty in this threshold is primarily due to the composition of the salt film. The waste package and drip shield would always experience some combination of humid air corrosion and aqueous phase corrosion. The uncertainty in this parameter is discussed in more detail in the associated AMRs (CRWMS M&O 2000c, 2000d). The correlation used for the threshold RH in a consecutive bonding case as the deliquescence point for NaNO_3 is assumed to determine the threshold RH for the formation of aqueous film. As the temperature is increased, the lowest RH under which an aqueous film can be sustained is represented by the data for NaNO_3 .

The distribution of general corrosion rates for either humid air corrosion or aqueous phase corrosion represented by the curves given in Section 3.1.5.4. Distributions for 316NG are represented by Figure 3-15, which shows distributions formed from published data. Figure 3-23 shows the distribution of rates for Alloy 22, based upon data taken from the LTCTF. Figures 3-26 and 3-27 shows the distribution for Titanium Grade 7 rates, also based upon data from the LTCTF. The dispersion in these curves is assumed to be entirely due to uncertainty.

The variability is assumed to be comparable in magnitude and is represented by a triangular distribution.

A detailed analysis of the error in general corrosion rate is given in each supporting AMR, with the results summarized in Tables 3-8 and 3-9.

Determinations of corrosion and threshold potential are based upon three replicate cyclic polarization measurements at each combination of environment and temperature. The results are tabulated in the supporting AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000c, 2000d), as summarized in Figures 3-38 through 3-48. The uncertainty in the corrosion potential due to gamma radiolysis is

addressed by Figures 3-51 and 3-52 (maximum positive shift in error of about 250 mV). Some uncertainty in the selection of corrosion and threshold potential is shown in the figures as Threshold Potential 1 through 3. The bounds of the threshold potential are shown graphically in the figures. Numerical representations of this uncertainty have been made and are embedded in WAPDEG.

The rates of localized corrosion have been bounded with the range of values found in the published literature, and are summarized in Tables 3-11 and 3-12.

3.1.9.4 Stress Corrosion Cracking

For the first time, SCC has been included in the performance assessment calculation done with WAPDEG. Two alternative SCC models have been considered, one based upon a threshold stress intensity factor (Method A), and another based upon a threshold stress for a smooth surface (Method B). In the second approach, cracks are assumed to propagate by the slip-dissolution mechanism after initiation. Method B is used as the basis of the performance assessment. The slip-dissolution model (Method B) predicts that crack propagation is a function of the local stress intensity at the crack tip. Thus, the uncertainty in this driving force must be estimated.

The local stress intensity is calculated from the local stress and the crack penetration. The uncertainties in the stress distribution (stress vs. depth) are based upon analyses of measured residual stresses in welds, before and after mitigation, as well as finite element modeling with the ANSYS code. These uncertainties are abstracted for WAPDEG and shown quantitatively for the initial performance assessment in Section 3.2.7.

Aside from the stress intensity, K_I , the parameters in the slip-dissolution model for SCC propagation are based upon measurements for stainless steel from the boiling water reactor industry. Since stainless steels are much more prone to SCC than Alloy 22, these parameter estimates are projected to be conservative.

The threshold stress for initiation of SCC on a smooth surface is conservatively estimated to be approximately 10 to 40 percent of the yield stress, based upon the determination of such thresholds for related but more susceptible alloy systems exposed to very aggressive environments. The uncertainty is assumed to be within " 10 percent of the yield stress around the median value.

3.1.10 Model Validation

According to ASTM C 1174-97, *Standard Practice for Prediction of the Long-Term Behavior of Materials, Including Waste Forms, Used in Engineered Barrier Systems (EBS) for Geological Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste*, model validation is the process through which independent measurements are used to ensure that a model accurately predicts an alteration behavior of waste package materials under a given set of environmental conditions (e.g., under repository environment over the time periods required). Obviously, no model can be validated over the 10,000-year service life (time period) of the repository. The only means of validating models must involve accelerated testing. According to the same ASTM procedure, an

accelerated test is a test that results in an increase in the rate of an alteration mode, when compared with the rates for service condition. Changes in alteration mechanism, if any, must be accounted for in the use of the accelerated test data.

Model validation of specific process models is addressed in each of the AMRs as required by the procedures used to develop these models. Key elements are presented here.

The thermal aging model is represented by equations 3-5 and 3-6, both of which assume Arrhenius-type kinetics. Precipitation and long range ordering can be accelerated by increasing the temperature above those levels expected in the repository. If the model can accurately predict the kinetics of these phenomena at combinations of time and elevated temperature, it will be considered valid for making predictions at lower temperature and longer time.

Since all available data has been used to establish these correlations the correlations are considered valid for their intended use. Additional data that are being collected will help to reduce uncertainties and improve the level of confidence in the model.

The effects of precipitation and long range ordering on corrosion are determined by electrochemical techniques. Through application of electrochemical potentials more anodic than the open circuit corrosion potential, corrosion phenomena can be accelerated. Variations in corrosion and threshold potential can be correlated with the extent of thermal aging. Similarly, variations in rates of dissolution through the stable passive film can also be correlated with the extent of thermal aging. These rates of dissolution are accelerated by application of a potential between the corrosion and threshold potentials, and are proportional to the passive current density. The corrosion rate enhancement factor is determined by calculating the ratio of measured passive current densities for aged and unaged samples. Since all available electrochemical data have been used to establish the corrosion model for thermally-aged samples, this model is considered valid for its intended use.

The models for dry air corrosion of Alloy 22, Titanium Grade 7, and 316NG stainless steel are based upon published data found in the scientific literature. More specifically the model for dry air corrosion of Alloy 22 is based upon the parabolic growth of the oxide film at elevated temperature. However, in the absence of any such low-temperature data, the parabolic rate constant for high temperature is applied at low temperature. Given the extremely small magnitudes of these rates, dry air corrosion is expected to have no significant impact on waste package performance.

The threshold RH for humid air corrosion is based on the deliquescence point of sodium nitrate. The threshold for salt films deposited in the repository may be slightly different. However, salt deposits produced by evaporating simulated J-13 water to dryness, support this basis.

Rates of humid air corrosion are expected to follow distributions of general corrosion rates based upon weight-loss data from the LTCTF. The distributions for Alloy 22 data for 6, 12, and 24 months of exposure to a variety of test media. Corroborative measurements made with the atomic force microscope and other surface analytical techniques have also been used as further means of model validation. The test program will continue; ultimately providing data for

60-months of exposure. Future data will be considered independent and corroborative, and will be used to reduce uncertainties and conservatism in the model.

The threshold RH for aqueous phase corrosion is the same as that used for humid air corrosion. The same approach has been used for validation. Rates of general corrosion in the aqueous phase also obey the general distributions based upon weight-loss data from the LTCTF. The same approach described for validation of the rate model for humid air corrosion has been employed for validation of the rate model for general corrosion in the aqueous phase.

Comparisons of corrosion and threshold potentials are used to determine whether rates for general corrosion or localized corrosion are applicable. The initial correlations given in this PMR are based upon standard cyclic polarization measurements in simulated dilute water, simulated concentrated water, simulated acidic water, and simulated saturated water, covering a broad range of temperature.

The SCC model is primarily based on published data. Very limited data have been obtained under repository relevant conditions. The data obtained under the YMP include pre-cracked specimens tested under very aggressive environments. Thus the model uses a very conservative approach. Future data obtained by the Project will serve to reduce the level of conservatism and improve the confidence in the model.

3.1.11 Alternative Approaches or Models

Alternative models have been considered for rates of dry air corrosion, localized corrosion thresholds, stress corrosion thresholds, SCC, stress mitigation, & HIC. These alternatives are summarized below.

3.1.11.1 Dry Oxidation

Method A – Parabolic Growth Law

Method B – Logarithmic Growth Law

In the case of dry air corrosion, Method A is used for Alloy 22 (CRWMS M&O 2000c), while Method B is used for Titanium Grade 7 (CRWMS M&O 2000d). These model selections were based upon the availability of published data to support the corresponding models.

3.1.11.2 Localized Corrosion Threshold

Method A – Threshold Electrochemical Potential

Method B – Threshold Temperature

In the case of localized corrosion, Method A is used because the threshold potential model is more solidly rooted in the theoretical concepts underlying passive film stability (CRWMS M&O 2000c, 2000d). Furthermore, it is expected that good correlations of threshold and corrosion potential can be used to deduce a threshold temperature. The threshold temperature would be the temperature at which the corrosion and threshold potentials are equivalent.

3.1.11.3 Stress Corrosion Cracking

Method A – Threshold Stress Intensity Factor at Pre-Existing Flaw

Method B – Initiation at Threshold Stress on Smooth Surface/Propagation by Slip-Dissolution Mechanism

Method B is preferred for SCC since it is believed to be the more conservative model, and since it has been used for predicting the performance of boiling water reactors, and since a wealth of data exists for stainless steel, a material more prone to SCC than Alloy 22. In prediction based upon a correlation for stainless steel would yield a conservative prediction for Alloy 22 (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4.4).

Weld Stress Mitigation

Method A – Induction Annealing

Method B – Laser Peening

In regard to stress mitigation, Method A is preferred for any external lid on the Alloy 22 waste package outer barrier. This selection is based upon the ability of the induction annealing process to place compressive stress deeper into the weld. Method B, laser peening will be used on any internal lid weld, due to the occluded nature of such a weld.

3.1.11.4 Hydrogen-Induced Cracking – Titanium

Method A – Threshold Electrochemical Potential

Method B – Threshold Hydrogen Concentration

HIC evaluation is based upon a threshold hydrogen concentration. Since such concentrations are possible to measure with secondary ion mass spectrometry, Method B is therefore preferred. The drip shield design avoids any galvanic couple that would lead to the possibility of HIC via Method A, the threshold electrochemical potential method.

A simple and conservative model has been developed to evaluate the effects HIC on the drip shield. The basic premise of the model is that failure will occur once the hydrogen content exceeds a certain limit or critical value (H_c). This model is very conservative because it assumes that, once the environmental and material conditions can support that particular corrosion process, failure will be effectively instantaneous. Extensive evidence has been provided to support a qualitative assessment of Titanium Grade 7 as an excellent choice of material for the drip shield with regard to degradation caused by HIC (CRWMS M&O 2000h, Section 6.1.3).

Quantitative evaluation based on the HIC model described in the corresponding AMR indicates that the drip shield material (Titanium Grade 7) is able to sustain the effects of HIC. Available test data show, that the hydrogen concentration is well below the critical hydrogen concentration of 1,000 $\mu\text{g/g}$ for Titanium Grade 7.

3.2 INTEGRATED WASTE PACKAGE DEGRADATION MODEL

The WAPDEG software was used to implement an integrated model for waste package and drip shield degradation analysis, and to perform the degradation simulations. WAPDEG, Version 4.0, is used to determine waste package and drip shield failure fractions as a function of time (CRWMS M&O 2000ah). WAPDEG (Version 4.0) is an appropriate tool for this application, because it was specifically designed to produce drip shield and waste package degradation profiles in a manner consistent with the information requirements for implementation in the TSPA model. WAPDEG (Version 4.0) was used within the range of values for which it was validated (CRWMS M&O 2000g).

3.2.1 Conceptual Model for the Integrated Model

This section discusses the conceptual model for the integrated model for waste package and drip shield degradation analysis in the Total System Performance Assessment-Site Recommendation (TSPA-SR). More detailed descriptions of the conceptual model are given in the companion AMR, *WAPDEG Analysis of Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation* (CRWMS M&O 2000g). In the TSPA-SR analysis, WAPDEG models various types of corrosion mechanisms that may occur on a waste package and drip shield as a function of the exposure time and conditions. (For convenience of discussion in this section, the drip shield is considered as an integral part of the waste package. Except where it is necessary, no separate discussion is given for the drip shield). In the nominal case analysis of TSPA-SR, the waste package outer barrier and drip shield were included in the waste package degradation analysis. The stainless steel inner shell, whose primary purpose is to provide structural support to the waste package, is not expected to provide any substantial time-period of waste-containment performance after an initial breach of the waste package outer barrier. Once exposed to corrosive conditions, the stainless steel inner shell is expected to fail by localized corrosion and SCC in a relatively short time period (see CRWMS M&O 2000e for the details of the inner shell degradation). Because of this, no performance credit is taken for the stainless steel inner shell in the waste package degradation analyses discussed in Section 3.2.7. This is based on the penetration rates shown in Figures 3-14 and 3-15 which suggest that the material may quickly fail by localized corrosion under certain conditions. However, in reality the inner shell would provide “some” waste containment performance after breach of the waste package outer barrier, and would also serve as a barrier to radionuclide transport after waste package failure. The potential performance credit of the stainless steel inner shell is ignored in the nominal TSPA-SR analysis. This is a conservative modeling approach.

As discussed in detail in Section 3.1.7, a dual closure-lid design has been adopted for the closure-end of waste package outer barrier. That is, there is one Alloy 22 lid on one end of the outer barrier and two Alloy 22 lids on the closure end of the outer barrier. This dual closure-lid design was adopted to mitigate the potential for early failure of the closure lid weld regions by SCC. A schematic shown in Figure 3-66 illustrates the dual closure-lid waste package design. (See also Figures 1-1 and 3-63 for more details). The dual closure-lids are referred to as the outer closure-lid (or outer shell extended closure lid in Figure 1-1) and the inner closure-lid (or outer shell flat closure lid in Figure 1-1), respectively, in this section. The outer closure-lid is 25-mm thick and the inner closure-lid is 10-mm thick. There is a physical “gap” between the two closure-lids. Thus, any SCC cracks penetrating the outer closure-lid stop at the gap between

the closure-lids. The inner closure-lid welds are then subject to SCC initiation and subsequent crack growth. This design feature is included in the waste package degradation analysis as described below in this section.




Figure 3-66. Schematic of the Dual-Closure-Lid Design for Waste Package Outer Barrier

Abstracted models of the process models discussed in preceding sections were developed for implementation in the WAPDEG software. The abstracted models were developed in such a manner that important features of the process models are captured as explicitly as possible. More details of the TSPA-SR approach to waste package and drip shield degradation analysis are given in the supporting AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000g). As was done in the Total System Performance Assessment-Viability Assessment analysis (see Section 2.2), effects of spatial and temporal variations in the exposure conditions over the repository region were modeled by explicitly incorporating relevant exposure condition time histories into the waste package degradation analysis. The exposure condition parameters that were considered were RH and temperature at the waste package surface, seepage into the emplacement drift, and chemistry of the seepage water. In the waste package degradation analysis, the humid-air corrosion condition occurs when there is no dripping water contacting the waste package surface and the RH at the waste package surface is equal to or greater than the no-drip threshold RH (i.e., the threshold RH in the absence of drips). The aqueous corrosion condition requires the presence of dripping water and the RH at the waste package surface to be equal to or greater than the drip threshold RH (i.e., the threshold RH in the presence of drips). In the current analysis, the no-drip and drip threshold RH distributions are identical (see Section 3.1.3.1).

In the WAPDEG analysis the waste package (or drip shield) surface is discretized into many subareas referred to as “patches.” It is at the patch-level that corrosion degradation processes are modeled (i.e., the relevant corrosion model parameter values and/or corrosion rates are sampled and applied to each patch). A schematic showing the patch conceptual modeling approach is shown in Figure 3-67. This approach allows for representation of potentially “variable” degradation processes on the patches composing a single waste package. For example, patches contacted by dripping water (those marked with “s”) could be subject to localized corrosion depending on the exposure conditions (especially chemistry of contacting water) that those patches experience. Patches with closure-lid welds (those marked with “y”) could be subject to SCC depending on the stress state and exposure conditions. In addition, the general corrosion rate may vary over the waste package surface. This potential variability is represented by populating the general corrosion rate over the patches.




Figure 3-67. Schematic of the Conceptual Model of Stochastic WAPDEG Model for TSPA-SR

Figure 3-68 shows a logic flow diagram for the WAPDEG model for waste package (or drip shield) degradation analysis for TSPA-SR. In the figure each of the yellow boxes represents a model abstraction or model abstractions. The logic flow repeats for a drip shield, if included in the analysis, and each layer of the waste package. Exposure conditions that are included in the TSPA-SR waste-package degradation analyses are temperature and RH at the waste package (and drip shield) surface, in-drift dripping water, and pH of the water contacting waste package (and drip shield). The temperature and RH histories at the waste package and drip shield surfaces are provided by the multi-scale thermal-hydrologic model abstraction. The evolution of pH of solution contacting waste package is provided by the EBS chemical environment abstraction.

In the analysis, the waste package surface RH is compared to the threshold RH (RH_{th}) for corrosion initiation. The RH_{th} is based on the deliquescence point of pure NaNO_3 salt as discussed in Section 3.1.3. If the surface RH becomes greater than or equal to the threshold RH, the waste package (or drip shield) undergoes corrosion. Depending on whether the waste package (or drip shield) is dripped on or not, it could undergo different corrosion degradation modes. In the current analysis, the same threshold RH is used for both the dripping and no-drip conditions (see Section 3.1.3.1). Both the upper and under sides of drip shield are assumed subject to corrosion if the initiation threshold is met, that is, if the RH on the drip shield is equal to or greater than the threshold RH. This is because the both sides are exposed to the exposure conditions in the emplacement drift.

Waste packages that are not dripped on undergo humid-air corrosion during the entire time that the threshold RH is exceeded. Under humid-air conditions, the waste packages undergo general corrosion and eventually fail by gradual thinning of the container wall. No localized corrosion occurs in the absence of dripping water. The general corrosion rates of the waste package outer barrier (and drip shield) are very low (see Sections 3.1.5 and 3.2.2). For the waste package outer barrier and drip shield, the current model assumes the same general corrosion rate distribution for both humid-air general corrosion and aqueous general corrosion (i.e., regardless of whether the waste package is dripped on or not).

For microbiologically influenced corrosion, process-level models recommend the use of a threshold RH of 90 percent (Section 3.1.5). The WAPDEG model conservatively assumes that microbiologically influenced corrosion is possible if RH at the surface is greater than the threshold RH for corrosion initiation. This conservatism was necessary due to input limitations of the WAPDEG software (CRWMS M&O 2000g, Section 5.8). The effect of microbiologically influenced corrosion is modeled with a corrosion rate multiplier (enhancement factor), which is applied to the general corrosion rate of the barrier (localized corrosion does not initiate on the waste package outer barrier, see Section 3.2.3). The enhancement factor has a uniform distribution between 1 and 2 (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.8). The microbiologically influenced corrosion enhancement factor is applied to the entire waste package outer barrier surface whenever the RH is above the threshold RH (i.e., corrosion initiation threshold R.H). The drip shield is assumed not to be subject to microbiologically influenced corrosion under expected repository exposure conditions (CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 5.8).




Figure 3-68. Logic Flow for Nominal-Case Model for Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation Model for TSPA-SR

The current model assumes that the Alloy 22 waste package outer barrier weld regions are subject to aging and phase instability under expected repository conditions. The effect is modeled with a corrosion rate multiplier (enhancement factor) that is applied to the general corrosion rate (localized corrosion does not occur in the waste package outer barrier, see Section 3.1.4). The aging enhancement factor has uniform distribution between 1 and 2.5 (Section 3.1.4), and is applied only to the closure lid weld regions of the outer barrier. The drip shield is assumed not subject to aging and phase instability (see Section 3.1.4).

In the current model, SCC is possible if the RH at the waste package surface is greater than or equal to the threshold RH for corrosion initiation (RH_{th}) (i.e., no dripping water or highly corrosive water chemistry is required). As indicated in the logic flow diagram, the inputs to the SCC analysis are: (1) the area subject to SCC, such as the closure-lid weld regions as in the current analysis; (2) stress and stress intensity factor (K_I) versus depth of the affected area; (3) SCC crack propagation model (slip dissolution model or threshold stress intensity factor (K_{ISCC}) model); (4) threshold stress for crack propagation; and (5) manufacturing defect occurrence and size in the affected area.

Both the slip dissolution model and the threshold stress intensity factor model have been incorporated in the WAPDEG model. For SCC analysis with the slip dissolution model, the following criteria must be met before initiating SCC on a patch: (1) the stress intensity factor (K_I) should be positive, and (2) the stress state at the crack tip must be greater than or equal to the threshold stress. In the WAPDEG analysis, for those patches with a compressive stress zone (or layer) in their outer surface, the compressive stress zone must be removed by general corrosion before SCC can initiate. The delay time depends on the compressive zone thickness and the general corrosion rate sampled for the patch.

The drip shield is assumed to be fully annealed before it is placed in the emplacement drift. As discussed in Section 3.1.7.1, the drip shield could be subject to rockfall-induced SCC and through-wall cracks. However, those degradation processes are not considered in the current nominal case analyses because of the reasons discussed in Section 3.1.7.1 and later in this section. Likewise, all the fabrication welds in the waste container, except the welds for the closure lids, are assumed fully annealed and thus not subject to SCC. Therefore, only the closure-lid welds were considered in the SCC analysis.

In addition, pre-existing manufacturing defects in a patch are assumed all surface-breaking. As discussed in Section 3.1.2, the manufacturing defects considered in the current analysis include both the initially surface-breaking and embedded defects. The defects are assumed to grow at the general corrosion rate sampled for the patch. This is based on the modeling assumption that the same exposure condition that a patch experiences during a given time step is also applicable to the interior of the defects in the patch. Growth of the defects at the general corrosion rate of the patch is a highly conservative assumption. Patches with pre-existing defects would be subject to SCC earlier than other patches without defects.

For a waste package (or a drip shield) that is dripped on, the wetted area (or patches) of the waste package is assumed to undergo aqueous corrosion if the RH at the surface is greater than the threshold RH. As indicated above, the same threshold RH is used for both the dripping and no-drip conditions. It is assumed that the entire surface of waste package (or drip shield) is

wetted by the drips if it is dripped on. This is a conservative assumption. While the drip shield is operative (i.e., not failed), the waste package underneath the drip shield is assumed to undergo humid-air corrosion as described above. General corrosion occurs all the time under aqueous corrosion condition. As indicated above, for the waste package outer barrier and drip shield, the current model assumes the same general corrosion rate distribution for both humid-air general corrosion and aqueous general corrosion (i.e., regardless of whether it is dripped on or not). The same microbiologically influenced corrosion and aging and phase instability enhancement factors as under humid-air condition are also applied to general corrosion under aqueous corrosion condition. Also, the same SCC model and inputs are applied for both humid-air and aqueous conditions. These modeling approaches are due to no dependence of the process models on drip and no-drip conditions. This approach renders no difference in the waste package and drip shield degradation analysis results for drip and no-drip conditions. Initiation of localized (pitting and crevice corrosion) corrosion is dependent on the local exposure environment on the wetted patches. In the current analysis, it is assumed that localized corrosion of the drip shield and waste package outer barrier can initiate only under dripping conditions. This is because of the necessary presence of aggressive ions (such as chloride) in order to initiate and sustain pit and crevice growth and because the only mechanism for these species to gain ingress to the drift is through drips. Localized corrosion of a patch is assumed to initiate if the corrosion potential (E_{corr}) of the patch is greater than or equal to the “threshold” critical corrosion potential (E_{crit}) sampled for the patch. After initiated, localized corrosion continues while $E_{corr} \geq E_{crit}$. If E_{corr} becomes less than E_{crit} , or dripping ceases, localized corrosion stops. The potential for microbiologically influenced corrosion and aging and phase instability effects on localized corrosion is represented with the same corrosion rate enhancement factors as used for general corrosion, that is, the microbiologically influenced corrosion enhancement factor sampled from a uniform distribution between 1 and 2, and the aging and phase instability enhancement factor sampled from a uniform distribution between 1 and 2.5. These enhancement factors are applied to the localized corrosion rate.

After failure of the drip shield, it is assumed that the dripping water finds the opening(s) in the drip shield regardless of the opening location in the drip shield (i.e., top or side of the drip shield), and the waste package underneath the failed drip shield is assumed to be subject to dripping. Although, in reality, the area of the waste package surface wetted by drips underneath the failed drip shield would depend on the drip rate, and the penetration opening location, size and number in the drip shield, the current model assumes that the entire surface of the waste package is wetted by the dripping water through the drip shield opening (or openings). This is a highly conservative modeling assumption, but would not affect the waste package degradation analyses results due to insensitivity to corrosion models to dripping conditions. The waste package is subject to the aqueous corrosion degradation processes (general corrosion, localized corrosion, and SCC) described above.

When a waste package fails, the WAPDEG model also considers corrosion degradation of the waste package from the inside-out corrosion. The inside-out corrosion analysis includes general corrosion and localized corrosion of the waste package outer barrier. The inside-out corrosion would cause penetrations by general and localized corrosion in addition to those by the outside-in corrosion only. The inside-out general corrosion is assumed to initiate at the time of the waste package failure. Like the outside-in localized corrosion, initiation of the inside-out localized corrosion is based on the corrosion potential and critical corrosion potential, which are

a function of the pH of water inside the failed waste package (see Section 3.2.3). The in-package water chemistry results from degradation of the waste form and other internal structural materials (such as basket materials) (CRWMS M&O 2000am; CRWMS M&O 2000g, Attachment I).

The current model does not include the radiolysis enhanced corrosion of waste package outer barrier and drip shield because the materials are not subject to radiolysis enhanced corrosion under the repository conditions (Section 3.1.6). Also the current model does not consider rockfall induced stress states, which could lead to SCC of the drip shield, or HIC of the drip shield. These processes would result in through wall cracks which will continue to corrode at very low passive corrosion rates until the gap region of the tight crack opening is “plugged” by the corrosion product particles and mineral precipitates, such as carbonate, present in the water. Any water transport through this oxide/salt filled crack area will be mainly by diffusion-type transport processes (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5.5). Thus, the effective water flow rate through cracks in the drip shield would be expected to be extremely low and should not contribute significantly to the overall radionuclide release rate from the underlying failed waste package. Therefore, since the primary role of the drip shield is to keep water from contacting the waste package, SCC and HIC of the drip shield are of low consequence to the expected mean dose rate.

The WAPDEG analysis tracks down corrosion degradation of waste packages for three types of penetration modes: crack penetration by SCC, pit and crevice penetration by localized corrosion, and patch penetration by general corrosion. The analysis provides, as output, the cumulative probability of waste package failure by one of the three penetration modes as a function of time, and the number of penetrations for each of the penetration modes as a function of time. The waste package failure time and penetration number profiles are used as input to other TSPA analyses such as waste form degradation and radionuclide release rate from waste packages.

3.2.2 Abstraction of General Corrosion Models for Waste Package Outer Barrier and Drip Shield

This section discusses the approaches and assumptions used in the abstraction of general corrosion models for waste package outer barrier and drip shield, and the abstraction results. Details of the abstraction approaches are described in CRWMS M&O (2000i).

3.2.2.1 Abstraction Approaches and Assumptions

The model abstractions are to develop two CDFs each one representing the general corrosion rate distribution for the waste package outer barrier (Alloy 22) (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Sections 5.3, 6.5) and the other for the drip shield (Titanium Grade 7) (CRWMS M&O 2000d, Sections 5.3, 6.3). For each alloy, the weight loss and crevice sample penetration rate data were combined to yield one general corrosion rate data set for each alloy. For the Alloy 22 waste package outer barrier, the general corrosion rate data with 6-month, 1-year and 2-year exposure were considered. As shown in Figure 3-69, the median and variance of the general corrosion rate data decreases with increasing exposure time (see Section 3.1.5.4.2). It is concluded that the 2 year data are sufficiently conservative to represent long-term general corrosion rate of the Alloy 22 waste package outer barrier. Therefore only the 2-year data were used in the model abstraction




Figure 3-69. Cumulative Distribution Functions for the General Corrosion Rate of Alloy 22 Derived from 6-month, 1-Year, and 2-Year Exposure Data

(i.e., the 6-month and 12-month data were not included). For the Titanium Grade 7 drip shield, the 12-month data were used in the model abstraction. The cleaning method employed with the 6-month titanium samples caused significant metal loss, thereby yielding unusually high corrosion rates that proved to be artifacts (CRWMS M&O 2000d, Section 6.5.2). Therefore the 6-month titanium data were not included in the abstraction development.

The general corrosion rate data were then sorted in ascending order. Any negative general corrosion rates were then deleted from the data set as suggested in Section 3.1.5. Cumulative probabilities were assigned to each general corrosion data point based on its rank (position) in the sorted data set yielding a CDF. The units of the general corrosion rates were converted from nm per year (reported in Section 3.1.5) to mm per year. An upper bound (corresponding to the 100th percentile cumulative probability) was also applied to the resulting general corrosion rate CDFs. The upper bound was $7.30\text{E-}5$ mm/year for Alloy 22 (see the assumption below) and $3.25\text{E-}4$ mm/year for Titanium Grade 7 (see the assumption below).

Key assumptions used in the general corrosion rate abstraction are described below:

- For both alloys considered (Alloy 22 and Titanium Grade 7), corrosion penetration rate data from the weight loss of both plain and creviced geometry test coupons were considered to represent general corrosion penetration rate.
- The maximum general corrosion rate for Alloy 22 was set to $7.30\text{E-}5$ mm/year. This assumed upper bound is slightly greater than the maximum penetration rate of $7.25\text{E-}5$ mm/year observed in the LTCTF (Section 3.1.5).
- The maximum general corrosion rate of Titanium Grade 7 was set to $3.25\text{E-}4$ mm/year. This assumed upper bound is slightly greater than the maximum penetration rate of $3.19\text{E-}4$ mm/year observed in the LTCTF (Section 3.1.5).

- The Gaussian Variance Partitioning (CRWMS M&O 1998b, Section 5.7.2.2) is an adequate method to separate uncertainty and variability from a distribution that represents the combination of the both. Details of the Gaussian Variance Partitioning technique are described in Section 3.2.2.2 below.

Detailed discussion of the assumptions employed in the model abstraction are given in CRWMS M&O (2000i).

As discussed in Section 6.5.5 of CRWMS M&O (2000c), the formation of silica scale deposits on the surface of the sample coupons could bias the distributions of the original estimated general corrosion rate distribution. The maximum potential measurement bias for the weight loss sample coupons was estimated to be $0.063 \mu\text{m}/\text{year}$ (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.5.5). It was recommended that the general corrosion rate distributions be corrected for the maximum bias due to silica scale deposit formation by adding a constant value of $0.063 \mu\text{m}/\text{year}$ to each general corrosion rate (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.5.5).

In the model abstraction the range of the general corrosion rate bias resulting from silica scale deposits is represented with uniform distribution between zero (i.e., no scale deposit) and the maximum bias ($0.063 \mu\text{m}/\text{year}$). This corrosion rate bias distribution was convoluted with the measured general corrosion rate distribution for the Alloy 22 waste package outer barrier resulting in the general corrosion rate CDF used in the abstraction analysis. The same data treatment was conducted for the correction of the measured Titanium Grade 7 drip shield general corrosion rate data. The resulting general corrosion rate CDF for the Alloy 22 waste package outer barrier and Titanium Grade 7 drip shield is shown in Figures 3-70 and 3-71, respectively, along with their respective original CDF. Details of this abstraction approach are described in CRWMS M&O (2000i).

3.2.2.2 Gaussian Variance Partitioning Technique for Uncertainty and Variability Representation

The Gaussian Variance Partitioning is a technique that decomposes a CDF containing both uncertainty and variability into two distributions that characterize each element separately. This provides a better conceptual understanding of TSPA model sensitivity to the elements of uncertainty and variability. Gaussian Variance Partitioning starts with a distribution that involves both uncertainty and variability and then works backward to obtain two separate distributions, one that characterizes variability and another that characterizes uncertainty. This is




Figure 3-70. Cumulative Probability Distribution Functions for the General Corrosion Rate of Alloy 22 Waste Package Outer Barrier Before (Original) and After (Corrected) Accounting for Bias Due to Possible Silica Scale Deposits




Figure 3-71. Cumulative Probability Distribution Functions for the General Corrosion Rate of the Titanium Grade 7 Drip Shield Before (Original) and After (Corrected) Accounting for Bias Due to Possible Silica Scale Deposits

accomplished by assuming that uncertainty and variability are independent. If the mixed distribution is normally distributed, i.e. $N(\mathbf{m}\mathbf{s}_m^2 + \mathbf{s}_v^2)$, then it can be represented as a random variable \mathbf{g} having the form

$$\mathbf{g} = m + v \quad (\text{Eq. 3-35})$$

where m is a normal random variable with mean \mathbf{m} and variance \mathbf{s}_m^2 , and v is a normal random variable with mean zero and variance \mathbf{s}_v^2 . Thus, \mathbf{g} is a random variable distributed around the mean \mathbf{m} with a total variance given by the sum of the variances due to uncertainty and variability. If uncertainty is defined as the uncertainty in the mean value and variability as the variance about that mean, then \mathbf{g} can be alternatively parameterized as

$$\mathbf{g} \sim N(m, \mathbf{s}_v^2), \text{ where } m \sim N(\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{s}_m^2) \quad (\text{Eq. 3-36})$$

The uncertain mean is represented by the random variable, m , which is normally distributed with mean, \mathbf{m} and variance, \mathbf{s}_m^2 . The random variable, \mathbf{g} , is then the convolution of the distributions of the random variable given by m and a random variable, v , which can be represented by the addition of two normal random variables as given above where

$$m \sim N(\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{s}_m^2) \text{ and } v \sim N(0, \mathbf{s}_v^2) \quad (\text{Eq. 3-37})$$

Thus, given the distributions for m and v , a variability distribution is realized by sampling a value from the parameter uncertainty distribution and adding it to the mean zero variability distribution.

This partitioning method can be extended to non-normal distributions by means of a score transform (Deutsch and Journal 1992, p.138) mapping the percentiles of the non-normal CDF to those of the standard normal by a lookup table. The normal score transform works best if the non-normal CDF is as symmetric as possible. This may sometimes be accomplished by using the natural logarithms of CDF values. The natural logarithms of the CDF values are used to perform the normal score transformation and the transformed distribution is used to partition the total variance of the transformed distribution between uncertainty and variability. Finally the normal score transformation is applied in reverse to the resultant distributions to obtain a final distribution for variability.

3.2.2.3 General Corrosion Model for Waste Package Outer Barrier

The (silica corrected) CDF for the general corrosion rate for the Alloy 22 waste package outer barrier is shown in Figure 3-70. The CDF is considered a mix of uncertainty and variability of the general corrosion rate. Quantification of uncertainty and variability in the measured general corrosion rate is difficult because the measured general corrosion rates are extremely low and considered to be within the measurement noise. Because of this, it is difficult to separate what the fraction of the total variance in the parent CDF results from uncertainty and what fraction is due to variability. In the WAPDEG analysis the fraction for the split of the uncertainty and variability from the parent CDF is treated as an uncertain parameter (CRWMS M&O 2000g,

Section 6.4.6). Figure 3-72 also shows, along with the original CDF, the resulting variability CDFs for GC rates using 25 percent - 75 percent, 50 percent - 50 percent, and 75 percent - 25 percent uncertainty and variability partitioning ratios, and 50th uncertainty percentile. Figures 3-73 and 3-74 show the resulting variability CDFs using 25th and 75th uncertainty percentiles, respectively.

3.2.2.4 General Corrosion Model for Drip Shield

The (silica corrected) CDF for the GC rate for the Titanium Grade 7 drip shield is shown in Figure 3-71. As with the CDF for the waste package outer barrier GC rate, the drip shield general corrosion CDF is considered a mix of uncertainty and variability of the GC rate. However, quantification of uncertainty and variability in the corrosion rate measurements is also limited because the measured corrosion rates are extremely low and considered within the measurement noise. Because of those it is difficult to separate what the fraction of the total variance in the parent CDF represents the uncertainty and what fraction represents the variability. In the waste package degradation analysis the fraction for the split of the uncertainty and variability from the parent CDF is treated as an uncertain parameter (CRWMS M&O 2000g. Section 6.4.5). Figure 3-75 also shows, along with the original CDF, the resulting variability CDFs for GC rate using 25 percent - 75 percent, 50 percent - 50 percent, and 75 percent - 25 percent uncertainty and variability partitioning ratios, and the 50th uncertainty percentile. Figures 3-76 and 3-77 show the resulting variability CDFs using 25th and 75th uncertainty percentiles, respectively.




Figure 3-72. The Variability Cumulative Distribution Functions for the General Corrosion Rate of the Alloy 22 Waste Package Outer Barrier with the Silica-Scale Deposit Correction Using 25 percent - 75 percent, 50 percent - 50 percent, and 75 percent - 25 percent Uncertainty and Variability Partitioning Ratios and 50th Uncertainty Percentile




Figure 3-73. The Variability Cumulative Distribution Functions for the General Corrosion Rate of the Alloy 22 Waste Package Outer Barrier with the Silica-Scale Deposit Correction Using 25 percent - 75 percent, 50 percent - 50 percent, and 75 percent - 25 percent Uncertainty and Variability Partitioning Ratios and 25th Uncertainty Percentile




Figure 3-74. The Variability Cumulative Distribution Functions for the General Corrosion Rate of the Alloy 22 Waste Package Outer Barrier with the Silica-Scale Deposit Correction Using 25 percent - 75 percent, 50 percent - 50 percent, and 75 percent - 25 percent Uncertainty and Variability Partitioning Ratios and 75th Uncertainty Percentile




Figure 3-75. The Variability Cumulative Distribution Functions for the General Corrosion Rate of the Titanium Grade-7 Drip Shield with the Silica-Scale Deposit Correction Using 25 percent - 75 percent, 50 percent - 50 percent, and 75 percent - 25 percent Uncertainty and Variability Partitioning Ratios and 50th Uncertainty Percentile




Figure 3-76. The Variability Cumulative Distribution Functions for the General Corrosion Rate of the Titanium Grade-7 Drip Shield with the Silica-Scale Deposit Correction Using 25 percent - 75 percent, 50 percent - 50 percent, and 75 percent - 25 percent Uncertainty and Variability Partitioning Ratios and 25th Uncertainty Percentile




Figure 3-77. The Variability Cumulative Distribution Functions for the General Corrosion Rate of the Titanium Grade-7 Drip Shield with the Silica-Scale Deposit Correction Using 25 percent - 75 percent, 50 percent - 50 percent, and 75 percent - 25 percent Uncertainty and Variability Partitioning Ratios and 75th Uncertainty Percentile

3.2.3 Abstraction of Localized Corrosion Models for Waste Package Outer Barrier and Drip Shield

This section discusses the approaches and assumptions used in the abstraction of localized corrosion models for waste package outer barrier and drip shield, and the abstraction results.

3.2.3.1 Approaches and Assumptions

The model abstractions are to develop two localized corrosion initiation criteria; one representing the localized corrosion initiation criterion for the waste package outer barrier (Alloy 22) and the other for the localized corrosion initiation criterion for the drip shield (Titanium Grade 7). As discussed in Section 3.1.6.3, cyclic polarization measurements were made in several synthetic concentrated J-13 waters. For each cyclic polarization curve obtained, the critical potential for localized corrosion initiation, E_{crit} , and the corrosion potential, E_{corr} , were determined. The potential difference between E_{crit} and E_{corr} (i.e., $\mathbf{DE} = E_{crit} - E_{corr}$) was then fit to a function of relevant exposure parameters. Consistent with the discussion in Section 3.1.6.3, localized corrosion should initiate if $\mathbf{DE} < 0$ (i.e., $E_{crit} < E_{corr}$). Details of the abstraction approaches are described in CRWMS M&O (2000n).

A set of assumptions were employed in the model abstraction. Key assumptions are described below.

- “Threshold Potential 1” (see Figures 3-41 through 3-48) was used as the critical potential above which localized corrosion can initiate. This is the lowest (most conservative) of the various critical thresholds discussed in Section 3.1.6.3.
- For both the waste package outer barrier (Alloy 22) and the drip shield (Titanium Grade 7), it was assumed that DE varied linearly with relevant exposure parameters.

Detailed discussion of the assumptions employed in the model abstraction is given in CRWMS M&O (2000n).

3.2.3.2 Localized Corrosion Model for Waste Package Outer Barrier

The cyclic polarization data for the waste package outer barrier (Alloy 22) was first used to fit DE to a function of absolute temperature, T , the base 10 logarithm of the chloride ion concentration (mol/L), solution pH, and solution pH^2 , i.e.,

$$DE = b_0 + b_1 \cdot T + b_2 \cdot \log(Cl^-) + b_3 \cdot pH + b_4 \cdot pH^2 + g \quad (\text{Eq. 3-38})$$

however, it was found that DE exhibited little dependence on absolute temperature or the base 10 logarithm of the chloride ion concentration. Therefore, the cyclic polarization data for the waste package outer barrier (Alloy 22) was used to fit DE to a function of solution pH and pH^2 only i.e.,


$$DE = c_0 + c_1 \cdot pH + c_2 \cdot pH^2 + e \quad (\text{Eq. 3-39})$$

Linear regression gave the following estimates for the parameters in Equation (3-39): $c_0 = 1160$, $c_1 = -193$ and $c_2 = 12.0$. The covariance matrix (s) and correlation matrix (C) resulting from the fitting procedure were determined to be:

$$s = \begin{bmatrix} 3530 & -1040 & 64.4 \\ -1040 & 364 & -24.4 \\ 64.4 & -24.4 & 1.69 \end{bmatrix} \quad C = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & -0.915 & 0.835 \\ -0.915 & 1 & -0.982 \\ 0.835 & -0.982 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-40})$$

and the variance of e determined from the linear regression fitting procedure is 4670.

Figure 3-78 shows a plot of how the median potential difference DE given by Equation (3-39) varies with pH . Also shown are the $\pm 3\sigma$ and $\pm 4\sigma$ confidence intervals and the cyclic polarization experimental data.



Source: CRWMS, M&O 2000n, Section 6.3.1

Figure 3-78. Plot of ΔE vs. pH for Alloy 22 from Equation (3-39) Showing the $\pm 3\sigma$ and $\pm 4\sigma$ Confidence Intervals and the CP Experimental Data

The abstraction results in Figure 3-78 shows that localized corrosion of Alloy 22 does not initiate at any pH based on the 4σ confidence interval and based on extrapolation of the repository-relevant experimental data used in the analysis.

3.2.3.3 Localized Corrosion Model for Drip Shield

The cyclic polarization data for the drip shield (Titanium Grade 7) was first used to fit ΔE to a function of absolute temperature, T , the base 10 logarithm of the chloride ion concentration (mol/L), and solution pH , i.e.,

$$\Delta E = d_0 + d_1 \cdot T + d_2 \cdot \log(Cl^-) + d_3 \cdot pH + g \quad (\text{Eq. 3-41})$$

however, it was found that ΔE exhibited little dependence on absolute temperature or the base 10 logarithm of the chloride ion concentration. Therefore, the cyclic polarization data for the drip shield (Titanium Grade 7) was used to fit ΔE to a function of solution pH only i.e.,


$$\Delta E = f_0 + f_1 \cdot pH + e \quad (\text{Eq. 3-42})$$

Linear regression gave the following estimates for the parameters in Equation (3-42): $f_0 = 1670$ and $f_1 = -52.2$. The covariance matrix (s) and correlation matrix (C) resulting from the fitting procedure was determined to be:

$$s = \begin{bmatrix} 2040 & -230 \\ -230 & 31.9 \end{bmatrix} \quad C = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & -0.904 \\ -0.904 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-43})$$

and the variance of e determined from the linear regression fitting procedure is 1080.

Figure 3-79 shows a plot of how the median potential difference ΔE given by Equation (3-42) varies with pH . Also shown are the $\pm 3\sigma$ and $\pm 4\sigma$ confidence intervals and the cyclic polarization experimental data.



Source: CRWMS, M&O 2000n, Section 6.4.1

Figure 3-79. Plot of ΔE vs. pH for Titanium Grade 7 from Equation (3-42) Showing the $\pm 3\sigma$ and $\pm 4\sigma$ Confidence Intervals and the CP Experimental Data

The abstraction results shown in Figure 3-79 indicate that localized corrosion of Titanium Grade 7 does not initiate even at a pH of 14 based on the 3σ and 4σ confidence intervals and based on extrapolation of the repository-relevant experimental data used in this analysis.

3.2.4 Abstraction of Slip Dissolution Stress Corrosion Cracking Model

In the current waste package degradation analysis, two alternative SCC models, the slip dissolution (or film rupture) model and the threshold stress intensity factor (K_{ISCC}) model, are considered (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Sections 6.3, 6.4). In the threshold stress intensity factor model, the threshold stress intensity factor (K_{ISCC}) is used to determine when SCC will occur. Provided that an initial flaw and corrosive environment is present, a SCC failure will occur when the applied stress intensity factor K_I is greater than or equal to the threshold stress intensity factor K_{ISCC} (i.e., $K_I \geq K_{ISCC}$). The slip dissolution model assumes that incipient cracks or defects grow continuously when the oxidation reaction that occurs at the crack tip ruptures the protective film via an applied strain in the underlying matrix. The rate at which the crack grows is a function of the crack tip strain rate and environmental and material chemistries. The theory and fundamentals of the SCC models are described in detail in the process model analysis (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Sections 6.3, 6.4). As recommended in the process model analysis (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4), the slip dissolution model was used to assess the SCC degradation of the waste package outer barrier (also see Section 3.1.7.2). This section discusses the approach and methodology used in the abstraction development for the slip dissolution model and the associated parameters.

3.2.4.1 Abstraction Approach and Methodology

The purpose of this analysis is to develop abstractions for the parameters that are associated with the slip dissolution model. In the WAPDEG analysis this model is employed to calculate the growth rate of cracks initiated by SCC. The theory and fundamentals of the model are discussed in detail in the process model analysis (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4). The waste package degradation analysis employs a stochastic approach to model the initiation and propagation of SCC cracks. The major efforts in the abstraction discussed in this section are to develop an approach to represent the uncertainty and variability associated with the SCC initiation and crack propagation processes, and to implement them in the waste package degradation analysis. As discussed in the following section, the associated parameters in the model include two model parameters (A and n), stress intensity factor (K_I), threshold stress, and incipient crack density and size. The nominal-case SCC analysis also includes pre-existing manufacturing defects in the closure-lid welds. Abstractions for the manufacturing defects and the residual stress and stress intensity factor in the closure-lid welds are discussed in Sections 3.2.5 and 3.2.6, respectively. The current abstractions for the model parameters (A and n), threshold stress, and incipient cracks expand the process model analysis results to represent and quantify the uncertainty and variability associated with the parameters (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Sections 6.4, 6.5). The abstraction assumes that statistical sampling of the associated model parameter values within their probable range capture the effects of the complex processes affecting the SCC crack initiation and growth rate.

3.2.4.2 Crack Growth Rate Model

The crack growth rate in the slip dissolution model is determined by the following expression in Section 3.1.7.8. (also see CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4.4).

$$V_t = \bar{A}(K_I)^{\bar{n}} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-44})$$

where V is the crack growth rate in mm/s, and K_I is the stress intensity factor in $\text{MPa(m)}^{1/2}$. Parameters, \bar{A} and \bar{n} , in the above equation are expressed as follows (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4.4; also see Section 3.1.7.8).

$$\bar{A} = 7.8 \times 10^{-2} n^{3.6} (4.1 \times 10^{-14})^n \quad (\text{Eq. 3-45})$$

$$\bar{n} = 4n \quad (\text{Eq. 3-46})$$

Parameter “ n ” (referred to also as the repassivation slope) is a function of environmental and materials parameters such as solution conductivity, corrosion potential, and alloy composition (i.e., chromium depletion in the grain boundary) (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4.2). The variability in the crack growth rate may be represented with potentially varying exposure conditions (introduced through the repassivation slope, n) and stress intensity factor (K_I) among waste packages and also on different locations over a single waste package. However, due to a lack of data, n is considered independent of exposure conditions and alloy composition (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4.4). The effect of n on the failure time by SCC is smaller than that of the stress intensity factor (K_I) (see Section 3.2.4.5 below). As discussed in

Section 3.2.5, the stress intensity factor profile (as a function of depth in the closure-lid weld) varies along the circumference of the closure-lid welds, but the variability is not significant. It is assumed that there is no variability in the profile among waste packages.

The uncertainty associated with the crack growth rate is represented through the uncertainties in the model parameters, i.e., n and K_I . As discussed in Section 3.2.5, the uncertainties associated with the K_I profiles are represented with a triangular distribution bounded at ± 5 , ± 10 , or ± 30 percent of the yield strength from the mean profile. The uncertainty associated with n is coarsely defined: uniform distribution between the lower bound 0.75 and the upper bound 0.84 (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4.4). Incorporation of more recent data into the process model analysis (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4.4) has resulted in revision of the uncertainty distribution bounds associated with n , i.e. a uniform distribution between 0.843 and 0.92.

3.2.4.3 Threshold Stress for Crack Growth Initiation

The threshold stress is defined as the minimum stress at which cracks start growing at a rate determined by Equation (3-44). The threshold stress may be represented as a fraction of the yield strength of the material, which varies with temperature (CRWMS M&O 1999f, Section 5.7). Because the upper limit of the temperature at which corrosion initiates (or stable liquid water can form) is 120.59°C (CRWMS M&O 2000a, Section 4.1.8, Table 7), the yield strength of Alloy 22 at 125°C is used. The yield strength was calculated by linearly interpolating the yield strengths at 93°C (338 MPa) and 204°C (283 MPa) (CRWMS M&O 1999f, Section 5.7). The resulting yield strength used for the threshold stress is 322.3 MPa (46.72 ksi). Although the yield strength increases as temperature decreases, the value at 125°C is used for all the waste package temperatures after corrosion initiates in the repository. This is because there is only a small change in the yield strength of Alloy 22 from 125°C to the ambient temperature. Potentially marginal variability in the yield strength and thus the threshold stress are ignored in the current analysis.

As suggested in the process model analysis (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5.2), the uncertainty in the threshold stress is conservatively represented as 20 to 30 percent of the yield strength, and uniform distribution is assumed for the uncertainty range. Thus, the resulting uncertainty range for the threshold stress is 64.46 to 96.60 MPa with the assumed uniform distribution between the two values. Incorporation of more recent analysis has resulted in revision of the uncertainty distribution for the threshold stress to be a uniform distribution between 10 and 40 percent of the yield strength (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5.2). The resulting uncertainty range for the threshold stress is 32.23 to 128.92 MPa. In the SCC analysis of waste package closure-lids weld with WAPDEG, for each realization (or each run), the threshold stress is sampled from a uniform distribution, and the sampled threshold stress is used for all the closure-lid weld patches of the waste packages under consideration (CRWMS M&O 2000g, Section 6.4.12).

3.2.4.4 Incipient Cracks and Manufacturing Defects

In the SCC process the crack initiation is associated with microscopic crack formation at localized corrosion or mechanical defect sites that are associated with pitting, intergranular attack, scratches, weld defects, planar dislocations, secondary phase precipitates, or design


notches (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4.2). The crack growth rate increases as the microscopic cracks coalesce, and approaches a steady-state value when a crack can be detected (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.4.1). The current analysis assumes that a crack depth range of about 20 μm to 50 μm represents the minimum crack depth for which the slip dissolution model can be applied. Those cracks are referred to as “incipient” cracks. Exponential distribution with a maximum size of 50 μm and a median size of 20 μm was suggested for the incipient crack size distribution (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5.2). Because the effect of differing incipient crack sizes within the suggested range on crack growth rate is much less than the model parameters (n and K_I), the maximum crack size (50 μm) is used for all the incipient cracks considered in the SCC analysis.

The SCC analysis using the slip dissolution model also considers manufacturing defects in the closure-lid welds. As discussed in Section 3.2.6, in the WAPDEG analysis, the size of the manufacturing defects are sampled for the closure-lid weld patches, and the sampled defects are included in the analysis with the slip dissolution model. Because manufacturing defects are much larger than the incipient cracks, the closure-lid weld patches with manufacturing defects are likely to fail initially by SCC (CRWMS M&O 2000g, Section 6.5).

3.2.4.5 Slip Dissolution Model Analysis

Bounding analyses were performed to examine the model responses for the SCC failure time of the outer lid (25-mm thick) and inner lid (10-mm thick) as a function of the model parameters (n and K_I). The analyses considered two bounding values (0.75 and 0.84) for n (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Sections 3.2, 6.4.4) and a range of values for the stress intensity factor that is expected in the closure-lid welds (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Attachment I). The threshold stress for crack growth initiation and pre-existing manufacturing defect were not considered in this bounding analysis. The results are shown in Figure 3-80. As shown in the figure, the stress intensity factor is the dominant parameter in the model, and the time to failure by SCC increases exponentially as the stress intensity factor decreases. The failure time by SCC is less than 100 years for the stress intensity factors greater than 20 $\text{MPa}\cdot\text{m}^{1/2}$. The failure time increases to well above 1,000 years if the stress intensity factor is kept below 6 $\text{MPa}\cdot\text{m}^{1/2}$. The analysis demonstrates that, once a SCC crack initiates, it penetrates the closure-lid thickness fast. It also demonstrates importance of stress mitigation in the closure-lid welds to avoid early failures of waste packages by SCC.

A similar bounding analysis is considered for the latest distribution for n (uniform between 0.843 and 0.92) (CRWMS M&O 2000a, Sections 3.2, 6.4.4). In Figure 3-80, the curves for $n = 0.84$ are suitable for evaluation of the lower bound (0.843). As shown in the figure, the failure time by SCC is less than 100 years for the stress intensity factors greater than 30 $\text{MPa}\cdot\text{m}^{1/2}$. The failure time increases to above 6,000 years if the stress intensity factor is kept below 6 $\text{MPa}\cdot\text{m}^{1/2}$.



Source: CRWMS, M&O 2000j, Section 6.5

Figure 3-80. Bounding Calculations for the Model Responses for the Time to Failure of the Outer and Inner Closure Lids by SCC Calculated with the Slip Dissolution Model Using the Bounding Values for Parameter n for a Range of the Stress Intensity Factor Values

3.2.5 Abstraction of Stress and Stress Intensity Factor Profile in Waste Package Closure Welds

This section discusses the approaches and assumptions used to develop abstracted models for stress and stress intensity factor profiles as a function of depth in the closure-lid welds of waste package outer barrier. The resulting abstracted models represent uncertainty and variability of the profiles and used as input to the SCC analysis in the closure lid welds using the integrated WAPDEG model (CRWMS M&O 2000g).

3.2.5.1 Approaches and Assumptions

The waste package outer barrier has dual closure lids (referred to as the outer (25-mm thick) and inner lid (10-mm thick), respectively) (see Figure 1-1). The process model analyses provide the stress and stress intensity factor profiles along the circumference of the welds for each of the closure lids (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2). The results were analyzed to develop abstracted models to represent uncertainty and variability of the profiles in the closure-lid welds. In addition, the abstraction was to present the profiles in a format that is suitable for implementation in the integrated WAPDEG model. Details of the abstraction approaches are discussed in the supporting AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000j).

Major assumptions employed in the realistic-case abstraction are described below.

- The hoop stress (and the corresponding stress intensity factor for radial cracks) is the prevailing stress in the closure-lid welds that could lead to SCC through-wall cracks in the closure-lid weld regions of the waste packages. Thus, the current abstraction is limited to the profiles for the hoop stress and corresponding stress intensity factor for radial cracks.
- The hoop stress (and corresponding stress intensity factor profiles for radial cracks) in the inner lid welds are for a plane that is inclined at about 53 degrees from a plane normal to the outer surface of the inner lid (CRWMS M&O 2000j, Section 5.3). Because the SCC analysis in the integrated WAPDEG model assumes that cracks propagate normal to the lid surface, the profiles were projected to a plane normal to the outer surface of the lid. The crack orientation used in the abstraction is in the radial direction, which is normal to the hoop stress. As discussed above, the radial crack is considered in the abstraction because the hoop stress was found to be the dominant stress in the closure-lid welds. The hoop stress is likely to be close to the first principal (or maximum) stress. It is assumed the SCC analysis with the projected profiles properly represents the hoop stress and stress intensity factor profiles for the inclined plane.
- The hoop stress and corresponding stress intensity factor profiles as a function of depth in the closure lid welds from the process model analyses (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2) represent the mean profiles.
- The hoop stress and stress intensity factor profiles vary along the circumference of the closure lid welds, and those represent the variability in the profiles on a given waste package. The angular variation in the hoop stress, $\mathbf{s}_t(x)$, where x is the thickness, is given by,

$$\mathbf{s}_t(x, \mathbf{q}) = \mathbf{s}_s(x) - (17.236892) \cdot (1 - \cos(\mathbf{q})) \quad (\text{Eq. 3-47})$$

where \mathbf{s} is angle around the circumference of the waste package closure-lid welds ($\mathbf{s} = 0$ point arbitrarily chosen). $\mathbf{s}_s(x)$ is the mean hoop stress defined in Section 6.3.1 of CRWMS M&O (2000j).

- It is assumed that the same degree of the profile variability is applied equally to all the waste packages in the repository, and there is no variability in the profiles among waste packages.
- The uncertainty in the stress state and stress intensity factor is introduced through a scaling factor, $sz(z)$. The functional form of the scaling factor (CRWMS M&O 2000j, Section 6.3.1) is shown in Equation 3-48.

$$sz(z) = \left(\frac{z \cdot YS \cdot F}{3} \right) \quad (\text{Eq. 3-48})$$

YS is the yield strength, F is the yield strength scaling factor (a constant), and z is the magnitude of the uncertainty variation from the mean profile (sampled from a distribution). The yield strength scaling factor, F , defines the maximum uncertainty variation possible (the bounds). The yield strength, uncertainty scaling factors, and distribution for z used for the two lids are given in Table 3-13.

Table 3-13. Stress and Stress Intensity Factor Uncertainty Model Parameters for the Closure Lid Regions of the Waste Package Outer Barrier

Parameter	Value
Yield Strength (YS)	322.3 MPa
Yield Strength Scaling Factor (F)	0.05 - Optimum 0.10 - Realistic 0.30 - Conservative
Uncertainty variation, z	Triangular between ± 3 with a mode of 0

Note that three different values of the yield strength scaling factor, F , are considered in this analysis (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Sections 5, 6.2.2). The stress uncertainty range of ± 5 percent (yield strength scaling factor of 0.05) is used to represent the optimum case that is achievable through stringent control of such processes as welding, stress mitigation, material variability, and other fabrication steps. The stress uncertainty range of ± 10 percent (yield strength scaling factor of 0.10) is used to represent the realistic case that is achievable through appropriate levels of process controls. The stress uncertainty range of ± 30 percent (yield strength scaling factor of 0.30) is used to represent the worst-case that might result from inadequate control of the processes (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2).

As presented in CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2, the stress relation, accounting for uncertainty, is given by

$$\mathbf{s}(x, \mathbf{q}, z) = \mathbf{s}_t(x, \mathbf{q}) + sz(z) \quad (\text{Eq. 3-49})$$

and the stress intensity factor relation is given by


$$K(x, \mathbf{q}, z) = K_s(x) \frac{\mathbf{s}_t(Thck, \mathbf{q})}{\mathbf{s}_t(Thck, 0)} + 0.058534 \cdot sz(z) \cdot \sqrt{\mathbf{p} \cdot x} \quad (\text{Eq. 3-50})$$

Note that this is the more conservative approach of the two alternative approaches discussed in CRWMS M&O (2000f, Section 6.2.2).

As a crack propagates in the closure lid welds or the weld is thinned by general corrosion, the residual stresses in the welds may re-distribute in such a way that the SCC initiation and crack growth are mitigated (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2). Such stress re-distribution or relaxation is not considered in the current abstraction. This is a conservative approach.

3.2.5.2 Abstraction Results for Stress and Stress Intensity Factor Profiles


The abstraction results for the uncertainty range of the hoop stress as a function of depth in the outer closure lid welds (25-mm thick) are given in Figure 3-81. The stress profiles in Figure 3-81 are at a reference location (0° angle) on the circumference of the lid welds. The figure shows that the hoop stress in the outer closure lid welds is compressive at the surface (from stress mitigation with the induction-heating solution annealing technique, see Section 3.1.7.6) and becomes tensile at a depth of 6 mm for the maximum upper bound and 10 mm for the minimum lower bound. The corresponding stress intensity factor profiles as a function of radial crack depth are shown in Figure 3-82. The stress intensity factor is negative at the surface, consistent with the compressive stress at the surface shown in Figure 3-81, and becomes positive at a depth 3 mm for the + 30 percent bounding case. No SCC crack growth will initiate until this layer is removed.



Source: CRWMS, M&O 2000j, Section 6.3


Figure 3-81. Hoop Stress as a Function of Depth in the Alloy 22 Outer Closure Lid Welds (25-mm thick) at the Reference Location on the Outer Closure Lid Weld Circumference using Uncertainty Bounds of ± 5 , 10, and 30 Percent of the Yield Strength

Figure 3-83 and Figure 3-84 show, respectively, the median hoop stress as a function of depth and the corresponding stress intensity factor as a function of radial crack depth, both at 0° , 90° , and 180° angle along the circumference of the outer closure lid welds. The reference location designated at 0° angle has the largest hoop stress, and the location at 180° angle has the least hoop stress. As shown in the figures, the variability of the both profiles along the weld circumference is minor.




Source: CRWMS, M&O 2000j, Section 6.3

Figure 3-82. Stress Intensity as a Function of Depth in the Alloy 22 Outer Closure Lid Welds (25-mm thick) at the Reference Location on the Outer Closure Lid Weld Circumference using Uncertainty Bounds of ± 5 , 10, and 30 percent of the Yield Strength



Source: CRWMS, M&O 2000j, Section 6.3

Figure 3-83. Median Hoop Stress as a Function of Depth in the Alloy 22 Outer Closure Lid Welds (25-mm thick) at 0°, 90° and 180° Angles Along the Circumference of the Outer Closure Lid Weld




Source: CRWMS, M&O 2000j, Section 6.3

Figure 3-84. Median Stress Intensity Factor as a Function of Depth in the Alloy 22 Outer Closure Lid Welds (25-mm thick) at 0°, 90° and 180° Angles Along the Circumference of the Outer Closure Lid Weld


The abstraction results for the uncertainty range of the hoop stress as a function of the projected depth in the inner closure lid welds (10-mm thick) are given in Figure 3-85. The stress profiles are at a reference location (0° angle) on the circumference of the lid welds. The hoop stress in the inner closure lid welds is compressive at the surface, transitions to tensile state at a projected depth between 1.5 and about 3 mm, and then back to compressive state at a projected depth between 6.8 and 9.8 mm. The corresponding stress intensity factor profiles as a function of the projected radial crack depth are shown in Figure 3-86. The stress intensity factor is negative at the surface and becomes positive at a projected depth of about 2 mm for the + 30 percent bounding case. No SCC crack growth will initiate until this layer is removed. The uncertainty of the stress intensity factor increases with the weld depth.

Figure 3-87 and Figure 3-88 show, respectively, the median hoop stress as a function of the projected depth and the corresponding median stress intensity factor as a function of the projected radial crack depth at 0°, 90°, and 180° angle along the circumference of the inner closure lid welds. The reference location designated at 0° angle has the largest hoop stress, and the location at 180° angle has the least hoop stress. As shown in the figures, the variability of the profiles along the weld circumference is minor.




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000j, Section 6.3

Figure 3-85. Hoop Stress as a Function of the Projected Depth in the Alloy 22 Inner Closure Lid Welds (10-mm thick) at the Reference Location on the Inner Closure Lid Weld using Uncertainty Bounds of ± 5 , 10, and 30 Percent of the Yield Strength




Source: CRWMS M&O 2000j, Section 6.3

Figure 3-86. Stress Intensity Factor as a Function of the Projected Radial Crack Depth in the Alloy 22 Inner-Lid Welds (10-mm thick) at the Reference Location on the Inner-Lid Weld Circumference using Uncertainty Bounds of ± 5 , 10, and 30 Percent of the Yield Strength



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000j, Section 6.3

Figure 3-87. Median Hoop Stress as a Function of the Projected Depth in the Alloy 22 Inner Closure Lid Welds (10-mm thick) at 0°, 90° and 180° Angles Along the Inner Closure Lid Weld Circumference



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000j, Section 6.3

Figure 3-88. Median Stress Intensity Factor as a Function of the Projected Radial Crack Depth in the Alloy 22 Inner Closure Lid Welds (10-mm thick) at 0°, 90° and 180° Angles Along the Inner Closure Lid Weld Circumference

3.2.6 Abstraction for Manufacturing Defects in Waste Package Closure Welds

This section describes the approaches and assumptions employed in developing abstracted models for the probability and size of manufacturing defects in the waste package closure-lid welds. The abstraction results and their implementation in the WAPDEG model for SCC analysis are discussed in this section.

3.2.6.1 Approaches and Assumptions

The analyses are to develop abstracted models representing the frequency of occurrence and size of defects potentially found in waste package closure-lid welds. Flaw density and flaw size distributions are obtained from other analyses (see Section 3.1.2 CRWMS M&O 2000m, Section 6.2.1). The flaw density is used as the parameter for a Poisson distribution used to represent the frequency of occurrence of flaws in a given length of closure weld. The defect sizes are given as a probability density function on each closure-lid weld.

Major assumptions employed in the abstraction are described below. Further details of the assumptions used in the abstraction analyses are discussed in (CRWMS M&O 2000k, Section 5).

- Pre-existing surface-breaking defects and the defects embedded in the outer ¼ of the weld thickness are considered as potential sites for crack growth by SCC. The embedded defects are considered capable of propagation in SCC because as general corrosion proceeds, embedded defects can become surface breaking defects.
- Flaws occur randomly and a Poisson distribution as suggested by the process model analysis (CRWMS M&O 2000m) to represents their occurrence.
- The mean flaw density (Poisson distribution parameter) of the closure lid welds is 0.6839 flaws/meter (CRWMS M&O 2000m, Section 6.2.1).
- The fraction of flaws considered to be capable of propagation by SCC is assumed uniformly distributed between 0.3481 and 0.3632 (CRWMS M&O 2000j, Section 5.2).
- Pre-inspection flaw sizes are log-normally distributed, with distribution parameters (dependent on the weld thickness) as given in CRWMS M&O (2000m, Section 6.2.1).
- The probability of non-detection is given as a function of flaw size as provided in CRWMS M&O (2000m, Section 6.2.1). The model is dependent on the detection threshold (p), the location parameter (b), and the scale parameter (n). The location parameter (b) and the scale parameter (n) are taken to be uncertain with uniform distributions. The ranges for these distributions are determined from the values identified in the literature as quoted in CRWMS M&O (2000m, Section 6.2.1). This is reasonable, as the manufacturing and detection processes for welds on the waste container are not fully specified to date. The model parameters are determined based on similar industrial manufacturing practices as reported in CRWMS M&O (2000m, Section 6.2.1).

- Results of the residual stress analyses for the closure-lid welds have indicated that the hoop stress is the dominant stress that could lead to SCC through-wall cracks in the closure-lid weld regions (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2). As a conservative approach, all the manufacturing defects are considered radial cracks and assumed to have a semi-circular shape.

3.2.6.2 Abstraction Results for the Probability and Size of Defect Flaws


Initial (pre-inspection) mean flaw densities and flaw sizes used in the analyses for this calculation were from (CRWMS M&O (2000m, Section 6.2.1). Calculation of the outer surface-breaking mean flaw density begins with the base mean flaw density of 0.6839 flaws/meter of weld for a one inch thick stainless steel Tungsten Inert Gas weld subject to radiographic and dye-penetrant tests (CRWMS M&O 2000m, Section 6.2.1). To convert this value to a flaw density for an uninspected weld, the base flaw density is increased by the sum of the flaw reduction factors provided for the radiographic testing and dye-penetrant testing tests. The adjustment for the radiographic testing examination increases the total flaw density by a factor of 12.8 while the dye-penetrant testing exam, which detects only surface-breaking flaws, increases the density of only the surface-breaking flaws by a factor of 31.4 (CRWMS M&O 2000m, Section 6.2.1). Next the effect of weld thickness on flaw density is used to adjust for the actual weld thickness on the closure weld. For the 25-mm thick closure weld, the flaw reduction factor (R) is 97.3 percent (865 divided by 889) (CRWMS M&O 2000m, Section 6.2.1). Multiplying this result by this circumference of the closure-lid weld results in the flaw density per closure weld (or per waste package). A final multiplication by the fraction of surface breaking flaws results in the final mean flaw density of surface breaking flaws per waste-package closure weld.

Figure 3-89 shows several probability density functions for defect sizes in the closure lid welds for various combinations of values for the defect location parameter (b) and the scale parameter (n). The same probability density functions are used for both the outer and inner lid welds. As shown in Figure 3-89, the size of most defects is between 1 mm and 3 mm. Few defects could be longer than 4 mm.

3.2.6.3 Implementation of Closure Weld Defect Abstraction Results in Waste Package Degradation Analysis

The number of defects that appear on a patch is sampled stochastically as a Poisson random variable. For each defect that occurs, a defect size is randomly assigned to it by sampling from the calculated defect size CDF. This defect's location and size are then used in the SCC analysis. The abstracted results are then input to the WAPDEG model to analyze its effect on waste package performance (CRWMS M&O 2000g).

The approach used in this abstraction is that, as these distributions accommodate the variability observed in the occurrence, frequency, and size of defects, some of the parameters that determine these distributions need to be treated as uncertain. The instances of where uncertainty is included are for: (1) the defect detection distributions (parameters b and n) and (2) the fraction of defects capable of propagation. The parameters are treated as follows. Values elicited from



Source: CRWMS M&O 2000j, Section 6.2.2

Figure 3-89. Conditional Probability Density Functions of Defect Sizes in the Closure Lid Welds for Various Combinations of Values for the Location and Scale Parameters (b & v)

the literature for b range from 1.6 to 5 mm (CRWMS M&O 2000c, Section 6.2.1) (note that 2.5 and 5 mm are the currently recommended bounding values for the b range (CRWMS M&O 2000m, Section 6.2.1)). Values for v range from 1 to 3 (CRWMS M&O 2000j, Section 6.2.1). The fraction of defects capable of propagation is allowed to uniformly range from 0.3481 to 0.3632. For a given realization of WAPDEG analysis, the model parameters (defect location parameter (b), defect scale parameter (v), and fraction of defects capable of propagation) are sampled independently to estimate the probability of a defect occurrence. Then, as discussed above, the number of defects that appear on a patch is sampled stochastically as a Poisson random variable.

The cumulative probability for the average number of defects per waste package in the welds of the outer (25-mm thick) and inner (10-mm thick) lids of waste package outer barrier, considering both surface breaking and embedded (within the outer $\frac{1}{4}$ of the surface) defects, is presented in Figure 3-90. As shown in the figure, almost 100 percent of waste packages have at least one defect. At the 50th percentile the outer-lid weld has an average of 18 defects per waste package, and the value for the inner-lid weld is about 15 defects per waste package. An upper bound value for the outer-lid and inner-lid weld is about 40 defects per waste package.

3.2.7 Drip Shield and Waste Package Degradation Analyses

This section reports WAPDEG analysis results for the waste package and drip shield degradation. The conceptual model and model logic flow employed in the WAPDEG model are described in Section 3.2.1.




Figure 3-90. Cumulative Probability for the Average Number of Defects per Waste Package in the Welds of the Outer (25-mm thick) and Inner (10-mm thick) Lids of Waste Package Outer Barrier Including Surface Breaking and Embedded Defects

The WAPDEG model, an integrated model used for waste package and drip shield degradation analysis, is based on a stochastic simulation approach and provides a description of waste package degradation, which occurs as a function of time and repository location for specific design and thermal-hydrologic modeling assumptions. The corrosion modes that were included in the analyses are:

- Humid-air phase general corrosion of drip shield
- Aqueous phase general corrosion of drip shield
- Localized (pitting and crevice) corrosion of drip shield
- Humid-air phase general corrosion of waste package outer barrier
- Aqueous phase general corrosion of waste package outer barrier
- Localized (pitting and crevice) corrosion of waste package outer barrier
- SCC of closure-lid welds of waste package outer barrier.

In addition, the following corrosion parameters were abstracted and included in the analyses:

- RH threshold for corrosion initiation of drip shield and waste package outer barrier
- Corrosion potential-based threshold for localized corrosion initiation of drip shield and waste package outer barrier
- Probability of the occurrence and size of manufacturing defects in closure-lid welds of waste package outer barrier

- Stress and stress intensity factor profiles in the closure-lid welds of waste package outer barrier incorporating stress mitigation techniques
- Threshold stress for the initiation of SCC crack growth for waste package outer barrier used with the slip dissolution model
- Corrosion enhancement factor for aging and phase instability of waste package outer barrier
- Corrosion enhancement factor for microbiologically influenced corrosion of waste package outer barrier.

For the SCC analysis of the waste package closure-lid welds in the WAPDEG analysis, the slip dissolution model has been adopted over the threshold stress intensity factor model (see Section 3.2.4). For the SCC analysis with the slip dissolution model, the following conditions must be met before SCC crack propagation can initiate on a patch: (1) the stress intensity factor (K_I) must be positive, and (2) the stress at the crack tip must be greater than or equal to the threshold stress. Localized stress-relief treatments (induction annealing of the outer closure lid welds and laser peening of the inner closure lid welds) will be applied to the closure lid welds (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.2.2.4). These treatments will result in the formation of compressive surface stresses in the waste package outer barrier closure lid weld regions (see Figures 3-81 and 3-88). SCC will not initiate until the crack tip extends beyond the compressive zone. In the WAPDEG analysis, pre-existing manufacturing defects in a patch, whether embedded or not, are conservatively assumed to be surface breaking (see Section 3.2.6). They grow at the general corrosion rate sampled for the patch. That is, the defects maintain their depth relative to the general corrosion front until they extend beyond the compressive zone (and SCC initiates). Therefore, SCC initiation is delayed until some portion of the compressive stress zone is removed by general corrosion. The delay time depends on the depth of the manufacturing defects, the compressive zone thickness, and the general corrosion rate sampled for the patch.

The corrosion enhancement factors for microbiologically influenced corrosion are applied to the general corrosion rate of the waste package outer barrier. No microbiologically influenced corrosion enhancement factor is applied to the localized corrosion rate because no localized corrosion occurs.

The corrosion enhancement factors for aging and phase instability are applied to the general corrosion rate of the waste package outer barrier closure lid weld regions. All other welds used in fabrication of the waste packages are fully annealed before the waste packages are loaded with waste. No aging and phase instability corrosion enhancement factor is applied to the localized corrosion rate because no localized corrosion occurs.

For most of the degradation models and parameters used, data and analyses are available to quantify their uncertainty and variability. Thus, uncertainty and variability were represented explicitly in the WAPDEG analysis. Variability in the degradation of the waste packages to be modeled is represented by allocating the total variability variance of the individual degradation models and their parameters to waste package-to-waste package variability and to patch-to-patch variability within a single waste package. For general corrosion, the uncertainty and variability

are not quantifiable and the variance in the general corrosion rate is considered to represent a mix of uncertainty and variability. The fraction of the total variance due to uncertainty was treated as an uncertain parameter and sampled randomly for each realization (Section 3.2.2). The Gaussian Variance Partitioning technique was used to separate the share of variance due to uncertainty and variability from the total variance (see Section 3.2.2.2 for detailed discussions).

Because, except for the RH threshold for corrosion initiation, temperature and RH do not affect waste package and drip shield degradation, a representative set of temperature and RH histories were used in the current analysis. Also, no separate analysis was conducted for different waste-type waste packages (i.e., commercial spent nuclear fuel waste packages, high-level waste waste-packages, etc.), which could give rise to varying thermal hydrologic conditions on the drip shield and waste packages. In addition, the threshold for localized corrosion initiation on the drip shield and waste package outer barrier requires the presence of dripping water chemistries that are more aggressive than expected in the repository. Thus, localized corrosion does not initiate for both the drip shield and waste package outer barrier materials. Other corrosion models are not dependent on dripping conditions (i.e., drip vs. no-drip). Therefore, no separate analyses were conducted for different dripping conditions. No performance credit was taken for the stainless steel waste-package inner shell (which provides structural support to the waste package). Although the stainless steel inner shell would provide a certain level of performance for waste containment and potentially act as a barrier to radionuclide transport after waste package breach, the potential performance credit of the stainless steel layer was not included in the nominal TSPA-SR analysis. Details of the approaches and assumptions associated with the analyses are described in the supporting report (CRWMS M&O 2000g).

In the TSPA-SR analysis, waste package degradation was analyzed using multiple realizations of the uncertain degradation parameters used in the WAPDEG model. Each WAPDEG realization represents a characterization of the variability of the degradation processes modeled, with a given number of waste package and drip shield pairs. Accordingly, the WAPDEG analysis outputs are reported as a group of “curves” that represent the potential range of the output parameters. The nominal case analysis for waste package and drip shield degradation uses 100 realizations of the uncertain degradation parameters (or 100 WAPDEG simulations). The major simulation parameters used in the analysis are summarized below:

- Temperature, RH, and contacting solution pH histories
- 400 waste package and drip shield pairs
- 20-mm thick waste package outer barrier (Alloy 22)
- 15-mm thick drip shield (Titanium Grade 7)
- 1000 patches per waste package
- 500 patches per drip shield.

Note that defense waste co-disposal waste package and naval fuel waste package have a 25-mm thick outer barrier, however potential performance benefit of the waste packages with the thicker outer barriers is ignored in the nominal case analysis. The WAPDEG analysis results (i.e., waste package and drip shield failure time and number of crack and patch penetrations) are reported as a group of “degradation profile curves” that represent the potential range of the output parameters. The analysis results are presented for the upper bound (100th percentile), lower

bound (0th percentile), mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th percentiles as a function of time for the following output parameters:

- Waste package first breach (or failure)
- Drip shield first breach (or failure)
- Waste package first crack penetration
- Waste package first patch penetration.

As discussed above, the upper and lower bounds, mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th percentile curves do not correspond to single realizations. They are summary statistics related to consideration of all 100 realizations. In the bullets below, the origin of the upper and lower bound, mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th percentile curves for first breach of the waste package are discussed. Similar wording (not included for the sake of brevity) could be applied for discussion of origins of the drip shield first breach curves, waste package first crack penetration curves, etc.

- At each point in time the upper bound curve shows the realization with the greatest fraction of waste packages failed calculated in any one of the 100 realizations. This may not be the same realization at each point in time. The upper bound curve becomes non-zero at the time of failure of first waste package in all of the 100 realizations. Therefore, the upper bound curve represents a case with an extremely low probability.
- At each point in time the 95th percentile curve shows the realization with the 95th greatest fraction of waste packages failed, i.e., 95 realizations out of 100 have smaller fraction of waste packages failed calculated in any one of the 100 realizations. This may not be the same realization at each point in time. The 95th percentile curve becomes non-zero at the time when at least 5 realizations have at least one waste package failure.
- At each point in time the 75th percentile curve shows the realization calculated in any one of the 100 realizations with the 75th greatest fraction of waste packages failed, i.e., 75 realizations out of 100 have smaller fraction of waste packages failed. This may not be the same realization at each point in time. The 75th percentile curve becomes non-zero at the time when at least 25 realizations have at least one waste package failure.
- At each point in time the 25th percentile curve shows the realization calculated in any one of the 100 realizations with the 25th greatest fraction of waste packages failed, i.e., 25 realizations out of 100 have smaller fraction of waste packages failed. This may not be the same realization at each point in time. The 25th percentile curve becomes non-zero at the time when at least 75 realizations have at least one waste package failure.
- At each point in time the 5th percentile curve shows the realization calculated in any one of the 100 realizations with the 5th greatest fraction of waste packages failed, i.e., 5 realizations out of 100 have smaller fraction of waste packages failed. This may not be the same realization at each point in time. The 5th percentile curve becomes non-zero at the time when at least 95 realizations have at least one waste package failure.

- At each point in time the mean curve shows the mean of all the fractions of waste packages failed in all of the 100 realizations. The mean curve becomes non-zero at the time of failure of first waste package in all of the 100 realizations.

Note that localized corrosion does not initiate for both the waste package (Alloy 22 outer barrier) and drip shield because the exposure conditions on the drip shield and waste package surface are not severe enough to initiate localized corrosion (i.e., the corrosion potential is less than the critical corrosion potential) (see Section 3.1.6). Therefore no pit or crevice penetration is reported. Also note that the drip shield is assumed not subject to SCC, thus there is no crack penetration failure of drip shield. Thus, for drip shield, the first patch breach time profile is the same as the failure time profile.

3.2.7.1 Nominal Case Analysis Results

The WAPDEG Model currently implemented within the TSPA (referred to as the Nominal Case) does not use all of the latest input parameters that have been identified in previous sections. The primary differences between the Nominal Case and the Updated Nominal Case (discussed in Section 3.2.7.3) are in the SCC and manufacturing defect implementations and are summarized below.

- The stress threshold for the initiation of SCC in the Nominal Case is uniformly distributed between 20 and 30 percent of the yield strength (the Updated Nominal Case uses a uniform distribution between 10 and 40 percent of the yield stress) (see Section 3.2.4).
- The location parameter for the probability of non-detection (b) is represented by a distribution between 1.6 and 5.0 in the Nominal Case (the Updated Nominal Case uses the same upper bound (5.0) but uses a larger lower bound of 2.5) (see Section 3.2.6).
- The repassivation slope (or crack growth exponent), n , is sampled from a uniform distribution between 0.75 and 0.84 in the Nominal Case (the Updated Nominal Case uses a uniform distribution between 0.843 and 0.92) (see Section 3.2.4).

The conservative yield strength scaling factor of ± 30 percent of the yield strength is used to treat uncertainty in the stress and stress intensity factor profiles.

Sensitivities using the other two bounds (± 5 and ± 10 percent of the yield strength) for the uncertainty in the stress and stress intensity factor profiles are discussed in the next section.

Figure 3-91 shows the upper and lower bounds, mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th percentile confidence intervals of the first breach profile for the waste packages with time. The upper bound profile, which is the upper extreme of the probable range of the first breach time, indicates that the earliest possible first breach time for a waste package is about 11,000 years. Note that the estimated earliest possible first breach time has a very low probability. It can be shown by comparing with the upper bound profile in Figure 3-93 (showing the first crack breach profiles of waste packages with time) that the first breach is by SCC crack penetration (see the discussion of the results in Figures 3-93 and 3-94 later in this Section). The median estimate (50 percent of

waste packages failed) of the first breach time of the upper bound profile is about 34,000 years. The median estimate of the first breach time of the mean profile is about 97,000 years. The time to fail 10 percent of waste packages for the two profiles is about 23,000 and 49,500 years, respectively.

Figure 3-92 shows the first breach profiles of drip shields with time. Because the drip shields are not subject to SCC and localized corrosion, the first breach profiles shown in the figure are all by general corrosion only. Both the upper and under sides of drip shield are exposed to the exposure conditions in the emplacement drift and are subject to corrosion. In addition, the both sides experience the same exposure conditions regardless of whether the drip shields are dripped on or not. Thus, in the analysis, the general corrosion rate for the drip shields is sampled twice independently, once for the patches on the upper side and the other for the patches on the under side. This results in reduced variability in the degradation profiles and thus fast failure rate (i.e., many drip shields failing over a short time period). This is shown in the upper bound profile, in which the drip shield failure starts at about 20,000 years and 50 percent of the drip shields fail within a couple of thousand years after the initial failure. Similar trends are also seen with the 95th, 75th and median profiles. In terms of the number of patch penetration openings per failed drip shield with time (not shown here; see CRWMS M&O 2000g, Section 6.5.1), the upper bound profile shows that as the drip shields fail, a large number of patches are perforated over a relatively short time period (a few thousand years). A similar trend is seen for the 95th percentile profile. However, a lot more spread of the failure profile is shown for the other profiles. There is no correlation for the uncertainty and variability split of general corrosion rate between the drip shield and waste package outer barrier.




Figure 3-91. The Upper and Lower Bounds, Mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th Percentile Confidence Intervals of the First Breach Profile of Waste Packages with Time for the Nominal Case




Figure 3-92. The Upper and Lower Bounds, Median, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th Percentile Confidence Intervals of the First Breach Profile of Drip Shield with Time for the Nominal Case




Figure 3-93. The Upper and Lower Bounds, Median, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th Percentile Confidence Intervals of the First Crack Breach Profile of Waste Packages with Time for the Nominal Case




Figure 3-94. The Upper and Lower Bounds, Median, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th Percentile Confidence Intervals of the First Patch Breach Profile of Waste Packages with Time for the Nominal Case

Figures 3-93 and 3-94 show, respectively, the first crack penetration and patch penetration profiles of the waste packages with time. The first crack breach times of the upper bound and 95th percentile profiles are about 11,000 and 20,000 years respectively (Figure 3-93), and the first patch breach times of the upper and 95th percentile profiles are about 36,500 and 41,000 years, respectively (Figure 3-94). Comparison of the first crack and patch breach profiles with the first breach profiles in Figure 3-91 indicates that the initial breach (or failure) of the waste packages is by SCC crack penetration in the Alloy 22 waste package outer barrier closure lid welds. For the 75th percentile profiles in the figures, the first crack and patch penetration times are about 30,000 and 50,000 years, respectively.

3.2.7.2 Sensitivities Using the Nominal Case

Four sensitivities were conducted using the nominal case WAPDEG Model. The first two of these utilize the optimum (± 5 percent) and realistic (± 10 percent) bounds for the yield strength scaling factor, stress and stress intensify factor unit (Section 3.2.5.1). All other parameters used are the same as those for the Nominal Case. The drip shield failure and waste package patch breach profiles are similar to those discussed in the Nominal Case since only SCC modeling parameters (which are applied only to the waste package outer barrier) are being changed in these sensitivities. Therefore, only the waste package first breach and first crack time profiles are discussed.

In Figure 3-95 the upper and lower bounds, mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th percentile confidence intervals of the first breach profile for the waste packages with time using the

optimum-case yield strength scaling factor (± 5 percent) are presented. The upper bound profile, which is the upper extreme of the probable range of the first breach time, indicates that the earliest possible first breach time for a waste package is about 20,000 years (10,000 years later than in the nominal case). It can be shown by comparing with the upper bound profile in Figure 3-96 (showing the first crack breach profiles of waste packages with time) that the first breach is by SCC crack penetration. The median estimate (50 percent of waste packages failed) of the first breach time of the upper bound profile is about 51,000 years (17,000 years later than in the nominal case). The median estimate of the first breach time of the mean profile is about 91,000 years (6,000 years earlier than in the nominal case). The time to fail 10 percent of waste packages for the two profiles is about 36,000 and 56,000 years, respectively.

Figure 3-96 shows the first crack penetration profiles of the waste packages with time. The first crack breach times of the upper bound and 95th percentile profiles are about 19,500 and 22,000 years, respectively. These times are about 9,500 and 2,000 years later, respectively, than the nominal (conservative) case. For the 75th percentile profiles in the figure, the first crack penetration time is about 71,500 years (about 41,500 years later than in the nominal case).

In Figure 3-97 the upper and lower bounds, mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th percentile confidence intervals of the first breach profile for the waste packages with time using the realistic-case yield strength scaling factor are presented. The upper bound profile, which is the upper extreme of the probable range of the first breach time, indicates that the earliest possible first breach time for a waste package is about 20,000 years (10,000 years later than in the nominal case). It can be shown by comparing with the upper bound profile in Figure 3-98 (showing the first crack breach profiles of waste packages with time) that the first breach is by SCC crack penetration. The median estimate (50 percent of waste packages failed) of the first breach time of the upper bound profile is about 50,500 years (16,500 years later than in the nominal case). The median estimate of the first breach time of the mean profile is about 93,700 years (4,300 years earlier than in the nominal case). The time to fail 10 percent of waste packages for the two profiles is about 35,000 and 55,500 years, respectively.

Figure 3-98 shows the first crack penetration profiles of the waste packages with time. The first crack breach times of the upper bound and 95th percentile profiles are about 19,500 and 20,500 years, respectively. These times are about 9,500 and 500 years later, respectively, than the nominal case. For the 75th percentile profile in the figure, the first crack penetration time is about 30,000 years (about the same time as in the nominal case).

One interesting observation to note is that the waste package failure profiles for the two cases, the optimal and realistic cases, are similar. This is due to the fact that the profiles of stress and stress intensify factor, the two major parameters controlling SCC crack initiation, are similar,

The third sensitivity study conducted using the nominal case WAPDEG Model involved changing the threshold stress from a uniform distribution between 20 and 30 percent of the yield strength used in the nominal case to a wider range between 10 and 40 percent of the yield strength. All other parameters used are the same as those for the Nominal Case. The drip shield failure and waste package patch breach profiles are similar to those discussed in the nominal case since only SCC crack modeling parameters are being changed in these sensitivities. Therefore, only the waste package first breach and first crack time profiles are discussed.




Figure 3-95. The Upper and Lower Bounds, Mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th Percentile Confidence Intervals of the First Breach Profile of Waste Packages with Time using Optimum Case (± 5 percent) Yield Strength Scaling Factor for Stress and Stress Intensify Factor Uncertainties




Figure 3-96. The Upper and Lower Bounds, Mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th Percentile Confidence Intervals of the First Crack Breach Profile of Waste Packages with Time using Optimum Case (± 5 percent) Yield Strength Scaling Factor for Stress and Stress Intensify Factor Uncertainties




Figure 3-97. The Upper and Lower Bounds, Mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th Percentile Confidence Intervals of the First Breach Profile of Waste Packages with Time using Realistic Case (± 10 percent) Yield Strength Scaling Factor for Stress and Stress Intensify Factor Uncertainties




Figure 3-98. The Upper and Lower Bounds, Mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th Percentile Confidence Intervals of the First Crack Breach Profile of Waste Packages with Time using Realistic Case (± 10 percent) Yield Strength Scaling Factor for Stress and Stress Intensify Factor Uncertainties

In Figure 3-99 the upper and lower bounds, mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th percentile confidence intervals of the first breach profile for the waste packages with time using the modified threshold stress distribution are presented. The upper bound profile, which is the upper extreme of the probable range of the first breach time, indicates that the earliest possible first breach time for a waste package is about 15,000 years (5,000 years later than in the nominal case). It can be shown by comparing with the upper bound profile in Figure 3-100 (showing the first crack breach profiles of waste packages with time) that the first breach is by SCC crack penetration. The median estimate (50 percent of waste packages failed) of the first breach time of the upper bound profile is about 34,000 years (about the same time as in the nominal case). The median estimate of the first breach time of the mean profile is about 97,000 years (about the same time as in the nominal case). The time to fail 10 percent of waste packages for the two profiles is about 23,000 and 36,000 years, respectively.

Figure 3-100 shows the first crack penetration profiles of the waste packages with time. The first crack breach times of the upper bound and 95th percentile profiles are about 15,000 and 20,000 years, respectively. The upper bound first crack breach time is about 5,000 years later than the nominal case. The 95th percentile first crack breach time is about the same as the nominal case. For the 75th percentile profile in the figure, the first crack penetration time is about 30,000 years (about the same time as in the nominal case).




Figure 3-99. The Upper and Lower Bounds, Mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th Percentile Confidence Intervals of the First Breach Profile of Waste Packages with Time using Nominal Case (± 30 percent) Yield Strength Scaling Factor and Modified Threshold Stress Distribution




Figure 3-100. The Upper and Lower Bounds, Mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th Percentile Confidence Intervals of the First Crack Breach Profile of Waste Packages with Time using Nominal Case (± 30 percent) Yield Strength Scaling Factor and Modified Threshold Stress Distribution

The fourth sensitivity study conducted using the Nominal Case involved changing the fraction of defects considered from a uniform distribution between 0.3481 and 0.3632, used in the nominal case, to a uniform distribution between 0.003481 and 0.003632, i.e., only 1 percent of the defects are considered capable of propagation in the radial direction in the presence of hoop stresses. This less conservative choice of parameters is consistent with analyses of defect orientations presented in the process model analysis (CRWMS M&O 2000f, Section 6.5; CRWMS M&O 2000m, Section 6.2.1). All other parameters used are the same as those for the Nominal Case. The drip shield failure and waste package patch breach profiles are similar to those discussed in the nominal case since only SCC crack modeling parameters are being changed in these sensitivities. Therefore, only the waste package first breach and first crack time profiles are discussed.

In Figure 3-101 the upper and lower bounds, mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th percentile confidence intervals of the first breach profile for the waste packages with time using the reduced number of defects for radial crack growth in SCC are presented. The upper bound profile, which is the upper extreme of the probable range of the first breach time, indicates that the earliest possible first breach time for a waste package is about 20,000 years (about 10,000 years later than the nominal case). It can be shown by comparing with the upper bound profile in Figure 3-102 (showing the first crack breach profiles of waste packages with time) that the first breach is by SCC crack penetration. The median estimate (50 percent of waste packages failed) of the first breach time of the upper bound profile is about 55,000 years (about 25,000 years later than the nominal case). The median estimate of the first breach time of the

mean profile is about 115,000 years (about 18,000 years later than in the nominal case). The time to fail 10 percent of waste packages for the two profiles is about 40,000 and 66,000 years, respectively.




Figure 3-101. The Upper and Lower Bounds, Mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th Percentile Confidence Intervals of the First Breach Profile of Waste Packages with Time Considering only 1 Percent of the Defects Capable of Propagation in Radial Direction by SCC

Figure 3-102 shows the first crack penetration profiles of the waste packages with time. The first crack breach times of the upper bound and 95th percentile profiles are about 20,000 and 29,000 years, respectively. The upper bound first crack breach time is about 10,000 years later than the nominal case. The 95th percentile first crack breach time is about 19,000 years later than in the nominal case. For the 75th percentile profile in the figure, the first crack penetration time is about 45,000 years (about 15,000 years later than in the nominal case).

3.2.7.3 Updated Nominal Case Analysis Results

The WAPDEG Model currently implemented within the TSPA (referred to as the Nominal Case) does not use all of the latest input parameters that have been identified in previous sections. As discussed in Section 3.2.7.1, the primary differences between the Current Nominal Case and the Updated Nominal Case are in the SCC and manufacturing defect implementations.

Figure 3-103 shows the upper and lower bounds, mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th percentile confidence intervals of the first breach profile for the waste packages with time. The upper bound profile, which is the upper extreme of the probable range of the first breach time, indicates that the earliest possible first breach time for a waste package is about 15,000 years. Note that the estimated earliest possible first breach time has a very low probability. It can be shown by comparing with the upper bound profile in Figure 3-105 (showing the first crack breach profiles of waste packages with time) that the first breach is by SCC crack penetration (see the discussion

of the results in Figures 3-105 and 3-106 later in this section). The median estimate (50 percent of waste packages failed) of the first breach time of the upper bound profile is about 34,000 years. The median estimate of the first breach time of the mean profile is about 100,000 years. The time to fail 10 percent of waste packages for the two profiles is about 23,000 and 49,500 years, respectively.




Figure 3-102. The Upper and Lower Bounds, Mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th Percentile Confidence Intervals of the First Crack Breach Profile of Waste Packages with Time Considering only 1 Percent of the Defects Capable of Propagation in Radial Direction by SCC

Figure 3-104 shows the first breach profiles of drip shields with time. Because the drip shields are not subject to SCC and localized corrosion, the first breach profiles shown in the figure are all by general corrosion only. The upper and under sides of the drip shield experience the same exposure conditions regardless of whether the drip shields are dripped on or not. Thus, as in the nominal case, the general corrosion rate for the drip shields is sampled twice independently, once for the patches on the upper side and the once for the patches on the under side. This results in reduced variability in the degradation profiles and thus a fast failure rate (i.e., many drip shields failing over a short time period). This is shown in the upper bound profile, in which the drip shield first breach starts at about 20,000 years and 50 percent of the drip shields fail within a couple of thousand years after the initial failure. Similar trends are also seen with the 95th, 75th and median profiles.




Figure 3-103. The Upper and Lower Bounds, Mean, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th Percentile Confidence Intervals of the First Breach Profile of Waste Packages with Time for the Updated Nominal Case WAPDEG Model




Figure 3-104. The Upper and Lower Bounds, Median, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th Percentile Confidence Intervals of the First Breach Profile of Drip Shield with Time for the Updated Nominal Case WAPDEG Model




Figure 3-105. The Upper and Lower Bounds, Median, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th Percentile Confidence Intervals of the First Crack Breach Profile of Waste Packages with Time for the Updated Nominal Case WAPDEG Model




Figure 3-106. The Upper and Lower Bounds, Median, and 95th, 75th, 25th and 5th Percentile Confidence Intervals of the First Patch Breach Profile of Waste Packages with Time for the Updated Nominal Case WAPDEG Model

Figures 3-105 and 3-106 show, respectively, the first crack penetration and patch penetration profiles of the waste packages with time. The first crack breach times of the upper bound and 95th percentile profiles are about 15,000 and 20,000 years respectively (Figure 3-105), and the first patch breach times of the upper and 95th percentile profiles are about 33,000 and 43,000 years, respectively (Figure 3-106). Comparison of the first crack and patch breach profiles with the first breach profiles in Figure 3-103 indicates that the initial breach (or failure) of the waste packages is by SCC crack penetration in the Alloy 22 waste package outer barrier closure lid welds. For the 75th percentile profiles in the figures, the first crack and patch penetration times are about 32,500 and 58,000 years, respectively.

3.2.7.4 Analysis Summary

The waste package and drip shield degradation analyses for the Nominal and Updated Nominal Cases have shown that, based on the current corrosion model abstractions and assumptions, both the drip shields and waste packages do not fail within the regulatory time period (10,000 years). From the perspective of initial waste package failure time, the analysis results are encouraging because the upper bounds of these two nominal cases are likely to represent the worst case combination of key corrosion model parameters that could significantly affect long-term performance of waste packages in the potential repository. As discussed previously, the upper bound curves have an extremely low probability.

The candidate materials for the drip shield (Titanium Grade 7) and the waste package outer barrier (Alloy 22) are highly corrosion resistant. Under the expected repository exposure conditions, these materials are not expected to be subject to the degradation processes that, if initiated, could lead to failure in a short time period. Those degradation modes are localized corrosion (pitting and crevice corrosion), SCC, and HIC (applicable to drip shield only). Both the drip shield and waste package degrade by general corrosion at very low passive dissolution rates. The current experimental data and detailed process-level analyses, upon which the model abstractions that have been incorporated in the WAPDEG analysis are based, have also indicated that, except the closure-lid welds of waste package, the candidate materials would not be subject to those rapidly penetrating corrosion modes under the expected repository conditions. Complete stress mitigation may not be possible for the closure-lid welds. Because of the potential residual stresses, the closure-lid welds may be subject to SCC. Once a SCC crack initiates, it penetrates the closure-lid thickness in a very short time (see Section 3.2.4.5). Thus stress mitigation in the closure-lid welds is a key design element to avoid early failures of waste packages by SCC.

The estimated long life-time of the waste packages in the current analysis is attributed mostly to the following two factors: (1) the stress mitigation to substantial depths in the dual closure-lid weld regions, which delays the onset of SCC crack propagation until the compressive zone layer is removed by general corrosion processes; and (2) the very low general-corrosion rate applied to the closure-lid welds to corrode the compressive stress zones, which results in a long delay time before initiating SCC crack propagation. Substantial uncertainties are associated with the current SCC current analyses, especially stress mitigation on the closure-lid welds. The uncertainty range in hoop stress and associated stress intensity factor used in the current SCC analyses will be re-evaluated to further quantify and reduce uncertainties as additional data and analyses are developed. In addition, inclusion of the embedded manufacturing defects in SCC analysis of the

waste package outer barrier closure-lid welds is highly conservative because most embedded defects would not be oriented such that they would lead to the formation of radial cracks. Another major uncertainty in the current analysis is the general corrosion rate applied to the closure-lid welds. The general corrosion model will be refined as additional data and analyses are developed.

4. RELATIONSHIP TO NRC ISSUE RESOLUTION STATUS REPORTS

4.1 SUMMARY OF THE KEY TECHNICAL ISSUES

As part of the review of site characterization activities, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has undertaken an ongoing review of information on Yucca Mountain site characterization activities to allow early identification and resolution of potential licensing issues. The principal means of achieving this goal is through informal, pre-licensing consultation with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). This approach attempts to reduce the number of, and to better define, issues that may be in dispute during the NRC licensing review, by obtaining input and striving for consensus from the technical community, interested parties, and other groups on such issues.

The NRC has focused pre-licensing issue resolution on those topics most critical to the postclosure performance of the potential geologic repository. These topics are called Key Technical Issues (KTIs). Each KTI is subdivided into a number of subissues. The KTIs are:

- Activities Related to Development of the EPA Standard
- Container Lifetime and Source Term
- Evolution of the Near-field Environment
- Igneous Activity
- Radionuclide Transport
- Repository Design and Thermal-Mechanical Effects
- Structural Deformation and Seismicity
- Thermal Effects on Flow
- Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA) and Integration
- Unsaturated Zone and Saturated Zone Flow Under Isothermal Conditions.

Identifying KTIs, integrating their activities into a risk informed approach, and evaluating their significance for postclosure performance helps ensure that NRC's attention is focused on technical uncertainties that will have the greatest affect on the assessment of repository safety.

Early feedback among all parties is essential to define what is known, what is not known and where additional information is likely to make a significant difference in the understanding of future repository safety. The Issue Resolution Status Reports (IRSRs) are the primary mechanism that the NRC staff uses to provide feedback to the DOE on the status of the KTI subissues. IRSRs focus on NRC acceptance criteria for issue resolution and the status of issue resolution, including areas of agreement or when the staff has comment or questions. Open meetings and technical exchanges between NRC and DOE provide additional opportunities to discuss issue resolution, identify areas of agreement and disagreement and plans to resolve any disagreements.

Each KTI is subdivided into a number of subissues. For most subissues, the NRC staff has identified technical acceptance criteria that the NRC may use to evaluate the adequacy of information related to the KTIs. The NRC has also identified two cross cutting programmatic criteria that apply to all IRSRs related to the implementation of the quality assurance (QA) Program and the use of expert elicitation.

Chapter 4 documents DOE's approach to addressing the acceptance criteria and work performed that is related to the criteria. The following sections provide a summary level discussion of the related KTIs by subissues and specific NRC acceptance criteria.

4.2 RELATION OF THE WASTE PACKAGE PMR TO THE KEY TECHNICAL ISSUES

The waste package Process Model Report (PMR) provides technical information and analyses that relate to three of the KTIs and their associated IRSRs. These include the *Issue Resolution Status Report Key Technical Issue: Container Life and Source Term* (NRC 1999a), the *Issue Resolution Status Report Key Technical Issue: Total System Performance Assessment and Integration* (NRC 2000), and the *Issue Resolution Status Report Key Technical Issue: Repository Design and Thermal-Mechanical Effects* (NRC 1999b). Several subissues of these KTIs that relate directly to the waste package PMR are discussed in the following sections. Table 4-1 summarizes these KTIs and their subissues that relate directly to this PMR, the related acceptance criteria and PMR approach. In addressing each acceptance criteria, it is assumed that the criteria apply to the drip shield performance as well.

4.2.1 Container Life and Source Term

The primary issue of the KTI on *Issue Resolution Status Report Key Technical Issue: Container Life and Source Term* (NRC 1999a) is adequacy of the engineered barrier system (EBS) design to provide reasonable assurance that containers will be adequately long-lived, and radionuclide releases from the EBS will be sufficiently controlled, and that the container design and packaging of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste glass will make a significant contribution to the overall repository performance. The site-specific proposed 10 CFR 63 (64 FR 8640) regulation, currently in the public commenting period, is a performance-based regulation. The current container life and source term (CLST) IRSR is mainly focused on the containers and waste forms as the primary engineered barriers, but it also considers other engineered sub-system enhancements (i.e., drip shield) incorporated in the EBS design. For the purpose of this IRSR, the NRC defines the physical boundary of the EBS by the walls of the waste package emplacement drifts. The CLST IRSR identifies six subissues and associated general and specific acceptance criteria deemed important to the resolution of this KTI:

1. The effects of corrosion processes on the lifetime of the containers
2. The effects of phase instability of materials and initial defects on the mechanical failure and lifetime of the containers
3. The rate at which radionuclides in spent nuclear fuel are released from the EBS through the oxidation and dissolution of spent fuel
4. The rate at which radionuclides in high-level radioactive waste glass are leached and released from the EBS
5. The effect of in-package criticality on waste package and EBS performance

6. The effects of alternate EBS design features on container lifetime and radionuclide release from the EBS.

The IRSR provides acceptance criteria for resolution of each of these subissues from the standpoint of performance of the container materials. Subissues 1, 2, and 5, 6 are related to the waste package PMR. The following paragraphs address each of the subissues. Also, specific acceptance criteria related to each of these subissues are discussed in Table 4-1, along with the approach to addressing the criteria and sections of the PMR that describe these approaches. In addressing each acceptance criterion, it is assumed that the criterion applies to drip shield performance as well.

It is to be noted that Table 4-1 addresses each of the acceptance criteria identified in the latest revision of the *Issue Resolution Status Report Key Technical Issue: Container Life and Source Term* (NRC 1999a). However, since the publication of this report, NRC and DOE staff have had a number of meetings to discuss both DOE activities and NRC expectations in this area. These discussions culminated in a Technical Exchange Meeting held in September 2000. At this meeting DOE activities related to each of the acceptance criteria for subissues 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 were discussed in detail. As a result of this meeting a number of path forward items that DOE will pursue to meet NRC expectations were identified. These action items are currently underway and are consistent with those addressed in Table 4-1. The path forward items are expected to provide additional data which will reduce the uncertainties and improve confidence in the process model predictions of container materials behavior.

NRC is expected to issue the next revision of the CLST IRSR incorporating the results of the Technical Exchange Meeting. This revision is expected to be available early in 2001.

Table 4-1. Issue Resolution Status Reports, Subissues, Technical Acceptance Criteria, and PMR Approach

NRC Technical Acceptance Criteria		PMR Approach
IRSR: Container Life and Source Term		
SUBISSUE 1 – The Effect of Corrosion Processes on the Lifetime of the Containers		
1.	DOE has identified and considered likely modes of corrosion for container materials, including dry-air oxidation, humid-air corrosion, and aqueous corrosion processes, such as general corrosion, localized corrosion, microbiologically influenced corrosion, stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC), as well as the effect of galvanic coupling.	All likely modes of corrosion have been considered and modeled in this PMR (See Section 1.5). The constituent models of this PMR include process models for dry-air oxidation, humid-air corrosion, SCC, hydrogen-induced cracking, and aqueous corrosion processes, such as general corrosion, localized corrosion, and microbial influenced corrosion. Galvanic coupling effects have been minimized.
2.	DOE has identified the broad range of environmental conditions within the waste package emplacement drifts that may promote the corrosion processes listed previously, taking into account the possibility of irregular wet and dry cycles that may enhance the rate of container degradation.	The corrosion models in this PMR include environmental thresholds that can be used to switch between dominant modes of corrosion. For example, as the waste package temperature drops and the relative humidity (RH) increases, the mode of attack changes from dry-air oxidation to humid-air or aqueous-phase corrosion. A comparison of the corrosion and threshold potentials is used to determine whether or not localized corrosion will occur. WAPDEG uses bounding conditions that envelop wet and dry cycles (see Section 3.2.3) depending upon the condition at a given time step.
3.	DOE has demonstrated that the numerical corrosion models used are adequate representations, taking into consideration associated uncertainties, of the expected long-term behaviors and are not likely to underestimate the actual degradation of the containers as a result of corrosion in the repository environment.	Uncertainties are accounted for in corrosion rates. For 2 year data the general corrosion rate Alloy 22 at the 50th percentile is approximately 10 nm y ⁻¹ , the rate at the 90th percentile is approximately 25 nm y ⁻¹ , and the maximum rate is 731 nm y ⁻¹ . About 10 percent of the values fall between 100 and 773 nm y ⁻¹ (Section 3.1.5.4.2). The effects of thermal aging over extended periods of time (10,000 years) is being accounted for in the overall corrosion model for the waste package outer barrier (Section 3.1.4).
4.	DOE has considered the compatibility of container materials, the range of material conditions, and the variability in container fabrication processes, including welding, in assessing the performance expected in the containers intended waste isolation.	The effects of welding and thermal aging on the corrosion resistance of the waste package materials have been accounted for. A fully aged sample of Alloy 22 exhibits a less noble corrosion potential, shifted in the cathodic direction by approximately 63 mV in the case of simulated acidic concentrated water at 90°C, 109 mV in the case of simulated concentrated water at 90°C, and by more than 100 mV in the case of basic saturated water at 100°C. It is assumed that E _{corr} is corrected to account for fully aged material by subtracting approximately 100 mV from values calculated for the base metal. The shift in E _{critical} (threshold potential 1) is approximately 100 mV in most cases. Thus, the difference E _{critical} - E _{corr} is virtually unchanged. The effect of thermal aging on the corrosion rate is accounted for in an enhancement factor, G _{aged} , and is based upon a ratio of the non-equilibrium current densities for base metal and aged material. The value of G _{aged} for base metal is approximately one (G _{aged} ~ 1), whereas the value of G _{aged} for fully aged material is larger (G _{aged} ~ 2.5). Material with less precipitation than the fully aged material would have an intermediate value of G _{aged} (1 ≤ G _{aged} ≤ 2.5) (Section 3.1.4).

Table 4-1. Issue Resolution Status Reports, Subissues, Technical Acceptance Criteria, and PMR Approach (Continued)

NRC Technical Acceptance Criteria	PMR Approach
IRSR: Container Life and Source Term	
SUBISSUE 1 – The Effect of Corrosion Processes on the Lifetime of the Containers	
<p>5. DOE has justified the use of data collected in corrosion tests not specifically designed or performed for the Yucca Mountain repository program for the environmental conditions expected to prevail at the Yucca Mountain site.</p>	<p>The waste package degradation process models are based on bounding environmental conditions (temperature, humidity, chemistry, etc.) expected in the proposed repository (See Section 3.1.3). The threshold RH used to determine whether vapor phase attack is by dry oxidation or humid air corrosion is based upon the deliquescence point of salt deposits that could form on the waste package surface due to aerosol transport. Measurements of general corrosion rates in the vapor and aqueous phases, electrochemical potentials, and other relevant performance data were in test media that can be directly related to water chemistry expected on the waste package surface during the service life of Alloy 22. These water chemistries are based upon evaporative concentrations of the standard J-13 well water chemistry. Crevice chemistry is being measured in situ, with and without the presence of buffer ions. In the aqueous phase, a range of temperature extending from room temperature to 120°C is being investigated. The high-temperature limit is based upon the boiling point of a near-saturation water chemistry without buffer. The expected boiling point of the aqueous phase on the waste package surface is expected to be lower. In addition to the data generated from long-term and short-term corrosion tests, the process model development also includes data generated outside the Yucca Mountain Project. These data in general include testing in environments not directly applicable to the Yucca Mountain Project and therefore are used as corroborative information.</p>

Table 4-1. Issue Resolution Status Reports, Subissues, Technical Acceptance Criteria, and PMR Approach (Continued)

NRC Technical Acceptance Criteria	PMR Approach
<p>6. DOE has conducted a consistent, sufficient, and suitable corrosion testing program at the time of the license application submittal. In addition, DOE has identified specific plans for further testing to reduce any significant area(s) of uncertainty as part of the performance confirmation program.</p>	<p>The DOE has established a corrosion test program that addresses all anticipated modes of corrosive attack of the waste package. There is a clear linkage between the experimental data being collected and modules in the predictive waste package degradation code (WAPDEG) that serves as the heart of the TSPA. Data and modules have been developed for each key element of the Enhanced Design Alternative (EDA) II design: the waste package outer barrier (Alloy 22); the inner structural support (stainless steel 316NG); and the protective drip shield (Titanium Grade 7). Companion Analysis Model Reports (AMRs) provide data and modules for the stainless steel 316NG and the Titanium Grade 7 alloy (PMR Section 3.1.4 through 3.1.8). Studies include exposure of over 18,000 samples of candidate waste package material in the Long Term Corrosion Test Facility (LTCTF). A large number of pre- and post-exposure measurements of dimension and weight allow establishment of distribution functions for representation of the general corrosion rate. Microscopic examination of samples from the LTCTF and other corrosion tests is done with Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM), Atomic Force Microscopy (AFM), X-Ray Diffraction (XRD), X-Ray Photoelectron Spectroscopy, Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry (SIMS), and other state-of-the-art surface analytical techniques. Potentiodynamic and potentiostatic electrochemical tests are conducted with base metal, thermally aged material and simulated welds. Thermally aged material is fully characterized with the transmission electron microscope (TEM) as discussed by Summers and Turchi (CRWMS M&O 2000b). The present test results provide sufficient confidence for the current design. In addition, the Project will continue testing of materials both in the laboratory and in the field. This part of the testing program is covered in the <i>Performance Confirmation Plan</i> (CRWMS M&O 2000q).</p> <p>This acceptance criterion pertains directly to the principal factors of the postclosure safety case associated with the degradation and performance of the waste package and drip shield. These principal factors are also associated with one of the performance confirmation factors and will be addressed through testing and analysis identified in the <i>Performance Confirmation Plan</i> (CRWMS 2000q). The information obtained in the performance confirmation program is to confirm the corrosion rates and will serve to reduce residual uncertainties regarding long-term corrosion behavior including those arising from corrosion mechanisms not detected in the baseline testing program. See Section 5.3.1.8 and Appendix G of the <i>Performance Confirmation Plan</i> (CRWMS M&O 2000q).</p>

Table 4-1. Issue Resolution Status Reports, Subissues, Technical Acceptance Criteria, and PMR Approach (Continued)

NRC Technical Acceptance Criteria	PMR Approach
<p>7. DOE has established a defensible program of corrosion monitoring and testing of the engineered sub-system components during the performance confirmation period to assure they are functioning as intended and anticipated.</p>	<p>This acceptance criterion pertains directly to the principal factors of the postclosure safety case associated with the degradation and performance of the waste package and drip shield. These principal factors are also associated with one of the performance confirmation factors and will be addressed through testing and analysis identified in the <i>Performance Confirmation Plan</i> (CRWMS M&O 2000q). The baseline for performance confirmation to address this factor will be information available from site characterization and pre-emplacement testing. Because the drip shield will not be installed until permanent closure, performance confirmation testing will be confined to laboratory testing to confirm corrosion rates fall within the limits considered in the licensing review (see Section 5.3.1.8 and Appendix G of the <i>Performance Confirmation Plan</i> [CRWMS M&O 2000q]) and prototype testing (see Sections 5.3.2, 5.3.5.4, and Appendix G of the <i>Performance Confirmation Plan</i> (CRWMS M&O 2000q). This information will be considered in evaluating whether the drip shields would operate as anticipated and intended (i.e., by comparing with design criteria). Other engineered subsystem components determined not to be important to post-closure safety case will not be addressed in the performance confirmation program. In the current version of the plan, testing to monitor and confirm expectations regarding the effects of other introduced materials to the EBS environment is included in the program. See Section 5.3.1.7 and Appendix G.</p>
<p>SUBISSUE 2 – The Effects of Phase Instability of Materials and Initial Defects on the Mechanical Failure and Lifetime of the Containers</p>	
<p>1. DOE has identified and considered the relevant mechanical failure processes that may affect the performance of the proposed container materials.</p>	<p>As described in this report, all likely degradation modes, including HIC and SCC as two possible mechanical failure modes have been considered. Both modes have been included in WAPDEG, and are described in the report (Sections 3.1.7 and 3.1.8, respectively).</p>
<p>2. DOE has identified and considered the effect of material stability on mechanical failure processes for the various container materials as a result of prolonged exposure to the expected range of temperatures and stresses, including the effects of chemical composition, microstructure, thermal treatments, and fabrication processes.</p>	<p>This PMR presents data showing that Alloy 22 has adequate phase stability to serve as a waste package material, provided that the temperature is not allowed to exceed 260°C. Expected range of temperature and stresses, chemical composition, microstructure, thermal treatments, and fabrication processes are all related to the material stability and have been considered in modeling in Section 3.1.4 of the PMR.</p>
<p>3. DOE has demonstrated that the numerical models used for container materials stability and mechanical failures are effective representations, taking into consideration associated uncertainties, of the expected materials behavior and are not likely to underestimate the actual rate of failure in the repository environment.</p>	<p>Uncertainties, assumptions, and limitations of the specific models are addressed in the related AMRs. As indicated in Section 3.2.1, the WAPDEG analysis also takes into account quantifiable uncertainties and variability of the degradation model for the possible ranges of corrosion parameters and exposure conditions. The WAPDEG model includes modules for dry oxidation or dry air oxidation, humid air corrosion, aqueous phase corrosion, SCC and HIC. Also, both general corrosion and localized corrosion are considered. The possibility of using either localized thermal annealing or laser peening is considered as a means of mitigating SCC in the waste package closure weld.</p>

Table 4-1. Issue Resolution Status Reports, Subissues, Technical Acceptance Criteria, and PMR Approach (Continued)

NRC Technical Acceptance Criteria	PMR Approach
4. DOE has considered the compatibility of container materials and the variability in container manufacturing processes, including welding, in its waste package failure analyses and in the evaluation of radionuclide release.	The design now used prevents galvanic coupling of Titanium Grade 7 with carbon steel, thereby preventing any hydrogen charging of the drip shield due to the cathodic reduction of hydrogen ions on the titanium surface. Variabilities in processes used for weld stress mitigation are accounted for in the SCC models for both laser peening and induction annealing techniques (See Section 3.1.7).
5. DOE has identified the most appropriate methods for nondestructive examination (NDE) of fabricated containers to detect and evaluate fabrication defects in general and, particularly, in seam and closure welds.	An NDE protocol is under development and will be used for drip shield and waste package inspection. Such inspection will limit the size of manufacturing defects as a means of helping prevent SCC and HIC. Materials used in waste package construction will be tested electrochemically, to assure that those materials being used are not unexpectedly susceptible to localized corrosion.
6. DOE has justified the use of material test results not specifically designed or performed for the Yucca Mountain repository program for environmental conditions (i.e., temperature, stress, and time) expected to prevail at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository.	Various AMRs supporting this report, such as the AMR on degradation of stainless steel (CRWMS M&O 2000e), provide discussion for the use of material test results from published data not specifically designed or performed for the Yucca Mountain repository program for environmental conditions expected to prevail at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository.
7. DOE has conducted a consistent, sufficient, and suitable material testing program at the time of the license application submittal. In addition, DOE has identified specific plans for further testing to reduce any significant area(s) of uncertainty as part of the performance confirmation program.	This acceptance criterion pertains directly to the principal factors of the postclosure safety case associated with the degradation and performance of the waste package and drip shield. These principal factors are also associated with performance confirmation factors and will be addressed through testing and analysis identified in the <i>Performance Confirmation Plan</i> (CRWMS M&O 2000q). The baseline for performance confirmation to address them will be information available from site characterization and pre-emplacement testing. This information will include the basis for estimates of the effects of thermal and stress perturbations. The information obtained in the performance confirmation program is to confirm these estimates and will serve to ascertain whether these elements are functioning as intended and anticipated, i.e., meet the design criteria established for them. See Section 5.3.1.8 and Appendix G of the <i>Performance Confirmation Plan</i> (CRWMS M&O 2000q).
8. DOE has established a defensible program of monitoring and mechanical testing of the engineered sub-systems components, during the performance confirmation period, to assure they are functioning as intended and anticipated, in the presence of thermal and stress perturbations.	This acceptance criterion pertains directly to the principal factors of the postclosure safety case associated with the degradation and performance of the waste package and drip shield. These principal factors are also associated with performance confirmation factors and will be addressed through testing and analysis identified in the <i>Performance Confirmation Plan</i> (CRWMS M&O 2000q). The baseline for performance confirmation to address them will be information available from site characterization and pre-emplacement testing. This information will include the basis for estimates of the effects of thermal and stress perturbations. The information obtained in the performance confirmation program is to confirm these estimates and will serve to ascertain whether these elements are functioning as intended and anticipated, i.e., meet the design criteria established for them. See Section 5.3.1.8 and Appendix G of the <i>Performance Confirmation Plan</i> (CRWMS M&O 2000q).

Table 4-1. Issue Resolution Status Reports, Subissues, Technical Acceptance Criteria, and PMR Approach (Continued)

NRC Technical Acceptance Criteria	PMR Approach
SUBISSUE 5 – The Effect of In-package Criticality on Waste Package and EBS Performance	
Subissue 5 addresses the effects of in-package criticality on waste package and EBS performance. In-package criticality is not addressed in this PMR. However, the related acceptance criteria are addressed in DOE's <i>Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report</i> (YMP 1998) and its supporting references.	
SUBISSUE 6 – The Effects of Alternate EBS Design Features on Container Lifetime and Radionuclide Release from the EBS	
1. DOE has identified and considered the effects of backfill, and the timing of its emplacement, on the thermal loading of the repository, waste package lifetime (including container corrosion and mechanical failure), and the release of radionuclides from the EBS.	Backfill is no longer part of the design and, therefore, the effects of backfill are not considered here.
2. DOE has identified and considered the effects of ceramic coating on waste package lifetime, including negative consequences as a result of breakdown of the ceramic coating (cracking, spalling, or delamination) in response to the action of environment, manufacturing defects, mechanical impacts and stresses arising from a multiplicity of sources, and the potential for enhanced localized corrosion of the containers that might occur at cracks are perforations in the ceramic coating layers.	This criterion is no longer applicable, as the current design for the repository does not include ceramic coatings.
3. DOE has identified ceramic coating materials with outer overpack materials and the combined effect of ceramic coating with backfill on container lifetime.	See response to Criterion 2.
4. DOE has identified and considered the effects of drip shields (with backfill) on waste package lifetime, including extension of the humid-air corrosion regime, environmental effects, breakdown of drip shields and resulting mechanical impacts on waste package, the potential for crevice corrosion at the junction between the waste package and the drip shield, and the potential for condensate formation and dripping on the underside of the shield.	The effects of the drip shield have been considered and evaluated in the analysis of waste package performance. This aspect is discussed in Section 3.2.3 of this document. The analysis conservatively assumes that the environment on the surface of the waste package is not affected by the presence of the drip shield. Degradation model for the waste package takes into account potential for crevice corrosion and degradation due to mechanical failure and assumes exposure to drift environment with no protection by drip shield against water dripping. The effects of the backfill with respect to changes in water chemistry are also not assumed since the current design does not include backfill.
5. DOE has evaluated the effect of design changes in container wall thickness that may increase γ -radiolysis of the water contacting waste packages and, therefore, enhance the possible occurrence of localized corrosion processes.	Experiments have been performed with Alloy 22 to accurately mimic the effects of gamma radiolysis. It is known that gamma radiolysis of aqueous electrolytes produces hydrogen peroxide, and that that hydrogen peroxide increases the open circuit corrosion potential of stainless steels. There has been concern that such effects could push the corrosion potential close to the threshold potential for the initiation of localized corrosion. Laboratory experiments have shown that the maximum increase in corrosion potential due to hydrogen peroxide in concentrated repository ground waters is approximately 200 mV, and insufficient to exceed the threshold for initiation of localized corrosion (See Section 3.1.6).

Table 4-1. Issue Resolution Status Reports, Subissues, Technical Acceptance Criteria, and PMR Approach (Continued)

NRC Technical Acceptance Criteria	PMR Approach
6. DOE has identified the chemical composition of the water in the environment surrounding the waste package and its evolution with time.	This has been done through both evaporative concentration and thermodynamic calculation.
7. DOE has justified the use of test results for the drip shields, ceramic coatings, and backfill materials not specifically collected for the Yucca Mountain site for the environmental conditions expected to prevail at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository.	At the present time, the ceramic coating and backfill are not part of the drip shield or waste package design.
8. DOE has conducted a consistent, sufficient, and suitable corrosion testing program at the time of the license application submittal. In addition, DOE has identified specific plans for further testing to reduce any significant area(s) of uncertainty as part of the performance confirmation program.	The design concept for the EBS includes Alloy 22 material for the waste package outer barrier and Titanium Grade 7 for the drip shield. Alternative EBS materials in each case are being evaluated as part of the design developmental testing, which will provide baseline information for the performance confirmation program for the selected materials. Only selected materials will be considered for continued evaluation in performance confirmation after submittal of the license application. Additional testing on alternative EBS materials may be conducted in mock-up/simulation testing to support assessment of design enhancements; however, this testing would only be considered as part of the performance confirmation program if an alternative material(s) were incorporated into the design through a license amendment and corresponding change to the performance confirmation program. As indicated, testing of the two different materials selected for the waste package and drip shield will be conducted in the performance confirmation program (see Section 5.3.1.8 of the <i>Performance Confirmation Plan</i>) (CRWMS M&O 2000q).
IRSR: TOTAL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT AND INTEGRATION	
SUBISSUE 1 – System Description and Demonstration of Multiple Barriers	
Transparency and Traceability of the Analysis	
TSPA Documentation Style, Structure, and Organization	
Criterion T1 - Documents and reports are complete, clear, and consistent.	The waste package PMR was carefully structured to be complete, clear, and consistent. The review of the draft document included checks for completeness, clarity and consistency.
Criterion T2 - Information is amply cross referenced.	The waste package PMR contains ample references to data sources, codes, assumptions, and conclusions.
Features, Events, and Processes Identification and Screening	
Criterion T1 - The screening process by which features, events and processes (FEPs) were included or excluded from the TSPA is fully described.	Section 1.6 of this PMR summarizes excluded and included FEPs including the rationale for these decisions.
Criterion T2 - Relationships between relevant FEPs are fully described.	Section 1.6 of this PMR describes the relationship between primary and secondary FEPs. The FEPs AMR provides additional documentation including the TSPA disposition of FEPs, IRSR issues relevant to specific FEPs, and analysis and discussion on specific FEPs.

Table 4-1. Issue Resolution Status Reports, Subissues, Technical Acceptance Criteria, and PMR Approach (Continued)

NRC Technical Acceptance Criteria	PMR Approach
Abstraction Methodology	
Criterion T1 - The levels and method(s) of abstraction are described starting from assumptions defining the scope of the assessment down to assumptions concerning specific processes and the validity of given data.	For each model in the waste package PMR, descriptions are provided of process models and, if the models are abstracted, descriptions of the abstractions of the models. The description includes a summary of data and assumptions used to construct models. The AMRs describing the models and the abstracted models provide additional details regarding data and assumptions.
Criterion T2 - A mapping (e.g., a road map diagram, a traceability matrix, a cross-reference matrix) is provided to show what conceptual features (e.g., patterns of volcanic events) and processes are represented in the abstracted models, and by what algorithms.	The waste package PMR provides a sufficient basis for the decisions and assumptions that were made during the abstraction process.
Criterion T3 - An explicit discussion of uncertainty is provided to identify which issues and factors are of most concern or are key sources of disagreement among experts.	The waste package PMR (Section 3.1.9) provides a discussion of uncertainties and limitations for the major process models included in the report. The AMRs describing the abstracted models provide additional details regarding uncertainties and limitations.
Data Use and Validity	
Criterion T1 - The pedigree of data from laboratory tests, natural analogs, and the site is clearly identified.	Section 1.4 of this PMR summarizes the QA status of the data and software used in the component models.
Criterion T2 - Input parameter development and basis for their selection is described.	The waste package PMR discusses input parameter development and the basis for using the parameters. The AMRs describing the models provide additional details regarding input parameter development and the basis for input selection.
Criterion T3 - A thorough description of the method used to identify performance confirmation program parameters.	The <i>Performance Confirmation Plan</i> (CRWMS M&O 2000q) specifically addresses the methodology for identifying and selecting parameters that are important to performance based upon TSPA sensitivity analyses and the repository safety strategy. Methods used to collect information for each parameter will be described by the performance confirmation plan or relevant supporting documents to support the license application. Performance confirmation test selection and rationale is also described in the plan based upon the significance of the parameter being measured, and the ability of the test to distinguish construction, emplacement, or time dependent changes in the parameter significant to performance.
Assessment Results	
Criterion T1 - Performance Assessment results (i.e., the peak expected annual dose within the compliance period) can be traced back to applicable analyses that identify the FEPs, assumptions, input parameters, and models in the Performance Assessment.	The Total System Performance Assessment-Site Recommendation (TSPA-SR) summarizes features, processes, conceptual models, and their implementation into the TSPA. This discussion will be based in part on information provided by the waste package PMR.

Table 4-1. Issue Resolution Status Reports, Subissues, Technical Acceptance Criteria, and PMR Approach (Continued)

NRC Technical Acceptance Criteria	PMR Approach
Criterion T2 - The Performance Assessment results include a presentation of intermediate results that provide insight into the assessment (e.g., results of intermediate calculations of the behavior of individual barriers).	TSPA-SR provides performance analysis results for the total system and will include intermediate results for the components of the system.
Code Design and Data Flow	
Criterion T1 - The flow of information (input and output) between the various modules is clearly described.	TSPA-SR provides a description of information flow between component models including couplings between information and data, conceptual and process-level models, and abstracted models.
Criterion T2 - Supporting documentation (e.g., user's manuals, design documents) clearly describes code structure and relationships between modules.	TSPA-SR describes the TSPA code and provides a reference to supporting documentation such as the user's guide.
SUBISSUE 2 – Total System Performance Assessment Methodology: Scenario Analysis	
Identification of an Initial Set of Processes and Events Data	
Criterion T1 - DOE has identified a comprehensive list of processes and events that: (1) are present or might occur in the Yucca Mountain region and (2) includes those processes and events that have the potential to influence repository performance.	Section 1.6 of this PMR describes the FEP in this PMR. The AMR supporting this section (CRWMS M&O 2000s) provides a list of the processes and events applicable to this PMR. The AMR provides a description of the screening arguments and dispositions for the FEPs and has been thoroughly reviewed by subject matter experts. In addition, the AMR describes the development of the FEPs database, including a description of the FEPs process in sufficient detail to demonstrate the comprehensiveness of the database.
Classification of Processes and Events	
Criterion T1 - DOE has provided adequate documentation identifying how its initial list of processes and events has been grouped into categories.	Section 1.6 of this PMR describes the FEP in this PMR. The AMR supporting this section (CRWMS M&O 2000s) provides documentation and justification for screening arguments and dispositions. Documentation is maintained of all mapping of FEPs into primary and secondary categories. For comprehensiveness, traceability is maintained from the secondary to the related primary FEPs. The AMR also describes the development of the FEPs database, including identifying and classifying relevant FEPs.
Criterion T2 - Categorization of processes and events is compatible with the use of categories during the screening of processes and events.	Section 1.6 of this PMR describes the FEP in this PMR. The AMR supporting this section, (CRWMS M&O 2000s), provides documentation and justification for screening arguments and dispositions. Documentation is maintained of all mapping of FEPs into primary and secondary categories. For comprehensiveness, traceability is maintained from the secondary to the related primary FEPs. The AMR also describes the development of the FEPs database, including identifying and classifying relevant FEPs.

Table 4-1. Issue Resolution Status Reports, Subissues, Technical Acceptance Criteria, and PMR Approach (Continued)

NRC Technical Acceptance Criteria	PMR Approach
Screening of Presses and Events	
Criterion T1 - Categories of processes and events that are not credible for the Yucca Mountain repository because of waste characteristics, repository design, or site characteristics are identified and sufficient justification is provided for DOE's conclusions.	Section 1.6 of this PMR describes the FEP in this PMR. The AMR supporting this section (CRWMS M&O 2000s) provides documentation and justification for screening arguments and TSPA dispositions. Documentation includes a statement of the screening decision for each FEP. Justification is provided for each excluded FEP including the criterion on which it was excluded and the technical basis for the screening argument.
Criterion T2 - The probability assigned to each category of processes and events is consistent with site information, well documented, and appropriately considers uncertainty.	Section 1.6 of this PMR describes the FEP in this PMR. The AMR supporting this section (CRWMS M&O 2000s) provides documentation and justification for screening arguments and dispositions. Probability estimates for FEPs are based on technical analysis of the past frequency of similar events consistent with site information, well documented, and appropriately considers uncertainty.
Criterion T3 - DOE has demonstrated that processes and events screened from the Performance Assessment on the basis of their probability of occurrence, have a probability of less than one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 10,000 years.	Section 1.6 of this PMR describes the FEP in this PMR. The AMR supporting this section (CRWMS M&O 2000s) provides documentation and justification for screening arguments and TSPA dispositions. Justification is provided for each excluded FEP including the criterion on which it was excluded and the technical basis for the screening argument. For excluded FEPs, documentation includes the criterion on which it was excluded and the technical basis for the screening argument. The probability assigned to FEPs may be one of the screening criteria. FEPs may be excluded only if they can be shown to have a probability of occurrence of less than 10^{-8} /year.
Criterion 4 - DOE has demonstrated that categories of processes and events omitted from the Performance Assessment on the basis that their omission would not significantly change the calculated expected annual dose, do not significantly change the calculated expected annual dose.	Section 1.6 of this PMR describes the FEP in this PMR. The AMR supporting this section (CRWMS M&O 2000s) provides documentation and justification for screening arguments and TSPA dispositions. For omitted categories, documentation includes the criterion on which it was excluded and the technical basis for the screening argument.
Formation of Scenarios	
Criterion 1 - DOE has provided adequate documentation identifying: (i) whether processes and events have been addressed through consequence model abstraction or scenario analysis and (ii) how the remaining categories of processes and events have been combined into scenario classes.	Section 1.6 of this PMR describes the FEP in this PMR. The AMR supporting this section (CRWMS M&O 2000s) provides documentation and justification for screening arguments and TSPA dispositions. FEPs that have not been excluded are identified as either expected FEPs or disruptive FEPs. Expected FEPs will be included in the TSPA-SR nominal scenario, which is simulated by the base case model described in the TSPA-SR documentation. Disruptive scenarios are constructed from expected FEPs and combinations of disruptive FEPs.
Criterion 2 - The set of scenario classes is mutually exclusive and complete.	Section 1.6 of this PMR describes the FEP in this PMR. The AMR supporting this section (CRWMS M&O 2000s) provides documentation and justification for screening arguments and TSPA dispositions. In addition, the AMR describes the development of the FEPs database including a description of the construction and screening of scenarios.

Table 4-1. Issue Resolution Status Reports, Subissues, Technical Acceptance Criteria, and PMR Approach (Continued)

NRC Technical Acceptance Criteria	PMR Approach
Screening of Scenario Classes	
Criterion 1 - Scenario classes that are not credible for the Yucca Mountain repository because of waste characteristics, repository design, or site characteristics - individually or in combination - are identified and sufficient justification is provided for DOE's conclusions.	The TSPA provides justification for screening arguments and TSPA disposition. Scenarios are screened using the same regulatory, probability, and consequence criteria used for screening individual FEPs. Documentation of this process includes identification of any scenarios that have been screened from the analysis and the technical basis for that screening decision.
Criterion 2 - The probability assigned to each scenario class is consistent with site information, well documented, and appropriately considers uncertainty.	The TSPA provides justification for screening arguments and TSPA disposition. Probability estimates for scenario classes are based on analyses similar to probabilities assigned for individual FEPs.
Criterion 3 - Scenario classes that combine categories of processes and events may be screened from the Performance Assessment on the basis of their probability of occurrence, provided: (i) the probability used for screening the scenario class is defined from combinations of initiating processes and events and (ii) DOE has demonstrated that they have a probability of less than one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 10,000 years.	The TSPA provides justification for excluding scenario classes. The probability assigned to scenario classes is one of the screening criteria. Scenario classes may be excluded from the TSPA only if they can be shown to have a probability of occurrence of less than 10^{-8} /year. Justification is provided for each excluded scenario class, including the criterion on which it was excluded and the technical basis for the screening argument. In addition, the AMR describes the development of the FEPs database including a description of screening and specifying scenarios for TSPA analysis.
Criterion 4 - Scenario classes may be omitted from the Performance Assessment on the basis that their omission would not significantly change the calculated expected annual dose, provided DOE has demonstrated that excluded categories of processes and events would not significantly change the calculated expected annual dose.	The TSPA provides justification for excluding scenario classes. For excluded scenario classes, documentation includes the criterion on which it was excluded and the technical basis for the screening argument. In addition, the AMR describes the development of the FEPs database including a description of screening and specifying scenarios for TSPA analysis.
SUBISSUE 3 – Total System Performance Analysis Methodology: Model Abstraction	
Engineered Barrier Degradation	
<p>Criterion T1 - Data and Model Justification</p> <p>Sufficient data (field, laboratory or natural analog data) are available to adequately define relevant parameters and conceptual models necessary for developing the waste package corrosion abstraction in TSPA. Where adequate data do not exist, other information sources such as expert elicitation have been appropriately incorporated into the TSPA.</p>	<p>The TSPA model requires estimates of corrosion and threshold potentials, both of which are determined through electrochemical testing. Thus far, cyclic polarization has been done in a wide variety of repository-relevant test solutions, including simulated dilute water, simulated concentrated water, simulated acidic concentrated water, simulated cement-modified water, simulated saturated water, and basic saturated water. The cyclic polarization tests are now being conducted in these media with artificial crevices. Experiments have been performed to quantify the extent that pH can be lowered inside crevices, formed between the Alloy 22 waste package outer barrier and the 316NG stainless steel structural material. The TSPA model also requires estimates of general corrosion rates. Testing in the Long-Term Corrosion Test Facility is continuing. Two-year test data has become available and is included in this PMR. These two-year test data are an integral part of the WAPDEG simulation (Sections 3.1.5 and 3.2).</p>

Table 4-1. Issue Resolution Status Reports, Subissues, Technical Acceptance Criteria, and PMR Approach (Continued)

NRC Technical Acceptance Criteria	PMR Approach
<p>Criterion T2 - Data Uncertainty</p> <p>Parameter values, assumed ranges, probability distributions, and bounding assumptions used in the waste package corrosion abstraction, such as the critical RH, material properties, pH, and chloride concentration are technically defensible and reasonably account for uncertainties and variabilities.</p>	<p>Model abstractions for various corrosion modes include the aspects of this criterion and documented in the supporting AMRs and Section 3-2 of this PMR.</p>
<p>Criterion T3 - Model Uncertainty</p> <p>Alternative modeling approaches consistent with available data and current scientific understanding are investigated and results and limitations appropriately factored into the waste package corrosion abstraction.</p>	<p>Where possible, alternative models are considered. For example, consider methods A and B in the SCC model. Method A is based upon the concept of a threshold stress intensity factor. Method B is based upon the slip dissolution or film rupture model used in the boiling water reactor industry. Both are accounted for in the PMR and TSPA calculation. Also consider methods A and B in the localized corrosion model. Method A is based upon the concept of exceeding a threshold electrochemical potential for the initiation of localized corrosion (crevice corrosion). Method B is based upon the concept of exceeding a threshold temperature of the initiation of localized corrosion (crevice corrosion).</p>
<p>Criterion T4 - Model Support</p> <p>Waste package corrosion abstraction output is justified through comparison to output of detailed process models or empirical observations (laboratory testings, natural analogs, or both).</p>	<p>Output from WAPDEG is being compared to experimental measurements used as the basis of calculations to verify that correct and reasonable results are obtained.</p>
<p>Criterion T5 - Integration</p> <p>Important design features, physical phenomena and couplings, and consistent and appropriate assumptions are incorporated into the waste package corrosion abstraction.</p>	<p>The waste package degradation model assumes conservative environmental and exposure conditions. WAPDEG code incorporates bounding conditions for the various corrosion modes that envelop effects of design features and couplings.</p>
Mechanical Disruption of Engineered Barrier	
<p>Criterion T4 - Model Support</p> <p>Mechanical disruption of the engineered barriers abstraction output is justified through comparison to output of detailed process models or empirical observations (laboratory testing, natural analogs, or both).</p>	<p>Abstraction of mechanical failure of waste package due to disruptive events is not in the scope of this PMR. However, will be addressed in addressed in the Disruptive Events PMR.</p>

Table 4-1. Issue Resolution Status Reports, Subissues, Technical Acceptance Criteria, and PMR Approach (Continued)

NRC Technical Acceptance Criteria	PMR Approach
<p>Criterion T5 - Integration</p> <p>Important design features, physical phenomena and couplings, and consistent and appropriate assumptions are incorporated into the mechanical disruption of the engineered barriers abstraction.</p>	<p>Abstraction of mechanical failure of waste package due to disruptive events is not in the scope of this PMR. However, will be addressed in the Disruptive Events PMR.</p>
Quantity and Chemistry of Water Contacting Waste Packages and Waste Forms	
<p>Criterion T1 - Sufficient data (field, laboratory, or natural analog data) are available to adequately define relevant parameters and conceptual models necessary for developing the quantity and chemistry of water contacting waste packages and waste forms abstraction in a TSPA. Where adequate data do not exist, other information sources such as expert elicitation have been appropriately incorporated into the TSPA.</p>	<p>Laboratory experiments have been conducted to determine the type of waters that may contact the waste package and the drip shield. Evaporative concentration of these waters have been performed to determine bounding concentrations of the solution that is likely to form on the surfaces of the waste package and the drip shield. The results of these studies were documented in an AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000a) and in Section 3.1.3. This information has been abstracted for use in the integrated model in WAPDEG. The waste form aspects of this criterion are addressed in the Waste Form PMR. No expert elicitation was used.</p>
<p>Criterion T2 - Parameter values, assumed ranges, probability distributions, and bounding assumptions used in the quantity and chemistry of water contacting waste packages and waste forms abstraction, such as the pH, carbonate concentration, chloride concentration, and amount of water flowing in and out of the breached waste package, are technically defensible and reasonably account for uncertainties and variability.</p>	<p>The parameters used for defining the chemistry of water contacting the waste packages are based on bounding assumptions. The threshold humidity required for maintaining an aqueous film on the surface deposits (the deliquescence point of NaNO_3) formed the bounding condition for the relative humidity. The bounding chemistry was assumed to be that expected from the evaporative concentration of the expected Yucca Mountain waters. (CRWMS M&O 2000a, PMR Section 3.1.3). The expected quantity of water contacting the waste package is not included in the AMR as the corrosion models are not affected by this parameter. The waste form aspects of this criterion are addressed in the Waste Form PMR.</p>
<p>Criterion T3 - Alternative modeling approaches consistent with available data and current scientific understanding are investigated and results and limitations appropriately factored into the quantity and chemistry of water contacting waste packages and waste forms abstraction.</p>	<p>The chemistry of the waters contacting the waste packages was bounded by the assumptions of evaporative concentration of the water and therefore alternative models are not included in the AMR. Alternative models based on this bounding chemistry for the various degradation modes for the waste package and the drip shield were evaluated in each of the specific AMRs and also briefly discussed in Section 3.1.11 of this PMR. The waste form aspects of this criterion are addressed in the Waste Form PMR.</p>
<p>Criterion T4 - Output of quantity and chemistry of water contacting waste packages and waste forms abstraction are supported by comparison to output of detailed process models or empirical observations (laboratory testing, natural analogs, or both).</p>	<p>Chemistry of the contacting water was determined by laboratory testing. No process model was developed for this data but the results of this testing were used for developing corrosion test data and process models for material degradation. The quantity of water contacting the waste package was not addressed as the degradation models assume bounding chemistries and are independent of the quantity. The waste form aspects of this criterion are addressed in the Waste Form PMR.</p>

Table 4-1. Issue Resolution Status Reports, Subissues, Technical Acceptance Criteria, and PMR Approach (Continued)

NRC Technical Acceptance Criteria	PMR Approach
Criterion T5 - Important design features, physical phenomena and couplings, and consistent and appropriate assumptions are incorporated into the quantity and chemistry of water contacting waste packages and waste forms abstraction.	The analysis for the environment on the surface of the waste package is bounding and is based on laboratory testing and is documented in the AMR (CRWMS M&O 2000a) does not take into account the benefits of the design features such as the drip shield. This is to provide a conservative approach. The quantity of the water contacting the waste package is not addressed in the PMR.
IRSR: REPOSITORY DESIGN AND THERMAL-MECHANICAL EFFECTS, REV. 2	
Subissue 3 – Thermal-Mechanical Effects on Underground Facility design and Performance	
Component 2: Effects of Seismically Induced Rockfall on Waste Package	
Criterion 1 - Approved quality assurance and control procedures and standards are applied to collection, development, and documentation of data, methods, models, and codes.	This PMR and its supporting AMRs were developed in accordance with project procedures for documenting data, analyses, models, and/or computer codes and preparing and reviewing technical reports (see Section 1.4).
Criterion 2 - If used, expert elicitation is conducted and documented in accordance with the guidance in NUREG-1563 or other acceptable approaches.	No expert elicitation results or data have been used in preparation of this PMR.
Criterion 5 - The analytical model used in the estimation of impact load due to rockfall on the waste package is: (I) based on reasonable assumptions and site data; (ii) consistent with the underground facility (emplacement drift geometry and backfill) and waste package design; and (iii) defensible with respect to providing realistic or bounding estimates of impact loads and stresses.	The rockfall impact analysis for waste package is based on reasonable assumptions on site data and on engineered barrier system design. The analyses does not include the presence of backfill. A separate analyses for drip shield has also been performed. The analyses use bounding assumptions with respect to rock size distribution.

4.2.1.1 Container Life and Source Term Issue Resolution Status Report General Criteria

In addition to the specific acceptance criteria addressed in Table 4-1, the CLST IRSR includes a set of generic acceptance criteria dealing with expert elicitation and all aspects of data collection, qualification, verification, documentation of uncertainties and limitations in both data and process models. All these general acceptance criteria fall into two NRC's programmatic criteria for QA and the use of expert elicitation. These programmatic criteria apply to all subissues, thus, they are addressed generically for all subissues.

The acceptance criteria for QA addresses DOE's implementation of an adequate QA program. The waste package PMR and supporting AMRs were developed in accordance with project procedures for documenting data, analyses, models, and/or computer codes and preparing and reviewing technical reports (see Section 1.4). The programmatic criterion for expert elicitation specifies that DOE conduct expert elicitation in accordance with NUREG-1563 (Kotra et al. 1996) or other acceptable approaches. The waste package PMR addresses the NRC's programmatic criteria for QA. No expert elicitation results or data have been used in preparation of this PMR.

4.2.1.2 Container Life and Source Term Issue Resolution Status Report Subissue 1

Subissue 1 considers failure of outer and inner overpacks as a result of various corrosion processes affecting both waste package materials, such as dry-air oxidation, humid-air and uniform aqueous corrosion, localized corrosion, microbiologically influenced corrosion, SCC, and HIC. Models for these corrosion processes have been developed and incorporated into the waste package degradation model and are discussed in various parts of the waste package PMR. Acceptance criteria related to this subissue and the PMR approach that address the acceptance criteria are provided in Table 4-1.

4.2.1.3 Container Life and Source Term Issue Resolution Status Report Subissue 2

Subissue 2 (NRC 1999a, Sections 4.2, 5.2) examines long-term degradation of mechanical properties of container materials as a result of prolonged exposures of the waste packages (thousands of years) at elevated temperatures. Mechanical failure due to phase instability of waste package materials is highly dependent on material chemical composition and processing history. Examples of material instability that can degrade mechanical properties include segregation of metalloid elements such as phosphorus and sulfur, precipitation of carbides of intermetallic phases, and long-range ordering. Fabrication defects that may lead to early failure of container materials are also the subject of this subissue, as well as the effects of damage due to disruptive events, such as seismicity, faulting, and igneous activity.

Acceptance criteria related to this subissue and the PMR approach that addresses the acceptance criteria are provided in Table 4-1.

4.2.1.4 Container Life and Source Term Subissue 5

Subissue 5 addresses the effects of in-package criticality on waste package and engineered barrier subsystem performance. In-package criticality is not addressed in this PMR. However,

the related acceptance criteria are addressed in DOE's Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 1998) and its supporting references.

4.2.1.5 Container Life and Source Term Issue Resolution Status Report Subissue 6

Subissue 6 addresses performance of the alternative EBS design features such as the drip shield and backfill. The concerns addressed by the NRC in the IRSR relate to the drip shield design to be fabricated from titanium alloys. These materials can suffer from thermal embrittlement. Both temper embrittlement of steels and thermal embrittlement of titanium alloys occur as a result of a thermally activated redistribution of barely soluble impurities from grain interiors to grain boundaries. Titanium alloys have been long recognized for being highly resistant to corrosion as a result of their ability to form a protective oxide film when in contact. The pH and chloride concentrations have been found to have a relatively minor influence on the passive dissolution rate of some titanium alloys, although data are limited in this area. A review of the literature indicates that some of titanium alloys are susceptible to crevice corrosion. Insufficient experimental data are available for titanium-palladium alloys such as Titanium Grade 7 in relevant environments to state with absolute certainty whether or not these materials will undergo crevice corrosion over a period of 10,000 years. It is generally accepted in the material science community that the addition of palladium to titanium does improve the crevice corrosion resistance of such materials. However, given the lack of data for titanium-palladium alloys, further investigation of crevice corrosion is warranted (NRC 1999a).

Environmentally assisted cracking of titanium-palladium alloys has not been extensively investigated. Many titanium alloys are susceptible to environmentally assisted cracking due to hydrogen embrittlement associated with the precipitation of hydrides ahead of the crack tip. However, the titanium-palladium alloys may be highly resistant to environmentally assisted cracking, especially those that have low equivalent oxygen content. The addition of palladium to titanium has also been thought to enhance environmentally assisted cracking resistance because hydrogen evolution as H₂ would preferentially take place at Pd-rich sites, thereby decreasing the available atomic hydrogen that could be absorbed into the titanium lattice. It is unclear if this mechanism is operable. Thus, the NRC notes in the CLST IRSR that further DOE investigation of the environmentally assisted cracking behavior of titanium-palladium alloys is needed, with particular emphasis on methodologies that would enable monitoring and measurement of slow crack propagation rates (NRC 1999a).

The performance modeling of the drip shield is addressed in this PMR and the effects and performance of the backfill are addressed in the PMR on EBS. Acceptance criteria related to this subissue and the PMR approach that addresses the acceptance criteria are provided in Table 4-1.

4.2.2 Total System Performance Assessment and Integration

The overall goal of the TSPA Integration KTI (NRC 2000) is to delineate staff's systematic approach for determining compliance with an overall system performance objective. The objective of this KTI is to describe an acceptable methodology for conducting performance assessments of repository performance and using these assessments to demonstrate compliance with the overall performance objective and requirements for multiple barriers. The TSPA

Integration IRSR identifies four subissues and associated acceptance criteria deemed important to the resolution of this KTI:

1. System Description and Demonstration of Multiple Barriers
2. TSPA Methodology: Scenario Analysis
3. TSPA Methodology: Model Abstraction
4. Demonstration of the Overall Performance Objective.

Subissues 1, 2, and 3 are related to the waste package PMR. The acceptance criteria for each subissue address fundamental elements of the DOE's TSPA model for the Yucca Mountain site. The following paragraphs address each of the subissues. Also, related acceptance criteria applicable to the waste package PMR are discussed in Table 4-1, along with the approach to addressing the criteria. Programmatic acceptance criteria related to the QA and expert elicitation are addressed generically in Section 4.2.1.1 and are not repeated here or in Table 4-1.

4.2.2.1 Subissue 1, System Description and Demonstration of Multiple Barriers

This subissue relates to the transparency and traceability of the analysis that allows for an adequate understanding of DOE's approach and results of the TSPA. Sufficient transparency and traceability of the TSPA analyses and results will convince the NRC that compliance with regulatory criteria will be achieved. The following aspects of transparency and traceability are addressed under this subissue: TSPA document style, structure, and organization FEPs identification and screening; abstraction methodology; data use and validity; assessment results; and code design, data flow, and supporting documentation. Acceptance criteria pertaining to these aspects of the transparency and traceability and the PMR approach in addressing the acceptance criteria are provided in Table 4-1.

4.2.2.2 Subissue 2, Total System Performance Assessment Methodology: Scenario Analysis

This subissue focuses on the attributes of an acceptable methodology for identifying, screening, and selecting FEPs for inclusion in the TSPA. FEPs that could effect future system performance are used to formulate scenarios. This includes construction of scenario classes, assignment of probabilities to scenario classes, and their incorporation into the TSPA. This is a key factor in ensuring the completeness of the TSPA. A systematic method was applied to identify and screen FEPs for waste package degradation. A description of this method is provided under Section 1.6. The results of the FEPs screening analyses are also summarized in Table 1-2.

This subissue includes five elements related to the scenario analysis: identification of initial set of processes and events, classification of processes and events, screening of processes and events, formation of scenarios, and screening of scenario classes. Acceptance criteria for these elements and the PMR approach in addressing the acceptance criteria are provided in Table 4-1.

4.2.2.3 Subissue 3, Total System Performance Assessment Methodology: Model Abstraction

This subissue focuses on the information and technical approaches needed to develop defensible model abstractions and their integration into TSPA. The waste package degradation model

addresses several elements of this subissue that are related to the engineered barrier degradation, mechanical disruption of engineered barriers, and quantity and chemistry of water contacting waste packages and waste forms. Some of the acceptance criteria for elements listed above that are directly related to the waste package PMR and the PMR approach in addressing the acceptance criteria are provided in Table 4-1.

4.2.3 Repository Design and Thermal-Mechanical Effects

The primary focus of the repository design and thermal-mechanical effects KTI is the review of design, construction, and operation of the geologic repository operations area with respect to the preclosure and postclosure performance objectives, taking into consideration long-term thermal-mechanical processes. Consideration of the time-dependent thermal-mechanical coupled response of a jointed rock mass is central to potential repository design and necessary for performance assessment at the Yucca Mountain site. Consequently, that is the focus of the preclosure and postclosure elements of this KTI (NRC 1999b, Section 2.1).

The repository design and thermal-mechanical effects KTI identifies four subissues and their associated components and acceptance criteria. Only Subissue 3, Thermal-mechanical Effects on Underground Facility Design and Performance, and its major component regarding effect of seismically induced rockfall on waste package performance is directly related to this PMR. Table 4-1 addresses the acceptance criterion for rockfall effects and the waste package PMR approach.

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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Performance of a potential monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain for high-level radioactive waste depends on both the natural barrier system and the engineered barrier system and on their interactions. As a major component of the engineered barrier system, the waste package contributes to isolation of high-level radioactive waste during the postclosure period and reduces the uncertainties associated with the performance of the repository. It is expected that the waste package protected by a drip shield will be exposed to processes and conditions in the repository environment that will eventually have an impact on its postclosure performance. Some of the important conditions contributing to waste package degradation include: humidity and temperature in the emplacement drift, chemistry of the water dripping onto the waste package, and corrosion properties of the waste package outer barrier. As part of the performance-based risk-informed evaluation of postclosure repository performance, it is important to understand and account for degradation processes that will impact the waste package lifetime. This document describes how waste package and drip shield degradation processes are modeled, analyzed, and combined into an overall model; the results from the overall model are incorporated into the assessment of the postclosure repository total system performance. This Process Model Report also addresses Key Technical Issues and Issue Resolution Status Reports of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and DOE's approach to the resolution of the issues. In addition, issues on repository performance raised by other agencies such as Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board are addressed.

A variety of anticipated modes of waste package degradation under the most important environmental conditions including thermal, hydrological, and geochemical conditions have been considered and analyzed as part of an integrated degradation process model. The waste package degradation process model consists of individual process models or analyses and associated abstraction models. These models address the environment on the degradation of the waste package and drip shield and consider various degradation modes including early material failure due to manufacturing and fabrication defects, phase stability and aging, general corrosion, localized corrosion, stress corrosion cracking (SCC), and hydrogen induced cracking (HIC). A generic integrated model was constructed based on abstracted results from individual component models. This model is then applied to the waste package and drip shield materials to determine their overall performance. A detailed discussion of the waste package and drip shield degradation processes within the near field environment and the analytical results from the process-level models are documented in the individual supporting Analysis Model Report. Following is a list of the process-level models:

- Environment on the Surfaces of Drip Shield and Waste Package Outer Barrier
- Mechanisms for Early Failures
- Aging and Phase Stability of Waste Package Outer Barrier
- General Corrosion and Localized Corrosion of Waste Package Outer Barrier
- General Corrosion and Localized Corrosion of Drip Shield

- SCC of the Drip Shield, the Waste Package Outer Barrier and the Stainless Steel Structural Material
- HIC of Drip Shield
- Degradation of Stainless Steel Structural Material.

Abstraction of Models—Abstraction results from the detailed process-level models listed above are used as input to the integrated waste package degradation code (WAPDEG) model for evaluation of the performance of the waste package outer barrier and drip shield materials. These abstractions include thresholds for corrosion initiation and degradation rate with the associated uncertainty and variability. The WAPDEG analysis results are further abstracted as input to the Total System Performance Assessment-Site Recommendation analysis. The abstractions include the time-histories of waste package failures including the number of penetrations on waste packages and the size distribution of penetration openings including their associated uncertainties. The Total System Performance Assessment-Site Recommendation uses the results of the abstraction and synthesis of waste package degradation information in performance assessment to determine waste package lifetime and potential impact on long-term repository performance.

Analysis Results—Abstracted results from the process models described above, along with abstracted results for the drift environment were used as input in the integrated waste package degradation model, WAPDEG. The WAPDEG model is used for waste package and drip shield degradation analysis and to determine the failure time. This integrated model is based on a stochastic simulation approach and provides a description of waste package and drip shield degradation as a function of time and repository location for specific design and thermal-hydrologic modeling assumptions. Each WAPDEG realization corresponds to a complete WAPDEG run for a given number of waste packages. Accordingly, the WAPDEG analysis outputs are reported as a group of “curves” representing the potential range of the output parameters. The nominal case analysis for waste package and drip shield degradation constitutes 100 realizations of WAPDEG simulation that uses 100 input vectors for uncertain corrosion model parameters and simulation parameters that were sampled from their respective ranges.

Except for the relative humidity (RH) threshold for corrosion initiation, the temperature and RH do not affect waste package and drip shield degradation. For this reason, representative sets of temperature and RH histories were used in the analysis. In addition, the threshold for localized corrosion initiation of the drip shield and waste package outer barrier requires the presence of drips and is much higher than the conditions expected in the repository. Therefore, localized corrosion is not expected. The analysis assumed waste package failure when the Alloy 22 outer barrier has breached. The stainless steel inner structural shell of waste package was not considered in the analysis, as this component is not viewed as a corrosion barrier.

The waste package and drip shield degradation analyses have shown that based on the current corrosion model abstractions and assumptions presented in this Process Model Report, both the drip shields and waste packages do not fail within the regulatory time period (10,000 years). In particular, the waste package service lifetime is predicted to extend beyond the regulatory time period (failure beginning at about 11,000 years). The materials selected for the drip shield

(Titanium Grade 7, an analog of Titanium Grade 16, which has been used for experiments) and the waste package outer barrier (Alloy 22) are highly corrosion resistant and, under the repository exposure conditions, are expected to be immune to the degradation processes that, if initiated, could lead to failure in a shorter time period. Those degradation modes are localized corrosion (pitting and crevice corrosion), SCC, and HIC (applicable to the drip shield only). Both the drip shield and waste package degrade by general corrosion at very low passive dissolution rates. The current experimental data and detailed process-level analyses, upon which the model abstractions incorporated in the WAPDEG analysis are based, have also indicated that the candidate materials would not be subject to those rapidly penetrating corrosion modes under the expected repository conditions, except for possibly the closure-lid welds of the waste package, if SCC were to occur there. To preclude SCC, weld stress mitigation will be implemented on a dual-lid waste package closure weld design.

The estimated long lifetime of the waste packages in the current analysis is attributed mostly to 1) the depth of the stress mitigation in the dual-closure-lid welds and 2) the very low general-corrosion rate of the closure-lid welds, which requires a very long time to corrode away the compressive stress zones, thus providing a very long delay time before initiating SCC crack growth.

This document may be affected by technical product input information that requires confirmation. Any changes to the document that may occur as a result of completing the confirmation activities will be reflected in subsequent revisions. The status of the technical product input information quality may be confirmed by review of the Document Input Reference System (DIRS) database.

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